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Abstract 
I present and defend an account of how it is that we acquire knowledge 
from what others tell us and an account of what it is for us to understand 
the utterances of others that can sustain this epistemology. 
In Chapters 1 & 2 I present my account of how it is that we can acquire 
knowledge from others.  I say that a speaker makes available irreducibly 
testimonial knowledge to their audience by voicing knowledge.  Testimonial 
knowledge is a distinctive kind of knowledge that one can get by way of 
transmission from a knowledgable source.  One voices knowledge that p 
when knowledge that p (one’s own, or another’s) contributes in the 
required way in a causal explanation of why one produced one’s 
utterance.  I defend the claim that, so long as a speaker in fact voices 
knowledge that p, then their audience can come to know that p by 
believing the speaker, regardless of what reasons they initially had to 
think that the speaker uttered truth or falsity. 
In Chapter 3 I show that the causal explanation of a speaker’s linguistic 
behaviour will also appeal to expectations that the speaker has of their 
audience; expectations that they will have understood what speaker has 
done in so speaking.  Understanding utterances is conceived of in terms 
of audiences meeting these expectations, by recognising what it is that 
the speaker thereby means to be doing.  Chapter 4 contains a defence of 
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a proposal provided by Ian Rumfitt, which conceives of such 
understanding as a state of possessing capacities to make inferences 
specific to the kinds of acts that speakers’ (mean to) perform with their 
utterances.  I end, in Chapter 5, by applying this picture of 
understanding to some historic debates in which the notion has featured, 
highlighting its explanatory advantages over some rivals. 
 4
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Introduction 
The main focus of this dissertation is on the role that our understanding 
the utterances of others has to play in enabling the transmission of 
knowledge.  Taking a methodological cue from some remarks made by 
David Lewis, I’ll be adopting the policy that, in order to say what 
understanding is, we may first ask what understanding does, and then 
find something that does that.   And one of the notable things that 1
understanding does is enable us to acquire knowledge from what others 
say to us; if you make available testimonial knowledge that p, by uttering 
something, I cannot ordinarily hope to come by the knowledge that you 
have made available, without understanding your utterance.  Here I will 
present, and attempt to defend, an account of how it is that we acquire 
knowledge from what others tell us and an account of what it is for us to 
understand the utterances of others that can sustain this epistemology. 
One way that one can make available testimonial knowledge is by, in a 
sense, transmitting it to someone else by saying something that one 
knows to a suitably habituated audience.  In Chapter 1, I try to make the 
 In ‘General Semantics’, Lewis says, “in order to say what a meaning is, we may first 1
ask what a meaning does, and then find something that does that” (Lewis 1970, p. 
193) 
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case for the idea that, when we allow for a distinctive kind of testimonial 
knowledge of this kind, we should allow for the possibility that the 
epistemic status of what the audience comes to believe to be entirely 
dependent on the epistemic status of what the speaker gives voice to.  I 
show that views that allow for this kind of distinctively testimonial 
knowledge tend to assume that this cannot be all that determines when 
our believing others can result in the acquisition of testimonial 
knowledge.  I try to cast doubt on that assumption.   In Chapter 2, I’ll 
say how it is that I think such knowledge does get made available, and 
what one has to do to acquire it.  I defend the view we can make 
available this distinctively testimonial knowledge when we say something 
that we know to be true because we know it.  That is to say that, if one 
makes available knowledge that p by saying that p, one’s knowing that p 
will feature in the causal explanation of why one produced the utterance 
in which one said that.  In a rational reconstruction of the reasons that 
one has for speaking, one’s possessing the relevant knowledge will explain 
why one has the following belief: that if one’s audience hears one say that 
p to them, they will have heard the truth with respect to the topic at 
hand.  I want to suggest that, if a speaker gives voice to their knowledge 
that p in this way, their audience can come to know that p by believing 
the speaker, regardless of what reasons they initially had to think that the 
speaker uttered truth or falsity. 
A rational reconstruction of the reasons one has for speaking can also 
help elucidate how understanding sustains knowledge transmission.     It 
is to this that I turn in Chapter 3.  Rendering the speech-action of 
speakers rational requires attributing to them certain expectations that 
 12
they will have of their audiences: expectations concerning the audience’s 
capacity to recognise what sort of thing the speaker is doing in producing 
their utterance.  Speakers perform many acts in uttering something, but 
the least an audience must do is recognise one thing in particular that 
speaker means to be doing—something that J. L. Austin called the rhetic 
act performed.  Achieving such recognition is what is needed to meet the 
expectation of the speaker that enables the transmission of the knowledge 
that a speaker gives voice to.  In Chapter 4, I end up endorsing a recent 
proposal provided by Ian Rumfitt, in which one’s rhetic understanding of 
an utterance is constituted by a state of possessing a capacity to make 
inferences of specific kinds.  When the utterance is one in which the 
speaker performs an act of saying something—an act in which one 
typically tells someone something—one who achieves rhetic 
understanding of this utterance is able to infer that the world is some 
way from the hypothesis that the saying is true/false (and vice versa). 
That is, to meet the relevant expectation of the speaker, one must be 
capable of making these kinds of inferences with respect to the particular 
rhetic act the speaker performed with their utterance.  
Finally, in Chapter 5, I apply the picture we get from Rumfitt to a set of 
wider debates in which the relevant notion of understanding has a key 
role.  There is an approach to providing specifications of what speakers 
say, employed to explain their linguistic behaviour, that appeals to what 
those who understand utterances of sentences of a language know.  The 
most popular form that such an account takes is one that appeals to 
propositional knowledge of truth-conditions.  Such accounts are, in a 
fundamental respect, circular.  However, circularity is not necessarily 
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inimical to explanation.  I attempt to show that, though no less circular, 
an account of this kind that employs Rumfitt’s proposal does possess 
some explanatory advantages in comparison to these more popular 
versions of the approach. 
Before embarking on this, though, I will take this opportunity to fix a 
little more precisely the target notion of understanding that I’m chiefly 
concerned with.  ‘Understanding’, even as used in a distinctively 
linguistic context, is multiply ambiguous.  One ambiguity is between the 
sense which takes as its object a language—as in, “She understands 
French”, and one that takes as its object utterances of sentences of a 
language.  The sense of ‘understands’ of the first kind picks out a 
particular kind of capacity.  To attribute to a subject understanding of 
this first kind is (at least) to attribute the capacity to understand 
particular utterances made with sentences of that language.  ‘Linguistic 
competence’ is a phrase that can be substituted for ‘understanding’ on 
this first disambiguation.   
So to understand a language is to possess a capacity to do something: 
namely, to understand utterances made with sentences of that language. 
The attribution of a capacity to understand a language provides some 
explanation of how a subject manages to understand some particular 
utterance of a sentence of that language.  Attributions of capacities can 
help explain why some particular events occur; there is some story—
maybe causal—to tell about why some actions are exercises of some 
capacity.  Where those exercises are non-defective, the result is a 
successfully doing of what one is capable of.  The sense of ‘understand’ 
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used in these kinds of attributions, therefore, pick out what is achieved 
by the exercise of a capacity to understand a language.  Let’s call this kind 
of understanding, ‘utterance understanding’.  What this thesis, in the 
end, is attempting to contribute to an answer to is the question: what do 
we achieve when we achieve utterance understanding? 
What is an utterance?  By ‘utterance’ I mean to be picking out a datable 
event with which some distinctively communicative act, or set of acts, is 
performed.  In the main, I will concentrate on, and talk in terms of, 
spoken utterances; in fact, I will narrow my focus further by looking at 
those utterances in which relational speech acts of saying, or asking, or 
ordering (etc.) something are performed by speakers vocalising sentences 
of a shared public language.  Nonetheless, in more general terms, I take 
utterances to be those actions with which acts of the kind just mentioned 
are performed.  Even though these are things that are typically done with 
sentences of a public language, they need not be.  To account for 
understanding of the kind I am interested in as it applies to 
communication more generally, then, we will have to allow for (at least) 
very closely related cognitive achievements with respect to those actions 
in which acts of saying, or asking, or ordering (etc.) something are 
performed, but when a sentence of a public language is not used.  (I am 
here trading on a distinction that can be drawn between ‘acts’ and 
‘actions’ that I will have reason to discuss at more length in Chapter 3, 
§III, and thereafter.  This is a distinction that Jennifer Hornsby makes 
between things done (acts) and the doing of those things (the actions); 
utterances are actions with which certain acts of stating, asking, ordering, 
etc. are done.)   
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I’ve just said that utterance understanding is that which is achieved by 
exercising one’s capacity that constitutes one’s linguistic competence.  I 
have implied that a non-defective exercise of such a capacity results in 
some kind of recognition of what a speaker has done, or means to have to 
done, in uttering something on the part of the one who possesses it. 
But one might worry that an exercise of that capacity—even if non-
defective—might not yield recognition of that kind, while nonetheless 
yielding something deserving the name ‘understanding’.   
There are a number of other senses of ‘understanding’ that should be 
separated from the target notion of utterance understanding; senses of 
‘understanding’ which might be thought to capture what is achieved by 
an exercise of one’s capacity to understanding a language, but fails to 
achieve the requisite level of recognition of what the speaker is doing. 
There is a notion of understanding some particular sentence-type, where 
one’s understanding a sentence-type does not entail that one understands 
what a speaker has done with that particular utterance of that sentence-
type.  For all that, it is not straightforwardly to be identified with one’s 
possession of linguistic competence.   This is brought out clearly in cases 2
where the sentence uttered by a speaker is ambiguous, and one cannot 
work out, from the surrounding context, which disambiguation is the 
 I take this distinction between understanding a sentence-type and (utterance) 2
understanding an utterance of that sentence-type to track a distinction that Guy 
Longworth makes between diﬀerent kinds of understanding that he identifies with 
respect to ‘meaning’ and ‘what is said’.  The target notion of ‘utterance understanding’ 
most closely resembles Longworth’s ‘state-understanding of what is said’, where that is 
identified as “understanding as a state entered though successful exercise of the ability” 
to discern what illocutionary act is performed by speakers on occasions. (Longworth 
2010, p. 4). 
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one that the speaker intends.  Indexicals, and more generally context 
sensitivity, bear this out too.  You say, “I’m bored”.  I don’t know who it 
is that is talking, but my understanding of the sentence-type that you 
made use of allows me to discern that the speaker of that sentence is 
bored, even though I don’t know who spoke.  Discerning so much is to 
not to achieve utterance understanding as I am using the notion.  What I 
have just described is that which is supplied by one’s linguistic 
competence, when the requisite background knowledge is absent. 
Absent that background knowledge, one falls short of utterance 
understanding, in that one fails to discern, in the requisite detail, what 
the speaker is doing in producing their utterance.  What detail of 
discernment is required is one of the issues that this thesis attempts to 
address. 
It is because of indexicality and ambiguity that Michael Dummett was 
lead to mark a distinction (which he first locates in G. E. Moore, drawn 
to his attention by some remarks by Gareth Evans (1982)) between what 
he called ‘occurrent understanding’ and ‘dispositional understanding’. 
The gloss that Dummett gave of the former is “that in which [the 
audience] may be said to understand a particular utterance”, and the 
latter is “that in which someone is said to understand a word, phrase or 
sentence, considered as a type” (Dummett 1993a p. 58).  For reasons that 
will become clear in Chapter 4, I’ve decided to not use Dummett’s 
phrasing, even though the gloss he gives of ‘occurrent understanding’ 
accurately describes the kind of understanding that I am interested in.  I 
avoid using ‘dispositional understanding’ because, in light of the gloss of 
it that Dummett provides, it seems to me to be ambiguous between that 
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which is secured by one’s linguistic competence that falls short of 
utterance understanding, and what one’s linguistic competence consists 
in with respect to individual sentences of the language that one 
understands. 
I hope the foregoing suﬃces to provisionally fix the topic.  As things 
progress I hope that it will come gradually into sharper focus.  I’ll now 
turn to the epistemology of testimony, which is my starting point in my 
investigation of utterance understanding.   
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Knowledge from Others 
1. 
Introduction 
It is commonly thought that, to avoid a pernicious form of scepticism, 
we must allow for there to be a distinctive kind of knowledge that we can 
acquire from what others tell us.  The distinctive kind of knowledge that 
I have in mind is what is normally thought of as knowledge that one can 
acquire, in some sense, by transmission from a knowledgeable source; that 
is, a kind of knowledge that one can only come by because someone who 
is knowledgable about the topic at hand has told one something that they 
know to be true.   In allowing for this kind of knowledge we allow for 3
the possibility of coming to know things from others when we are not in 
a position to establish those things for ourselves.  The thought is that we 
must allow for this, or else we cannot count as knowing very much of 
what we ordinarily take ourselves to know.   
In its essentials, I think a view like this has got to be correct.  However, it 
seems to me that views that allow for knowledge transmission tend not to 
 I am temporarily suppressing a complication here.  Really, if it to be plausible that 3
knowledge can transmit in the relevant sense, it has got be the case that either the 
speaker is knowledgeable about what they are talking about, or someone in their 
testimonial chain is.  Without this qualification, the thought comes up against 
examples that have been pressed by Jennifer Lackey.  I will say more about this when I 
come to set out my own account in Chapter 2 (see, in particular § IV. b.).
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follow the consequences of this allowance where it leads.  For once we 
allow for the distinctive testimonial knowledge of the kind I mentioned, 
we should take seriously the idea that the epistemic status of the belief an 
audience acquires on believing a speaker is entirely dependent on the 
epistemic status of what the speaker has given voice to in speaking.  If 
that is right, then this dependence renders the initial grounds one had for 
believing that the speaker uttered truth, or falsity, epistemically inert.  It 
is this consequence that I think is not always fully appreciated. 
This chapter is dedicated to motivating this way of conceiving of the 
structure of the epistemic dependencies that are operative in ordinary 
testimonial situations.  I’ll try to make plausible the idea that it is an 
optional extra to one’s view that one's accessing the knowledge that 
others can make available in speaking knowledgeably requires that one 
have suﬃciently epistemically supported beliefs that the speaker has 
uttered truth.   
Reductionist views deny that others can provide us with a distinctive kind 
of knowledge when they tell us things.  In §II, by employing an 
argument given by Michael Dummett, I’ll set out one respect in which I 
think that reductionist views engender a kind of scepticism.  In §III, I’ll 
set out what I take to be the central commitments of views that stand in 
opposition to reductionism—that is, non-reductionist views.  Views of 
this kind tend to endorse what I’ll call the ‘enabling principle’.  That 
principle says, roughly, that one must have suﬃcient epistemic support 
for believing that the speaker uttered truth, for one to come by 
knowledge that things are as the speaker says them to be.  In the context 
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of non-reductionism, this is a principle that, I think, has very often been 
assumed to hold, but rarely argued for.   My aim is to call this principle 
into question.   
I end the chapter with a discussion of a view that can be read into some 
of the things that John McDowell has said.  It is a view which aﬃrms the 
structure of epistemic dependencies that I want to suggest occurs in 
testimonial situations.  It can therefore be thought of providing one 
possible, more general, epistemological grounding for the kind of view 
that I want to eventually defend.  That view is one according to which 
the epistemic status of the belief an audience acquires on believing a 
speaker is entirely dependent on the epistemic status of what the speaker 
has given voice to in speaking.  This is a view that denies that there is any 
enabling principle that places substantive constraints on when our 
believing that a speaker has uttered truth can yield knowledge of that 
things are as the speaker says them to be (when, that is, they speak 
knowledgeably). 
II. 
Reductionism 
To be reductionist in the epistemology of testimony is to take what 
others tell us to be, epistemically speaking, unremarkable.  The epistemic 
significance of others’ utterances is dependent on their status as evidence 
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for things being as they are said to be.   The epistemic worth that others’ 4
utterances possess, then, would depend on what features they have that 
could provide support for the conclusion that things are as the speaker 
says that they are.  Typically, this will involve conceiving of the relevant 
features as serving as the basis of formulating premises in inductive, or 
abductive, arguments to the truth of what is being claimed by the 
speaker.  On this view, coming by knowledge from what others say to 
one is like coming by knowledge in any other way in which one collects 
evidence.  One might have good grounds for taking it that there are elk 
in the woods by finding what look like elk tracks leading into the trees 
(tracks of those kinds tend to correlate with there having been elk there). 
Likewise, one might have good grounds for believing that things are as 
the speaker said them to be, on the grounds that the speaker in this 
situation has certain features, and taking a speaker with those features, 
saying that things are that way, to be evidence in favour of their having 
spoken truly.  The ‘reductionist’ element is that the epistemic value that 
others utterances possess is the value conferred on those utterances by 
 Jennifer Lackey (2006, 2011) marks a distinction between global reductionism and 4
local reductionism.  Global reductionism is the view that “justification of testimony as 
a source of belief reduces to the justification of sense perception, memory and 
inductive inference” (2006, p. 161).  That is, we require that we have reasons—reasons 
that do not rely in anyway on the testimony of others—to suppose that testimony, in 
general, is a reliable source of true beliefs.  Local reductionism, by contrast is the view 
that “the justification of each particular report or instance of testimony reduces to 
justification of instances of sense perception, memory and inductive inference” (p. 
163).  In other words, we need to have the right kinds of reasons to suppose that for 
any particular bit of testimony, that is a reliable indication of the truth.  On the whole, 
I am here concentrating on what I take to be the more plausible local reductionism 
(for criticisms of global reductionism so understood see Lackey (2006, p. 162), Coady, 
(1992, p. 82) and Fricker (1994, p. 139)).  I’ll briefly discuss views that take both 
global and local factors to contribute to our grounds for taking things to be as the 
speaker says that they are. 
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whatever epistemic support can be garnered from perception, memory, 
and, most importantly, inductive inference. 
Michael Dummett saw that views of this kind impose a particular kind 
of requirement on when we can count as acquiring knowledge from what 
others tell us, 
[I]f we are to possess knowledge acquired [from the assertions of 
others in this way], we must be able to supply as backing an 
argument corresponding to the inference we omitted to draw […]. 
According to this suggestion, if I am to be said to know what 
someone else has told me, and do not know by any other means, I 
must be able to supply a specific ground for supposing my 
informant himself to have been informed on the matter and to 
have been speaking truthfully, even though, in originally accepting 
what he said, I did not advert to those grounds. 
(Dummett 1993b, pp. 419-20)  
As a description of what reductionism demands, I think this has got to be 
right.  Reductionism demands that there is an argument—most likely an 
inductive one—that one could appeal to for the claim that the speaker 
has uttered truth, when one comes to know that things are as the speaker 
said them to be (on the basis of believing them).  The version of the view 
that Dummett is considering here is one according to which we need not 
make an inference corresponding to the grounds that we have to believe 
that the speaker has spoken truly, in order to gain knowledge that things 
are as they say them to be.  What is required, rather, is that we are able to 
reconstruct an argument from these grounds that would sustain an 
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inference to knowledge.  And we can grant that we could, and sometimes 
do, have such grounds for taking some of the utterances of others to be 
true.  For example, if someone reports having seen the Foreign Secretary 
hand in an oﬃcial resignation letter to the Prime Minister, and we know 
that they have an occupation that makes their having seen this likely (if it 
happened), and we know that they are serious in their assertions, then we 
may well have an argument good enough to confer on us knowledge that 
they uttered the truth.  The question is, how often are we in possession of 
such good arguments?    
Dummett claims that these kinds of cases—cases of our having suﬃcient 
grounds to construct a requisitely good inductive argument—are all too 
rare.  The reason being that almost all the testimony we encounter itself 
relies, in some way or another, on the testimony of others.  And when it 
does, the requirement imposed by reductionism is hardly ever fulfilled. 
Dummett makes that case in the following way: 
[Y]ou will be allowed at any stage to add information you have 
received from others only if, at that stage, you have specific 
grounds for taking it to be trustworthy; and, at the outset, you may 
add such information only if such grounds are to be found within 
your unaided observation and reasoning. […] You will […] seldom 
be able to add to your stock of knowledge anything you were told 
by someone who himself had it from someone else: for, to do that, 
you would have to know who your informant’s informant was, and 
have independent evidence that he was reliable. 
(ibid.) 
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But, such is the thought, we hardly ever have such knowledge about our 
informer’s informants.  If that is right, then “we should have to confess to 
knowing pitifully little” (ibid.).  On the supposition that we are not 
radically mistaken about what it is we know, and so do know roughly 
what we ordinarily take ourselves to know, then the view must be 
mistaken about what is required for us to come to know things on the 
basis of having been told. 
Dummett’s argument is this.  For some fact to count as evidence in 
favour of some claim p, it must feature in an argument that one could 
construct for p.  When it comes to the utterances of others, what is 
therefore needed is that they said such-and-such to feature in a premise of 
such an argument.  For that premise to feature in an argument good 
enough to establish the desired conclusion, one must have grounds for 
the claim that they are being truthful in what they say.  The argument 
that one must be able to cite in favour of the claim that things are as they 
said them to be must include the claim that, whatever other testimony is 
being relied on in their asserting so much, one has grounds to suppose 
that that additional testimony is truthful too.  That is, if their having been 
told such-and-such also features as a premise in the argument one omitted 
to make, then one must have access to a further argument that the one 
who told them was truthful in their assertions.  If one is not capable of 
doing this, then one does not have suﬃcient grounds on which to 
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construct a requisitely good argument.  The point is not that this is not 
possible, but that one rarely has such grounds.  5
This can be seen as a particular instance of a more general problem that is 
often said to aﬀect reductionism.  Believing others, in general, comes 
with an element of risk.  That is to say, that when someone tells one 
something, the possibility that they are misleading one—by lying, or 
ignorance, or whatever—is not outrageously remote.  Such things 
happen every day.  For all that, we gain knowledge from what others tell 
us.  Reductionism is committed to the idea that the epistemic support 
available to us for believing the speaker to have uttered truth must suﬃce 
for knowledge that they have uttered truth, and only then do we have 
good enough grounds to count as knowing that things are as they said 
them to be.  The most common argumentative strategy employed against 
reductionism is to claim that the kinds of considerations that such views 
point to cannot do what is needed to suﬃciently mitigate these risks.  In 
other words, the paucity of the epistemic resources it points to is such 
that we rarely have enough to go on to count as knowing that they have 
spoken truly.  It follows that we rarely come to be in possession of 
knowledge from what others tell us.  6
 This seems particularly true of our current situation in the early 21st century; in the 5
actual testimonial situations that we find ourselves in the modern, complex, 
interconnected world, it seems that a body of justification so vast would be needed to 
meet this requirement that perhaps—perhaps—only certain governmental agencies 
have the resources available to construct arguments of this kind. 
 Arguments of this more standard sort, amongst many others, are first advanced in 6
their contemporary form in Coady’s seminal (1992).  As we’ll see, such a strategy is 
also employed, though in a rather diﬀerent epistemic context, in McDowell (1994). 
See §IV below.
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A standard line of response to this kind of objection is that those who 
advance it have not fully appreciated the inductive, and abductive, 
resources that the reductionist says that we have at our disposal, for most, 
if not all, of the testimonial exchanges that we encounter.   By building 7
up our more global base of evidence for the reliability of testimony, that 
leaves less for the local base of evidence to do.  That is to say that, by 
arguing that testimony is, to a greater or lesser extent, generally reliable as 
a knowledge source, what is needed to support a good enough inductive 
argument for the truthfulness of any particular instance of testimony 
becomes less demanding (for certain types of testimony, anyway).   For 8
example, they might point to the fact that there are certain societal 
structures in place that mean that we are liable to certain sanctions in 
telling untruths, and these give us some grounds to suppose that, in 
general, when someone tells us something under the pretence of sincerity, 
  Aspects of views of the kind I am about to describe can be found in Adler (2002), 7
who, at p. 157, says that “we both have enormous grounding for accepting a piece of 
testimony and do not first have to investigate its credulity”.  Though no reductionist, 
this line has also been pushed, to some degree, by Faulkner 2011 on their behalf (see 
pp. 30-51).  For further defences of reductionist lines of thought see Lackey 2006, pp. 
172-7.  Lackey, however, here only defends the necessity of one’s possessing positive 
epistemic support for acquiring the kind of knowledge that others can make available 
in telling us things, but denies its suﬃciency.  The necessity claim in conjunction with 
the suﬃciency claim is what is distinctive of reductionism, so Lackey is not a 
reductionist.  
 One might be tempted to appeal to testimonial types—that is, a way of classing the 8
testimony of others in such a way that their being so classified provides grounds for 
supposing that they are reliable, or truthful (claims made in academic peer reviewed 
journals, for example, might, in general, be thought to be more reliable than those 
made in tabloid newspapers).  This is a resource that the reductionist will, and should 
appeal to, though I don’t think that such an appeal will help in response to Dummett’s 
argument.  That is because we will not have an information even about the types that 
the testimony that others rely on putatively falls into, so it is not information which 
can feature in an argument of the kind Dummett insists the reductionist must appeal 
to.  For a diﬀerent objection to separating testimony into types for these purposes, see 
Coady 1992, p. 84.  For a reply see Lyons 1997.
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they will be truthful more often than not.  These claims may have a 
stronger weight once they are relativised to, for example, institutions (e.g. 
the societal sanctions for doctors telling untruths of particular kinds are 
particularly severe).  The point is that once we have these more general 
grounds operative, then there will be far less for the features of the 
specific circumstance of utterance to do to lend requisite support to the 
relevant knowledge claims.  9
Can such moves help the reductionist answer Dummett’s objection?  It 
strikes me that making this kind of move becomes increasingly 
implausible as the testimonial chain under consideration lengthens.  The 
strategy that I have represented the reductionist as employing is that local 
justification can be bolstered by global justification.  But when it comes 
to those speakers lower down the testimonial chain, local justification is 
liable to drop out entirely.  I think that Dummett is right in saying that 
we rarely have any information about the specific properties or 
circumstances of the testimony that our interlocutor is relying on in 
telling us what they do.   If Dummett is right about this, then, at some 10
point, usually pretty early on in the chain, all that we will have to go on 
is that testimony is a generally reliable knowledge source.  But if that is 
all we do have to go on, then the reductionist cannot employ the strategy 
I’ve described to answer Dummett’s objection.  That’s because such a 
claim of general reliability, even if true, would not be suﬃcient to ground 
 Various sophisticated moves of this kind are discussed in Faulkner 2011, pp. 30-45.9
 This, of course, relates to the inference that we didn’t draw.  All that Dummett is 10
demanding is that an argument could be constructed from which the inference could 
be drawn, not that reductionist are committed to the view that we make these 
inferences, or need to.  
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the requisite claims to knowledge that Dummett argues the reductionist 
says we need.  At least, that is so if we are not to hold the implausible 
view that something presented as testimony, as such, is suﬃcient evidence 
to support a knowledge claim to its truth.  That view is implausible 
because if that did constitute suﬃcient evidence, then all cases in which 
we were told something could support knowledge claims of their truth. 
But plainly they don’t. 
What this goes to show is that any time that we are told something by 
someone who themselves are relying on testimony, or is relying on 
testimony far enough down the testimonial chain, we cannot construct a 
suﬃciently good inductive argument that represents the inference that we 
omitted to draw.  Though we may come to know some of the things we 
thought we knew because another told us, it is still the case that we are 
mistaken about most of what we take ourselves to know.  A milder, but 
still absurdly pernicious, form of scepticism follows.  I am assuming that 
scepticism, even in this form, is false, so reductionism, on these grounds, 
can be rejected.   
III. 
Non-Reductionism 
We cannot, then, regard the utterances of others as capable only of 
providing evidence that supports inductive, or abductive reasoning to a 
conclusion that things are as the speaker said them to be.  That is not to 
say, of course, that others’ utterances cannot so function—I think, in 
point of fact, that they often do—but that others’ utterances can have 
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epistemic significance beyond that conferred on them by their status as 
evidence of this kind.   
The question is, what further significance can others’ utterances have? 
What a rejection of reductionism allows for is the possibility that one can 
acquire knowledge from what another says, in the absence of having 
suﬃcient evidence to support a knowledge claim that they have uttered 
truth.  Less strongly, it must allow for epistemic support for the belief 
that things are as the speaker said them to be, to outstrip the epistemic 
support for the belief that the speaker uttered truth.  But then what is it 
that allows for such a thing?  Where does the knowledge come from, if 
not from the status of the utterance as evidence? 
The most natural, and interesting, suggestion is that the knowledge in 
question can come from the speaker, or someone in their testimonial 
chain.  The idea is that, in the absence of possessing suﬃcient epistemic 
support to generate a conclusive argument that the speaker has uttered 
truth, and so that things are as the say them to be, we can still get 
knowledge that things are as they said them to be.  We can do this, the 
thought would be, just when the speaker knows that things are as they say 
them to be (or someone in their testimonial chain does).  So, on 
condition that the speaker, or someone in their testimonial chain, has the 
knowledge in question, our having something less than knowledge that 
the speaker uttered truth can still yield knowledge that things are as they 
say that they are. 
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III. a. 
Burge’s Non-Reductionism 
So understood, it is key to any view that rejects reductionism along these 
lines is that it marks a distinction between two kinds of epistemic 
support.  It is the distinction between what I have been calling the 
“epistemic support for the belief that the speaker has uttered truth”, and 
what I have been calling the “epistemic support for the belief that things 
are as the speaker said them to be”.  Tyler Burge—a prominent non-
reductionist—marks that distinction, or something close to it, in the 
following passage: 
[I]n interlocution we distinguish two bodies of epistemic warrant: 
(i) the recipient’s proprietary warrant for a belief—that is, the 
reasons available to him together with his epistemic entitlements 
for holding the belief; and (ii) the extended body of warrant for a 
belief—which includes not only the recipient’s proprietary warrant, 
but those warrants for the belief that are possessed or indicated by 
interlocutors on whom the recipient depends for his knowledge 
(though not for his proprietary warrant). 
(Burge, 1998, pp. 5-6) 
What I said was “epistemic support for the belief that the speaker utters 
truth” is what Burge refers to with his notion of “proprietary warrant”; 
what I said was “epistemic support for the belief that things are as the 
speaker said them to be” is what Burge refers to with his notion of the 
“extended body of warrant”.  Given the place these notions have in 
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Burge’s idiosyncratic view, I will avoid using his terminology.  But what 
Burge does provide us with is one plausible way of articulating what 
significance others’ utterance can have, once we have rejected 
reductionism.   
The picture that Burge presents us with is one according to which there 
are distinct bodies of epistemic support, each of which have a diﬀerent 
role to play in our eventually acquiring knowledge from testimony (when 
we do).  His own view relies crucially on the idea of ‘epistemic 
entitlements’. Epistemic support, according to Burge, has two forms, 
justifications and entitlements: 
The distinction between justification and entitlement is this: 
Although both have positive force in rationally supporting a 
propositional attitude or cognitive practice, and in constituting an 
epistemic right to it, entitlements are epistemic rights or warrants 
that need not be understood by or even accessible to the subject. 
(Burge 1993, p. 458) 
Burge regards his notion of entitlement as the externalist analogue to the 
internalist notion of justification.  When one has justification, one can 
cite the argument that justifies one’s belief.  When one has an 
entitlement, there is an argument that gives epistemic support to the 
belief one is entitled to hold, but one is not necessarily able to cite that 
argument—it is not necessarily cognitively, or reflexively, accessible to 
one.  Entitlements, in Burge’s epistemology, occur all over the place—
notably, in allowing us to properly possess knowledge on the basis of 
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memory, as well as from what others tell us.  ‘Warrant’, for Burge, 
includes both entitlements and justifications—in other words whatever it 
is that (Burge recognises) as lending epistemic support to our 
commitments.    
With this notion of an entitlement in place, he advances what he calls the 
acceptance principle, which sets out the conditions under which a 
speaker’s audience can exploit the ‘extended body of warrant’ that a 
speaker can make available.  In other words, what it is that, at least in 
part, constitutes the audience’s “proprietary warrant”.  That principle 
says,  
A person is entitled to accept as true something that is presented as 
true and this is intelligible to him, unless there are stronger reasons 
not to do so.    11
What Burge’s acceptance principle tells us is that there is always an 
argument in favour of one’s believing that things are as the speaker says 
them to be.   What that argument will ultimately depend on, it seems fair 
to assume, is a subsidiary premise articulating an entitlement to take the 
assertive utterances of speakers to be true—that is, an argument for the 
claim that the speaker has uttered truth.  That subsidiary argument lends 
epistemic support to one’s believing that they uttered truth only when 
one has no (overriding) reason to suppose that they are misleading one in 
what they are telling one.  What that argument sustains is the reliance we 
have on others when we form that belief about their uttering truth, for 
 Burge 1993, p. 467.11
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the epistemic support they make available for the belief that things are as 
they say them to be.  
The justification that Burge provides for the claim that we are, in fact, in 
possession of an entitlement to accept as true that which is presented as 
true to us, is in the form of attributing to us a number of (additional) 
interlocking entitlements.  Since what is presented to one, when 
confronted with speech behaviour, is intelligible, we are entitled to take 
the source of that behaviour to be rational.  And since this source 
presents something true to us, by the nature of rationality as such, we are 
entitled to presume that what is presented as true, is true.   These 12
presumptions can be overridden by any number of factors, but if they are 
not, we need no further reason to suppose that the speaker is speaking 
truthfully for us to exploit the epistemic position the speaker stands in 
with respect to the claims they are making.   
Each of these entitlements are underwritten by an argument; an 
argument that constitutes the warrant for the claim that we possess the 
entitlement that Burge posits.  So, for example, Burge takes it that it is 
because of the nature of rationality as such, that the rationality of the 
source of intelligible speech underwrites the entitlement to take as true 
 I am suppressing a great deal of detail in Burge’s view (the full picture emerges across 12
his 1993, 1997 and the beginning of his 1998).  For example, Burge has an elaborate 
and very abstract argument that purports to establish the claim that the relationship 
between rationality and truth justifies the claim that what is presented as true from a 
rational source can be presumed to be true when one has no reason to take it to be 
false.  This argument is the basis of the entitlement that he attributes to those who are 
confronted with speech behaviour.  I am only really interested in the shape of this 
proposal painted with a broad brush because I want to highlight a structural point that 
his view has in common its competitors. 
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that which is presented as true by (what we are entitled to take to be) a 
rational source. All these entitlements can be overridden by contravening 
factors, but when they are not, the entitlements suﬃce to provide 
suﬃcient epistemic support to make claims of knowledge of their basis.  
Burge’s general strategy, if not the specifics of his own justification for it, 
have proved popular: with something like an entitlement of the kind he 
posits in place, we can preserve the idea that we can acquire knowledge in 
cases where we have insuﬃcient inductive grounds upon which to make a 
plausible claim to knowing that the speaker, in that situation, uttered 
truth.   We don’t need such grounds because we can rely on the 13
knowledge, or warrant, that others posses for what they give voice to. 
The distinctive feature of this form of non-reductionism is that this only 
requires (though, crucially, it still does require) that we do not have 
overriding reasons to suppose that the speaker is being misleading in 
their uttering something that they represent as informative. 
 Other examples of such explicit claims can be found at Weiner 2003, p. 257, and 13
Audi 1998, p. 142.  I use Burge as my prime example because of the clarity with 
which the structure of this form of non-reductionism is represented.  There are many 
other views that are close to Burge’s form of non-reductionism—that is, a view of a 
kind that says we have a kind of epistemic right to rely on the word of others in the 
absence of (too much) contravening reason.  Such accounts can be found, for example, 
in Austin (1946), Coady (1992, 1994), and Williamson (2000).  An account of this 
kind is often read into Dummett (1994), though I think that Dummett’s view is 
actually not what it is commonly taken to be.  Dummett, on close inspection, does 
not claim that we have an epistemic right, in the absence of contravening reasons, to 
take as true what is presented as true.  Instead, Dummett only commits to the weaker 
principle that only when I have reason to suppose that the speaker is being misleading, 
do I need reason to suppose things are as the speaker says that they are.  It is consistent 
with this, I think, that we don’t have an entitlement of Burge’s sort, but I won’t argue 
for that point here.  Later in this chapter, I will also oﬀer a reading of McDowell 
(1994) on which, despite surface appearances, there is no entitlement of the kind 
operative in Burge’s account either.
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It is not particularly surprising that Burge here provides us with only one 
form that non-reductionism can take, given the complexity of his 
justification for it.  There have been plenty of accounts that have been 
advanced that reject at least one of the claims I have represented Burge as 
advancing.  Many of the criticisms that have come his way concern his 
acceptance principle.   I too want to suggest that there something 14
questionable about the principle.  But that is not primarily for the 
reasons that are typically appealed to—usually, its putatively 
counterintuitive consequences.  I think it is a questionable principle 
because it is not obvious what reasons there are for non-reductionists to 
impose any substantial epistemic constraints on when our believing that a 
speaker has uttered truth can result in the acquisition of the knowledge 
they can make available by speaking knowledgeably.  Burge’s acceptance 
principle still requires that we don’t have reason to suppose that the 
speaker is being misleading—crucially, it still requires this when the 
speaker is not, perhaps despite appearances, being misleading.  This is 
plainly a substantive constraint on when believing that the speaker is 
truthful results in the acquisition of irreducibly testimonial knowledge. 
One, or so I’ll suggest, that does not follow from a denial of 
reductionism. 
 The most persistent of these is that the acceptance principle engenders a sanction of 14
gullibility.  Elizabeth Fricker (1994) was the first to make the objection; similar 
complaints can be found in Faulkner (2000), and Lackey (2006).
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III. b. 
The Enabling Principle 
What non-reductionism does require is that we mark a distinction 
between the kind of epistemic support that one has for believing that the 
speaker has uttered truth, and the epistemic support that one can thereby 
acquire for believing that things are as the speaker said them to be.  It is 
in this regard that non-reductionism diﬀers from the kind of modified 
reductionism that I considered which appealed to factors that justified 
the supposition that testimony, in general, is reliable.  That said that we 
have reason to suppose that, in general, speakers utter truth when 
making their assertions, and this provides the evidential basis on which 
one can build a strong enough inductive argument, when supplemented 
with enough reason to suppose the particular utterance in question is a 
truthful one.  But non-reductionism says that the crucial epistemic 
support comes from the speaker’s end—whatever they are in possession 
of that lends support to the claims they are making, is what supports the 
audience’s testimonial beliefs.       
Marking this distinction allows for a number of diﬀerent views about 
how epistemic support of these two kinds relate to one another.  In 
Burge, we find a view that says that we must lack reasons to suppose that 
the speaker has produced a false utterance, for us to eﬀect the bypass to 
the speaker’s knowledge.  But other non-reductionist views on the market 
diverge wildly on the point of what is needed for this.   In the next 
chapter I will spend some time on a non-reductionist account that has 
been given to us by Richard Moran (2006).  I will wait until then to give 
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a full characterisation of that view, but in the present context it is worth 
mentioning that, though non-reductionist, Moran’s view is incompatible 
with the claim that we have anything like the kind of entitlement that 
Burge posits.  Instead, non-reductionists of Moran’s stripe insist that we 
do require reasons in favour of accepting the utterances of others in order 
to avail ourselves of the knowledge such utterances make available. 
However, the kinds of reasons that Moran and his followers insist are 
needed, are not what provides the epistemic support for the belief that 
things are as the speaker says them to be.  That is still dependent on the 
epistemic status of what the speaker gives voice to (hence, non-
reductionist).  Instead, what they say is required is reasons generated by 
the institution of trust that they think must hold between speaker and 
audience for the knowledge the speaker makes available to be picked up 
by their audience.  In the absence those particular kinds of reasons being 
operative in situations in which a speaker gives voice to what they know, 
the audience is not in a position to avail themselves of knowledge that a 
speaker has given voice to.  
  
So we have two forms of non-reductionism in contention: a kind of 
‘negative’ version, that says we only require a lack of reasons to believe 
that the speaker has spoken falsely, in order to have suﬃcient epistemic 
support for the claim that the speaker uttered truth; and a kind of 
‘positive’ version, that says we do require reasons in favour of the claim 
that the speaker spoke truth.  Both commitments can be seen as instances 
of a subscription to a more general principle; both of these views require 
a level of epistemic support of the first kind, so that the beliefs we acquire 
on the basis of believing others (that things are as the speaker said them 
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to be) can attain the status of knowledge.  That is, both suppose that an 
enabling condition on our exploiting others’ knowledge in the way that 
non-reductionism allows for is that we possess that former kind of 
epistemic support—either in its weak form, in a way similar to that 
proposed by Burge, or in the stronger form, in a way similar to that 
proposed by Moran.   
These views, then, subscribe to the following enabling principle for the 
acquisition of genuinely testimonial knowledge: 
When A believes that p by way of believing that u, of S, which 
constitutes testimony to p, is true, A comes to possess testimonial 
knowledge that p only if there is suﬃcient epistemic support for A’s 
belief that u is true. 
My aim in the rest of this chapter is to call this principle into question.   
We should start by asking what reason there are, in the non-reductionist 
context, for accepting the claim that we need epistemic support of the 
first kind, in order to exploit the epistemic support of the second kind. 
Because this question, I think, becomes particularly pressing when we 
note what determines the epistemic status of our testimonial beliefs, once 
we allow for whatever enabling conditions we favour to have been met. 
In these favourable circumstances, one comes by knowledge that things 
are as the speaker says them to be only if the speaker themselves knows 
what they are talking about, or, at worst, says something that a speaker 
earlier in the testimonial chain knew.   But if that is what determines the 
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status of the eventual belief acquired, why should the status of the 
distinct belief that the speaker spoke truth have a bearing on this? 
No such questions arise for reductionism.  The reductionist will think 
that one must have suﬃcient epistemic support for the belief that a 
speaker utters truth, for one’s belief that things are as they say them to be 
to be suﬃciently epistemically supported.  That’s just because, according 
to reductionism, the epistemic support for the former belief is what 
constitutes the epistemic support for the latter belief.  But that is not the 
case when it comes to non-reductionism.  The distinctive feature of such 
views is precisely that this epistemic support diverges.  It has to have this 
feature, if it is to allow knowledge acquisition from what others say, in 
the absence of one’s possessing suﬃcient evidence that the speaker utters 
truth.  So there is justificatory lacuna that needs to be filled by those who 
insist that the former plays an enabling role in one’s acquisition of 
epistemic support for the beliefs one acquires on the basis of 
understanding the utterances that one believes to be true. 
Paul Faulkner, I think, articulates what would initially, at least, seem the 
obvious reason to be given about why epistemic support for the belief 
that the speaker has uttered truth is needed to exploit the epistemic 
support that the speaker confers on the claim that things are as they said 
them to be.  What’s more, if he is right, then this would go some way to 
explaining why the literature has so little to say about how the two kinds 
of epistemic support link up: 
 40
What is epistemically distinctive about testimony as a source of 
knowledge and justification is that it is a way of resting on other 
people’s epistemic standings.  However, inheriting this standing does 
presuppose something of an audience.  It presupposes that accepting 
the bit of testimony to p is reasonable for the audience.   15
(Faulkner 2011, p. 12) 
Faulkner is giving expression to his own view about what is required to 
acquire testimonial knowledge by suggesting that one is only so much as 
capable of acquiring knowledgable beliefs on the basis of having been 
told, in the presence of reasons to do take the speaker to be truthful in 
her assertions (Faulkner endorses Moran’s account).  We are told, a 
presupposition of the claim that our accepting a bit of testimony can bear 
such epistemic fruit is that audiences are in possession of the reasons that 
Faulkner thinks are needed for one to meet this more general principle. 
Since I am including amongst the advocates of this principle non-
reductionism of the kind advanced by Burge, we can amend this to 
include the view that a lack of suﬃcient reason to reject the utterance as 
false can render one’s believing that the speaker uttered truth to be 
 This is not all.  Faulkner relies on what he calls the ‘argument from cooperation’ to 15
establish the claim too.  This is important both for motivating his particular version of 
the view that originates in Moran, and for many of his criticisms of rival views. 
Interesting as I think that this argument is, I will have to leave it to one side here.  I 
think that the argument itself relies on upstream commitments about the nature of 
practical interests of agents, which we may or may not want to accept.  It strikes me, 
though, that if we do accept what underpins the argument, more is needed to show 
that it has a bearing on the epistemic status of what is acquired on the basis of 
accepting some piece of testimony, as opposed to the epistemic status of our 
acceptance.  Though, I don’t pretend that this is an adequate response to this aspect of 
the case that Faulkner makes.  The argument is discussed repeatedly throughout 
Faulkner 2011.  
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suﬃciently epistemically supported—suﬃcient, that is, to make available 
the knowledge that the speaker is giving voice to.  So understood, why 
should we think that such a commitment is presupposed in putative cases 
of knowledge transmission? 
My aim, in the rest of this chapter, is modest.  I want to undermine the 
claim that a substantive reading of the enabling principle is presupposed 
by non-reductionist accounts as such.  I’m going to do so by exploring a 
particular non-reductionist account, backed up by some more general 
epistemological commitments, and show how this view is genuinely non-
reductionist and does not bring with it a substantive reading of the 
enabling principle.  A view of this kind, I think, can be found in some 
things that John McDowell has said.  
Before I do, it will be helpful to introduce some terminology.  I will use a 
notion of epistemic uptake to pick out what an audience does when, 
confronted with a speaker telling them that p by producing an utterance, 
u, the audience takes up their utterance just in case they come to believe 
that p on the basis of understanding u, and believing that the speaker has 
uttered truth.  We can conceive of the enabling principle as one that 
determines some of the conditions under which uptake can result in the 
possession of testimonial knowledge, where this is the knowledge that the 
speaker makes available in speaking knowledgeably.  That is, the kind of 
knowledge that non-reductionism allows—the kind which one can only 
come to possess from a speaker telling one something that they know, or 
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something that someone in their testimonial chain knows.   I will talk of 16
‘irreducible testimonial knowledge’ (sometimes just ‘testimonial 
knowledge’), by which I mean to pick out this kind of knowledge that 
non-reductionism allows, but reductionism precludes—a kind of 
knowledge that one can acquire when one is not in possession of an 
inductive argument that can support an knowledge claim about the 
speaker’s uttering the truth.  In these terms, the view that I’ll be 
advancing in this thesis is one according to which uptake can yield 
testimonial knowledge irrespective of one’s reasons to believe that the 
speaker uttered truth—that is, it suﬃces for uptake to result in 
irreducibly testimonial knowledge when it is uptake of an utterance with 
which (roughly speaking) a speaker tells one something that they, or 
someone else, knows. (I will consider some objections to views of this 
kind at the end of chapter 2). 
IV. 
McDowell’s Non-Reductionism 
It might seem, on first inspection, that McDowell’s account is very 
similar to Burge’s.  That’s because he appears to agree that something like 
an entitlement holds in the manner described by Burge.  I think that this 
appearance is misleading.  On the reading of McDowell that I give, the 
 Here I am advocating something close to the transmission principle that Lackey 16
(2008, pp. 39) calls ‘TEP-N’, and something closer to what Faulkner (2011, p. 62) 
calls his ‘transmission principle for testimonial knowledge’.  Lackey thinks that her 
‘TEP-N’ is false because of a certain kind of putative counterexample.  ‘TEP-N’ makes 
no reference to testimonial chains (as Faulkner’s transmission principle does), and the 
cases she discusses are counterexamples to ‘TEP-N’ as she presents it, but the view that 
I eventually end up advancing in Chapter 2 can accommodate these cases.  I show how 
in §IV. b. of that chapter.
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enabling principle that one can extract provides no substantial 
constraints on when testimonial knowledge can be acquired, beyond that 
which is a necessary condition on one’s acquisition of testimonial 
knowledge—namely, that the speaker, or someone in their testimonial 
chain, possesses the knowledge in question.  This is not the case 
according to Burge’s version of non-reductionism.  
Two notes before I begin my exposition of McDowell.  First, I take it 
that the view that I eventually end up endorsing in the next chapter, is at 
least consistent with this reading of McDowell’s epistemological 
conception.  This, I hope, gives substance to my account in so far as it 
shows that there is a well worked out general epistemology that can serve 
to underpin it (though, I take it, other possible accounts could play this 
role).  That, I think, is worth emphasising because of the some of the 
prima facie oddities of my account for those of a certain epistemological 
bent (I set out that view in §IV of chapter 2 and discuss possible 
objections to it in §V). Second, I don’t think that McDowell’s views are 
the only way of justifying the enabling principle, or any justification will 
have the consequence of, in eﬀect, providing no constraints on uptake 
beyond those that I argue are imposed by McDowell’s conception.  So I 
don’t pretend to be arguing, at least directly, against the cogency of those 
non-reductionist views that subscribe to a more substantive reading of 
that principle.  I intend, only, to give reasons to doubt that the a 
substantial reading is presupposed by non-reductionism, and oﬀer a 
cogent view that denies that any such the principle, so read, is in eﬀect. 
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IV. a. 
McDowell’s Cook Wilsonian Conception 
John Cook Wilson  took it that, in knowing that p, one cannot have the 17
grounds one does for taking p to be so, and it not be the case that p.  In 
other words, knowing something amounts to nothing less than one’s 
possessing a kind of proof that things are as one takes them to be; if one 
has a proof that p, it cannot be that not-p.  A corollary of this is that if 
one’s grounds for taking it that p are compatible, however unlikely, with 
not-p, then one’s possessing those grounds do not amount to one’s 
knowing that p; knowing, so conceived, excludes all possibilities that not-
p, thus one’s possessing grounds that are even so much as consistent with 
that possibility, does not render one knowledgable as to whether p. 
McDowell defends a Cook Wilsonian conception, in the first instance, 
because he agrees that in knowing something, one’s grounds cannot leave 
it open that things are not as one takes them to be.   If that is right, then 18
whatever it is that we think constitutes one’s knowing something has got 
to be such that, when it obtains, there is no possibility that things are not 
as one takes them to be.   
Can a Cook Wilsonian conception of knowledge cohere with a plausible 
epistemology of testimony?  The prospects may appear bleak.  As we’ve 
seen, when one is told something by another, there would always seem to 
be a possibility that they are lying or are misinformed.  That there is 
 I am entirely indebted to Travis (2005) and Travis & Kalderon (2009) for tracing 17
elements of McDowell’s epistemology back to Cook Wilson.
 McDowell (1982), (1995).18
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always, seemingly, such a possibility, in conjunction with the conception 
of knowledge that requires any possibility of that kind be excluded, 
appears to preclude one’s coming to possess knowledge on this basis.  So 
a Cook Wilsonian conception appears to commits us to a form of 
scepticism: this is, at any rate, the conclusion Cook Wilson himself 
drew.   But, of course, McDowell is no sceptic.  He thinks that there is a 19
way for testimony to be a source of knowledge under a Cook Wilsonian 
conception.  
To see how, we can start by looking to McDowell’s diagnosis about why 
it is that scepticism appears to be implied by that conception.  McDowell 
isolates a general principle that he takes to be behind the reasoning of the 
kind I articulated in the last paragraph; a principle that, prima facie, is 
just a statement of the Cook Wilsonian conception of knowledge: 
[I]f we want to be able to suppose the title of a belief to count as 
knowledge is constituted by the believer’s possession of an 
argument to its truth, it had better not be the case that the best 
argument he has at his disposal leaves it open that things are not as 
he believes them to be. 
(McDowell 1994, p. 421) 
This principle, together with the claim that knowledge that p is one’s 
possessing an argument for the truth that p, entails that one’s knowing 
that p amounts to one’s possession of an argument that does not leave it 
 Cook Wilson, 1926, p. 107.19
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open that not-p.  For the sake of ease of reference, let’s give this principle 
a name: the Conclusive Argument Principle. 
The Conclusive Argument Principle looks to be very strong; as I’ve 
suggested, for the instances in which it is thought to hold, sceptical 
consequences can appear inevitable.  Take the claim that Cameron is 
Prime Minister of the United Kingdom.  At the time of writing, this is 
true.  Is it the case, though, that we are ordinarily in possession of an 
argument that excludes the possibility that Cameron has made a shock 
resignation since last we checked the news?  McDowell, at any rate, 
thinks not.  So far as he is concerned, there is no such argument that 
could be in my possession, given my current information.  Since I am 
not in possession of an argument that is able to rule out these 
possibilities, then, if my knowing Cameron to be PM requires my 
possessing an argument of this kind, then I don’t know that Cameron is 
PM.  And if this kind of reasoning is correct in these relatively robust 
kinds of cases, then the kinds of commitments we incur in believing 
what others say to us cannot attain the status of knowledge: the 
Conclusive Argument Principle cannot be met by an argument with “A 
speaker, S, uttered u” as a premise, since there is always an open 
possibility that, in uttering u, S uttered a falsehood.  
To avoid the sceptical conclusion, one obvious route to take is to deny 
the Conclusive Argument Principle.  It could, instead, be replaced by 
something like the Good Argument Principle:  
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If one’s knowing that p is constituted by one’s possessing an 
argument to its truth, that argument must render it suﬃciently 
unlikely that not-p.   
There is a certain elasticity in the ‘suﬃciently unlikely’, that could allow 
for testimonial knowledge, if, in some circumstances, the possibility that 
the speaker is being misleading is remote enough.  Of course, 
subscription to the Good Argument Principle over the Conclusive 
Argument Principle is a denial of the Cook Wilsonian conception:  
In knowing, we can have nothing to do with the so-called ‘greater 
strength’ of evidence on which the opinion is grounded; simply 
because we know that this ‘greater strength’ of evidence of A’s being 
B is compatible with A’s not being B after all. 
(Cook Wilson 1926, p. 100) 
Rendering something unlikely is not ruling it out.  And since, according 
to the Cook Wilsonian conception, knowing just is one’s ruling out the 
incompatible possibilities, this is to have a fundamentally opposed base 
conception of knowledge to that which McDowell endorses.  What is 
required instead, on this altered picture, is that things happen to turn out 
as one takes them to be.  Only then, does one’s possession of a 
suﬃciently good argument count as knowing, when the Cook Wilsonian 
conception is abandoned in this way. 
So we now appear to be left with a choice: embrace scepticism, or 
abandon the Cook Wilsonian conception.  McDowell, though, takes 
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neither option.  To see how he manages this, notice that the above line of 
reasoning aﬃrmed the antecedent of the Conclusive Argument Principle
—namely, the claim that to know that p is to be in possession of an 
argument to its truth.  With this in place, the only thing left to reject in 
the line of reasoning that leads to scepticism is the principle itself: 
according to the view, to know p, it is not the case that, if one’s knowing 
is constituted by one’s possession of an argument, that argument rules 
out that things are such that not-p.  This, for McDowell, is a mistake; the 
Conclusive Argument Principle is true.  That’s just because knowing that 
p is to exclude the possibility that not-p, so if knowing something is a 
matter of possessing an argument to its truth, that argument cannot leave 
it open whether things are as one takes them to be.   What we need to 
realise is that the principle has no application in many cases: there are 
domains of knowledge acquisition for which the antecedent is not 
satisfied.  Of particular importance for present purposes is that 
testimonial exchanges fall into one of these domains.  Knowing 
something on the basis of having been told does not require one be in 
possession of an argument that things are as the speaker says that they 
are.   
Taking this line allows McDowell to retain the Cook Wilsonian 
conception, insisting that knowing that p does not leave it open that 
things are not as one takes them to be.  However, it also allows him to 
deny that one need be in possession of an argument that rules out that 
not-p, in order to rule out that not-p (i.e. know that p).  For McDowell, 
we can rule out the possibility that things are not as we take them to be 
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in the absence of our possession an argument that rules this possibility 
out.   
IV. b. 
The Requirement of Doxastic Responsibility 
For all that, though, we appear no closer to seeing how it is that a Cook 
Wilsonian conception can cohere with a plausible epistemology of 
testimony.  McDowell has told us what is not needed to make the 
exclusions necessary for knowing under that conception, but we do not 
yet have in view how he conceives of the putative capability we possess to 
make the exclusions that are necessary in testimonial cases.   
The crux of McDowell’s epistemology of testimony rests on the claim 
that so long as we are doxastically responsible in our taking up the 
utterances of others, we are at least in a position to avail ourselves of 
whatever knowledge may be made available by a speaker.  On the other 
hand, when we are doxastically irresponsible in our uptaking, we fail to 
exclude what is needed for knowledge.  This is how McDowell himself 
puts it:   
If one’s takings of things to be thus and so are to be cases of 
knowledge, they must be sensitive to the requirements of doxastic 
responsibility.  Since following the dictates of doxastic 
responsibility is obviously an exercise in rationality, this can be a 
partial interpretation of the thought that knowledge in general, 
and the specific epistemic positions like remembering and seeing, 
are standings in the space of reasons.  We could not conceive 
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remembering that things are thus and so, say, as a standing in the 
space of reasons if a subject could count as being in that position 
even if he were not responsive to the rational force of 
independently available considerations. 
(McDowell 1994, p. 429) 
McDowell finds it helpful to think about knowledge in Sellarsian terms 
of ‘standing in the space of reasons’.  How are we to make sense of this 
talk?   McDowell himself tells us that, 
If knowledge is a standing in the space of reasons, someone whose 
taking things to be thus and so is a case of knowledge must have a 
reason (a justification) for taking things to be that way. 
(ibid., p. 427)  
According to this conception what distinguishes one who knows from 
one who does not, is the reasons—the justification—for what they take 
to be so, that they are in possession of.   Accordingly, one who does not 
know that p cannot have the same reason for taking it that p (if they do) 
from one who does know that p.  They will be in possession of diﬀerent 
reasons.   
The structure of the view can be drawn out clearly in the perceptual case. 
McDowell takes it that if one sees that there is a goldfinch in the garden, 
then one knows that there is a goldfinch in the garden: seeing that p 
entails knowing that p.  One’s seeing that p constitutes a conclusive reason 
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for one that things are such that p.  That is, possessing a conclusive 
reason for the claim that things are some way, excludes the possibility 
that things are not as one has that reason to take them to be.  On the 
other hand, if one hallucinates a goldfinch in the garden, even if one’s 
hallucinations happen to be reliable as to how the world is arranged 
according to them, one is not in possession of a conclusive reason for 
things being as one hallucinates them to be.   
However plausible we find this in the perceptual case, what is important 
here is that there is an analogue of ‘seeing that p’, for McDowell, in the 
testimonial case.  The conclusive reason for taking it that p on the basis of 
what another has said is one’s having heard from the speaker that p.  Like 
the reason one possesses on seeing that p, if one’s reason for taking it that 
p is that one has heard from a speaker that p, then one knows that p—it 
cannot be the case that one has heard from a speaker that p and not-p. 
One’s possessing the reason of having heard from a speaker that p, rules 
out the possibility that things are not as one has heard from the speaker 
that they are.   
This shows why McDowell thinks that one can count as acquiring 
testimonial knowledge, even though one need not have an argument that 
rules out that not-p.  One comes to know that p on the basis of being 
told, one is in possession of a reason of this kind, and no argument is 
needed to come to be in possession of that reason.   
Under what conditions is a speaker capable of providing their audience 
with a reason of this kind?  Well, one plausible suﬃcient condition 
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would appear to be when the speaker is in possession of the knowledge 
that they intend to be communicating to their audience.  That is because 
they are in a position that they are able to rule out that not-p, by 
themselves possessing a conclusive reason for p.  In being in that position 
(in possessing a conclusive reason for p), they can allow another to hear 
from them (in the relevant sense) that p, given their capacity to 
communicate what they have conclusive reason for (namely, p).    
Why, then, does McDowell insist on ‘doxastic responsibility’ on the part 
of the audience?  Why can such reasons not be possessed by one who is 
doxastically irresponsible in their making of epistemic commitments with 
respect to what others say?   
V. 
Doxastic Responsibility & The Enabling Principle 
Absent McDowell’s background epistemological conception, it may seem 
that the requirement of doxastic responsibility engenders a form of 
standard non-reductionism much like Burge’s.  Insisting (only) that one’s 
uptake is not doxastically irresponsible might seem to be just a diﬀerent 
way of expressing a commitment to our possessing a kind of default 
entitlement to rely on the word of others in the absence of reasons to 
suppose that they are being misleading.    
But on my reading of McDowell, this appearance is illusory.  Having 
heard from another that p, we can rule out not-p, in the absence of our 
possessing an argument that does this.  We do this by possessing that 
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conclusive reason, and we can only come to be in possession that reason 
by being doxastically responsible.  Doxastic irresponsibility is, in eﬀect, a 
form of irrationality, because it is a kind of insensitivity to reasons.  We 
have seen that McDowell’s view is that knowledge just is one’s possessing 
the right kinds of reasons—the conclusive ones.  There is, then, an 
interpretation of this claim that doxastic responsibility is a sensitivity to 
the right kinds of reasons—the conclusive ones.  As such, doxastically 
responsible uptake is just taking up those utterances which provide one 
with conclusive reason to take things to be as things were thereby said to 
be.  If that is a correct interpretation of the requirement of doxastic 
responsibility, this is a very long way from the defeasible, prima facie 
entitlement that we got from Burge. 
Coming into possession of the reason to take it that p by having heard 
from the speaker that p, itself is suﬃcient for knowing, because one 
cannot have heard (in McDowell’s sense) that p from the speaker and 
there be a possibility that not-p.  Doxastic responsibility in one’s 
acceptance as true some testimonial utterance, so understood, in eﬀect, 
entails the acquisition of testimonial knowledge.   
The reading of McDowell’s requirement of doxastic responsibility on 
which it engenders a commitment to something like a Burgean 
entitlement to accept as true that which is presented to one as true is one 
that takes it that doxastic responsibility demands one not believe what 
one has (suﬃcient) evidence to suppose is false.  Doxastic responsibility 
on this reading would not suﬃce for knowledge acquisition.  Because on 
this reading of the requirement, it is consistent with one’s accepting as 
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true some testimonial utterance in a doxastically responsible way, that 
one, nonetheless, fails to acquire testimonial knowledge.  But then 
doxastic responsibility in uptake would not rule out that things are not as 
one takes them to be on that basis.  As such, one falls short of knowing 
that things are as the speaker told one that they are.  In one’s taking 
oneself to have heard from the speaker that p, when the speaker has not 
acted so as to put you in a position to have heard that p from what she 
said, one is being insensitive to the reasons that there are for taking it 
that p.  Insensitivity of this kind is consistent with things not being as 
one takes them to be.  As such, it fails to count as knowledge.  For 
doxastic responsibility to be a condition on acquiring knowledge, under 
the Cook Wilsonian conception, it has got to be understood not in these 
evidential terms, but in terms which allows doxastic responsibility to 
result in one’s possession of proof that things are as one responsibly took 
them to be.  
When we understand the requirement that one be doxastically 
responsible in one’s taking up an utterance as one’s being requisitely 
sensitive to reasons, the requirement of doxastic responsibility can be 
thought of as a version of the enabling principle.  What it demands is 
that, only if one is suﬃciently sensitive to the relevant reasons in taking 
up an utterance, can that uptake beget knowledge.  So McDowell’s 
grounds for advancing the requirement of doxastic responsibility may 
provide one form of justification for some version of the enabling 
principle.  The justification would be that, since knowing that p is one’s 
possessing a conclusive reason in favour of p, one’s knowing that p from 
being told must itself require possessing a conclusive reason.  If one is not 
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sensitive to the (conclusive) reasons there are for uptake, one cannot 
come by testimonial knowledge.  
But this, of course, doesn’t really amount to the kinds of demands on our 
epistemic behaviour that the enabling principle is intended to capture. 
On McDowell’s epistemology of testimony, the principle that comes out 
is trivially satisfied when we successfully take up utterances that make 
available testimonial knowledge.  The principle, so interpreted, places no 
substantive constraints on when uptake can beget knowledge.  All that is 
required is that one take up an utterance with which testimonial 
knowledge is made available by the speaker.  But that places no further 
constraints on us than the idea that there is such a thing as testimonial 
knowledge in the first place: namely, a kind of knowledge which can be 
acquired by an audience only when the speaker, or someone in their 
testimonial chain, possesses the knowledge in question.    20
 I want to include one caveat about the reading that I have given of McDowell.  In a 20
footnote discussing the case of the Boy Who Cried Wolf, we do get an expression of a 
view which is more like Burge’s version of non-reductionism, than the one of the kind 
that I have being trying to make plausible.  In eﬀect, McDowell tells us that, when, on 
the third time of doing so, the shepherd boy (knowledgably) cries “Wolf!”, he makes 
available knowledge that there is a wolf there to one who is passing, and has not heard 
the two previous lies, but does not make this available to those who have heard his lies, 
since uptake of this cry would be doxastically irresponsible.  According to the 
interpretation that I have given, this is a mistake—it would not be doxastically 
irresponsible to believe the shepherd boy the third time round, even if one had been 
confronted with the first two lies.  For this reason, I am hesitant to attribute to the 
actual McDowell the view that I have been articulating.  All the same, I think I’ve said 
enough to show how we might motivate such a view, and with it the claim that there 
can be non-reductionist accounts of testimonial knowledge that deny the enabling 
principle. 
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VI. 
Conclusion 
Where does this leave things?  The main point of this discussion has been 
to go some way to bring into question the claim that, in advancing a 
non-reductionist epistemology of testimony, one is a committed to a 
version of the enabling principle that places substantive constraints on 
when uptake can beget (irreducible) testimonial knowledge.  The point of 
providing the reading of McDowell that I have, is to show that there is a 
general epistemology on the market which allows us to make do without 
such a substantive constraint.  I don’t though, pretend to have established 
the denial of a substantive reading of that principle for non-reductionist 
accounts generally; I have oﬀered no in principle arguments for that. 
What I do take myself to have done is show why we should not accept 
reductionism, on pain of a mild, but pernicious, scepticism.  In light of 
the structure of the alternative to reductionism, I have questioned the 
justification for supposing that we require epistemic support for the 
claim that the speaker has uttered truth, in order to come by knowledge, 
from their speaking, that things are as they say them to be.  The 
discussion of McDowell is meant to show what kind of more general 
epistemology could vindicate a rejection of that requirement. 
But I do not intend to argue for McDowell’s account of testimony as I 
have read it.  I will present my own view of how we acquire knowledge 
from others in the next chapter; a non-reductionist view that denies that 
there is a enabling principle that places substantive restrictions on when 
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uptake can beget testimonial knowledge.  It is a view that takes it that the 
epistemic status of what one acquires on the basis of uptake is 
independent of the epistemic support one has for believing that the 
speaker has uttered truth.  It is a view that I take to be consistent with 
many elements of the reading of McDowell that I have given here, 
though it by no means committed to it.   
One final clarification before I move on.  I have not argued for or against 
any particular view of what is required for us to be justified in believing 
that a speaker has uttered truth (at least within the context of non-
reductionism about knowledge acquisition from testimony).  For all I 
have said, to be so justified requires what the non-reductionist accounts I 
have been discussing say is required.  Perhaps, if uptake is to be justified, 
one only need lack reasons to reject that utterance.  On the other hand, 
that might be wrong, and one needs to be in a relationship of trust with 
one’s speaker.  The issue I will be taking a stand on concerns the 
epistemic significance of one’s being so justified, however one thinks that 
is achieved.  The view I am about to articulate says that one’s grounds for 
antecedently forming such beliefs do not bear on the epistemic status of 
what one acquires on their basis. 
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2. 
Voicing Knowledge 
I. 
Introduction 
In this chapter I’ll be setting out my own account of how we can acquire 
knowledge from what others say to us.  I propose a non-reductionist 
account, according to which speakers make available testimonial 
knowledge by what I will call voicing knowledge.  In §IV I set out how I 
am thinking of that, as well as providing some indication of what 
audiences need to do to come to be in possession of the testimonial 
knowledge made available by speakers voicing knowledge.  That part of 
my view entails that there is no enabling principle that places substantial 
constraints on when uptake can yield possession of the testimonial 
knowledge made available by the speaker, beyond that which is imposed 
by the notion of irreducible testimonial knowledge itself (see Chapter 1, 
§§IV-VI).  As such, I expect that it is likely to strike many as an 
unattractive view, or perhaps even just obviously false.  I’ll attempt to 
anticipate, and allay, some worries to this eﬀect in §V.   
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Before doing any of this, though, I will begin this chapter by considering 
a form of non-reductionism that has been advanced by Richard Moran. 
This stands in contrast to Burge’s non-reductionism in so far as it requires 
audiences to be in possession of reasons in favour of believing that the 
speaker uttered truth in order to acquire testimonial knowledge from 
them.   I will be concerned, in particular, with his account of what 
speakers need to do in order to make available testimonial knowledge 
(§II).  I concentrate on Moran’s view because, though I want to deny 
some of his key claims, I do think that on some important fronts, he 
correctly sets the terms of debate.   
In §III, I’ll present a counterexample to Moran’s view in light of which 
I’ll give my account.  The most interesting thing, I think, about the fact 
that we can generate such a counterexample, is that it sustains a 
particular diagnosis of why his view is susceptible to it.  My application 
of this counterexample can be seen as a case study that coheres with the 
general narrative that I have provided in the last chapter: his view, like 
many other non-reductionist views, does not properly account for the 
independence of the epistemic status of the rewards of uptake from that 
which supports engaging in uptake in the first place.  The account that I 
go on to oﬀer in §IV is one that is informed by this more general 
conclusion.  But there is no pretence here of establishing the view I put 
forward.  The limited aim I have is to convince the reader that a view of 
this kind is a live option.  The rest of the thesis is, in large part, my 
attempt at saying what will, or at least can, fill the surrounding cognitive 
landscape in which I take this view of testimonial knowledge acquisition 
to be located.    
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II. 
Moran’s Account of ‘Telling’ 
Recall that Moran is a non-reductionist because he takes it to be possible 
for us to acquire irreducibly testimonial knowledge—that is, a kind of 
knowledge whose availability depends essentially on the speaker, or 
someone in their testimonial chain, being in possession of it.  However, 
he denies that we have a default entitlement to take as true that which is 
presented to us as true (in the absence of reasons to suppose otherwise). 
He believes that we do need reasons in favour of accepting what others 
say, and not just the absence of reasons not to, in order to avail ourselves 
of the knowledge that might be available to us when a speaker speaks 
knowledgeably. These reasons are non-evidential—they do not support 
inductive reasoning to conclusions concerning the truth of the utterance
—but they are knowledge sustaining—they enable their possessors to avail 
themselves of the testimonial knowledge that the speaker may make 
available.  These non-evidential, knowledge sustaining reasons are 
putatively generated from the intentional nature of some of those acts 
with which testimonial knowledge can be made available. 
According to Moran, what speakers can do is, in eﬀect, invite their 
audience to take their word for things being as they say them to be. 
Audiences can utilise this to avail themselves of the knowledge that the 
speaker has (at least implicitly) given their word that they (the speaker) 
have.  The key idea is that to give one’s word to one’s audience in this way 
is not to provide them with any evidence that things are the way one has 
assured them to be.  Categorically not; the ways in which speakers go 
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about giving their word would, when viewed as evidence, have a 
corrupting influence on the epistemic status of audience’s taking it that 
the speaker has uttered truth.    The intentional nature of this activity is 
something that, for Moran, precludes the treatment of testimonial 
utterances as evidence.  That’s because evidence that has such intentional 
features would be deemed corrupted, and epistemic support garnered 
from such corrupted evidence could not be knowledge sustaining.  21
Indeed, for Moran, quite the contrary: it precisely these very intentional 
features that make it the case that what others say can have the epistemic 
status suﬃcient to make available testimonial knowledge.   
Those intentional actions that testimonial utterances are thought, by 
Moran, to constitute are what he calls acts of ‘telling’.   By telling their 22
audience something, in a specific sense of what it is to do this, speakers 
give their word in this way and, in so doing, can make available 
testimonial knowledge.   ‘Telling’ someone something, so understood, 23
has the eﬀect of instigating a kind of interpersonal relationship between 
 See Moran 2006, p. 277.  This claim strikes me as questionable.  That the cat 21
burglar’s calling card is left at the scene of the crime is evidence that it was the cat 
burglar who committed the crime.  That it is intentionally left so as to get people to 
believe this does not undermine its status as evidence.  But Moran’s case against 
‘evidentialist’ accounts would imply that it would be.  See Keren 2012 for one kind of 
case against this part of Moran’s argument (a part endorsed by Faulkner 2011).  In any 
case, I’ll leave this part of the case that Moran makes to one side, because even if 
sometimes other’s utterances can be treated as evidence, it is plausible, at least on its 
face, that it is not necessary to do so in order to avail oneself of the testimonial 
knowledge that they make available.   
 The scare-quotes are included because, though it is obviously Moran’s aim that he 22
give an account of our ordinary notion of telling, for reasons that will become clear I 
don’t think that his account captures that notion.
 “Telling someone something is not simply giving expression to what’s on your mind, 23
but is making a statement with the understanding that here it is your word that is to 
be relied on” Moran, 2006, p. 280.
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the speaker and their audience that allows for the transmission of 
knowledge when the audience trusts the speaker to be uttering truth. 
II. a. 
MR-intentions 
Moran’s notion of ‘telling’ is an act that is a variant on the kind of acts 
that have what Paul Grice calls ‘non-natural meaning’.   To non-24
naturally mean that p, a speaker, S, must produce an utterance, u, 
intending that, 
 (1) their audience, A, believe that p; 
 (2) A believe that S intends A to believe that p; 
 (3) A believe that p on the basis of his believing that S intends 
  (1) & (2). 
Grice has an abbreviation for this kind of intention: ‘M-intention’.  25
Moran doesn’t think that to ‘tell’ one’s audience that p is for one to direct 
an utterance at them with which one non-natually means that p; 
nonetheless, Moran does think that S must M-intend A to believe that p, 
in order to tell A so much.  The reason why it cannot suﬃce for S to utter 
u with an M-intention to induce the belief that p in A, for S to tell A p, is 
that S can act in such a way as to fulfil conditions (1)–(3) but fail to 
 Moran 2006, p. 285.24
 I have used, for ease of illustration, the representation of Grice’s (1957) found in his 25
(1969). There are some diﬀerences to be found in how Grice represents his former self 
to how he presented himself at the time.  I suppress these complications.  See, for 
details, Bach 1987.
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make available testimonial knowledge.  This means that, in order for it 26
to provide an account of the acts with which speakers make available 
testimonial knowledge, Grice’s formulation of the intention he isolates 
needs to be modified.  This is what Moran suggests: 
The speaker intends not just that the recognition of his intention 
play a role in producing belief that P, but that the particular role 
this recognition should play is that of showing the speaker to be 
assuming responsibility for the status of his utterance as a reason to 
believe P. 
(Moran 2006, pp. 289–90) 
So to tell A something, S not only has to M-intend to induce a belief in 
them, but S must also intend that A, in recognising S’s M-intention, 
comes to recognise that S is taking on a kind of responsibility for her 
utterance.  And, as well as that, S must intend that A’s recognising S’s 
intention to assume such responsibility is to be taken by A as a reason for 
them to believe what S M-intends them to believe. We therefore get a 
fourth and a fifth condition on telling: for S to tell A that p, S utters u 
intending, 
 Moran (2006, p. 290) uses the following kind of example to show us how (I 26
paraphrase).  A speaker is going to Scunthorpe.  She intends to deceive her audience 
by saying that she is going to Scunthorpe, believing that her audience will take her for 
a liar—that is, believing that they will conclude that she is concealing her plans to go 
to, say, Bournemouth.  However, the audience knows all of this about the speaker, so 
concludes that she is going to Scunthorpe after all.  The idea is that recognition of the 
speaker’s intention plays a role in the audience forming a belief, but not in the right 
kind of way for that belief to count as distinctively testimonial knowledge.  So 
something more is needed.
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 (4) A to believe that if S’s M-intention is fulfilled, S is  
  assuming epistemic responsibility for A’s belief that p. 
and 
 (5) A to believe that S’s acting with the intentions (1)-(4) is a 
  reason to believe that p.  
Let’s call those intentions that satisfy the conditions jointly set down in 
(1)-(5), MR-intentions.  Moran thinks that telling somebody something is 
to act with an MR-intention.  Such acts therefore involve one’s possessing 
intentions concerning the beliefs of others, how those beliefs are 
acquired, and what role one takes as a speaker, in doing what one has 
done, in generating the reasons the audience has for the belief that one 
intends to impart. 
How is acting with such intentions meant to have epistemic significance? 
In (4), I have rendered the content of the augmented Gricean intention 
as that of intending that one’s audience to recognise that one, as a 
speaker, is assuming epistemic responsibility for the beliefs one intends 
them to form.  But what is this notion of ‘epistemic responsibility’?  This 
is a phrase I am using to capture Moran’s idea that the speaker takes 
“responsibility for the status of his utterance as a reason to believe” what 
he intends his audience to believe.  This kind of epistemic ‘taking of 
responsibility’ needs some explanation given the central role it has to play 
in Moran’s account of how utterances performed with MR-intentions can 
have the epistemic significance that he assigns to them.  And I think that, 
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properly understood, the notion is a helpful one.  I will now say 
something about how I understand it.  I want to draw special attention 
to this because the notion of epistemic responsibility will be employed in 
my proposed alternative account of how it is that speakers make available 
testimonial knowledge.  However, the role it plays in that account is not 
the role it plays in Moran’s account, because I do not think, as will 
become plain, that one needs to act with the intentions Moran invokes in 
order to make available testimonial knowledge to one’s audience. 
II. b. 
Epistemic Responsibility 
In the central cases, epistemic responsibility is something that speakers 
can assume for their audiences and something that audiences can defer to 
the speakers for whom they are the audience.  A defers epistemic 
responsibility, for their belief that p, to S, by treating S as (epistemically) 
authoritative as to whether p.  If knowledge transmits (that is, if it is 
possible for us to acquire irreducibly testimonial knowledge from a 
speaker), this results in the epistemic status of A’s belief that p (on the 
basis of taking up S’s utterance), to be dependent on the extent to which 
S is (epistemically) authoritative about whether p (i.e. dependent on the 
epistemic status of what S is giving voice to).  What is it to be 
epistemically authoritative in this context?  One would be maximally 
epistemically authoritative if, and only if, one knows that p.   Epistemic 27
 Epistemic authority, in the sense that I am using it, is not directly dependent on the 27
speaker’s certainty about something, or their status as an expert in the subject matter 
that p is a member of.  Epistemic authority is dependent on epistemic status, the 
quality of one’s grounds for taking things to be some way.  There are, of course, other 
senses of one’s being authoritative as to whether p that don’t track this usage.
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authority, as I am understanding it, is directly proportionate to the 
epistemic status of one’s belief or knowledge state, which may or may not 
be transparent to the subject.  This allows for the possibility that one may 
take oneself to be epistemically authoritative with respect to some claim, 
and fail to be.  In such cases, one would not be epistemically 
authoritative in the sense relevant to discharging epistemic responsibility. 
That is only achieved in the fullest degree either when one possesses 
knowledge that things are as one’s audience takes them to be (having 
taken up one’s utterance), or when one is appropriately relying on others 
who do.    28
Testimonial utterances (utterances with which testimonial knowledge can 
be made available) are utterances of a kind with which one assumes 
epistemic responsibility for those who take it up.  I’m tempted by the 
thought that it is constitutive of such acts that one assumes epistemic 
responsibility, when it is deferred to one—that just is, at least in part, 
what it is for one to produce a testimonial utterance.  Making available 
testimonial knowledge that p (by producing a testimonial utterance) is to 
discharge the epistemic responsibility one assumes in the production of 
the testimonial utterance with which one makes it available: it suﬃces for 
one to discharge one’s epistemic responsibility in so speaking that one 
 The second disjunct here is included to allow for testimonial knowledge acquisition 28
from non-knowledgeable speakers (see §IV. b. below).  I have introduced my preferred 
understanding of ‘epistemic responsibility’ with respect to the central cases—cases, that 
is, in which the speaker is in possession of the knowledge that they are giving voice to. 
I think that these cases of making available such knowledge by proxy are to be 
understood in terms of the central cases.
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knows that p.   One can produce a testimonial utterance and fail to 29
discharge the epistemic responsibility that one assumes for those who 
take it up (when one is mistaken about what one knows, or when one is 
lying).  I will have more to say about this shortly (§IV). 
So much for my own understanding of epistemic responsibility.  So 
conceived, what role does it play in Moran’s account?  It plays a dual role; 
not only does it play something like the role that I have just articulated, 
but it crucially interacts with another kind of responsibility: justificatory 
responsibility.  This notion is familiar from Brandom’s (1983) theory of 
assertion.  He says that in asserting something, what a speaker thereby 
does is undertake “the conditional task responsibility to justify the claim 
if challenged” (p. 641).  Moran does not commit to this being true of 
assertions generally, but does commit to the view that it is true of what 
might be regarded as a particular sub-set of assertions: Moran takes it 
that telling somebody something, essentially, brings about a normative 
eﬀect of this kind.  It is the assumption of justificatory responsibility, by 
the speaker, that is what it is for them to give their word about what they 
claim to be so to their audience.  Doing so puts one in a position to be 
subject to a distinctive range of reactive attitudes (depending on how 
things subsequently turn out) with respect to what one has told one’s 
audience.  If the belief A acquired by believing what S tells them is 
challenged, A has a right to defer justification of that belief to S.  S’s 
failure to do so, puts them at risk of being subject to those reactive 
attitudes from A (for example, resentment). 
 It is not, though, necessary.  That is because one can discharge one’s epistemic 29
responsibility if one says what it is that another knows (even when one does not know 
it oneself ).  See, again, §IV below. 
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It is the assumption of justificatory responsibility on the part of the 
speaker, in this way, that Moran takes to be the source of the knowledge-
sustaining, non-evidential reasons for A to believe that S’s utterance is 
true.  The assumption of epistemic responsibility, in and of itself, is the 
source of the reasons for belief that are transferred to A in the event of 
their taking up the utterance.  These two notions of responsibility thus 
interact in the following way: in order for one to take epistemic 
responsibility for another, one must give them a reason to accept what 
one says, by taking justificatory responsibility for what they end up 
accepting.  The taking of justificatory responsibility is achieved by 
making one’s intention to assume epistemic responsibility manifest—and 
one’s so acting being recognised by one’s audience.  In sum: S intends to 
assume justificatory responsibility for A by intending A to recognise that 
S intends to assume epistemic responsibility for what A would acquire on 
taking up S’s utterance.  When S’s intention is fulfilled, A defers 
epistemic responsibility to S in such a way that allows for the testimonial 
knowledge that S makes available (when she does) to be acquired by A. 
III. 
A Counterexample 
Moran’s account of what it required to make available testimonial 
knowledge—i.e. by ‘telling’ something to one’s audience—is susceptible 
to counterexample.  That’s because, according to it (a) MR-intentions are 
constitutive of acts of telling, and (b) acts of telling are the only source of 
testimonial knowledge.  But cases in which audiences can come by 
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testimonial knowledge from utterances performed without MR-
intentions are relatively easy to generate.  So, the knowledge sustaining 
epistemic value of such utterances does not derive from the intentions 
with which they were performed. 
III. a. 
Moran’s Susceptibility  
That MR-intentions are constitutive of the acts of telling is secured by 
Moran’s conception of what determines an utterance as the illocutionary 
act of telling.  Moran has a notion of ‘illocutionary authority’.  This says 
that speakers are capable of determining the kind of illocutionary acts 
that they perform with their utterances.  Suppose I utter the words “she 
sells sea shells on the sea shore”.  There are any number of things I could 
be doing in uttering those words.  One thing I might be doing is 
practicing my pronunciation; another is making a statement about where 
a shell-seller sells her shells.  What I, in fact, end up doing is down to me, 
because I have the power to decide what, of the various things I could be 
doing by uttering those words, I do end up doing.  This is the idea 
behind illocutionary authority. 
Assuming we possess illocutionary authority, what is it that determines 
whether I am making a statement or practicing pronunciation?  For 
Moran, it depends on what my intentions were in uttering those words. 
It is for this reason that the reasons for acceptance that audiences come to 
have are dependent on their recognising what the intentions of the 
speaker are when uttering their words.  The minimal claim is that such 
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recognition is an enabling condition on our acquiring (testimonial) 
beliefs.  If I didn’t know that you were trying to inform me of something, 
as opposed to, say, practicing your pronunciation, then your utterance 
could not so much as be a candidate for something for me to believe (see 
Moran 2013, p. 122).  
If this is the extent of the epistemic significance of such recognition, then 
it has no bearing, as yet, as to whether the utterance is a good reason for 
belief.  This element is secured by a speaker’s assumption of justificatory 
responsibility in possessing an MR-intention.  When recognised, it is 
meant to provide non-evidential knowledge sustaining reasons to accept 
the utterance, and so defer one’s epistemic responsibility to the speaker, 
for what one takes to be the case on the basis of what the speaker said. 
That is because, when recognised, one succeeds in assuming justificatory 
responsibility for the belief one intends one’s audience to acquire, and 
such an assumption is a reason for accepting the utterance—it is the oﬀer 
of a kind of indemnity against the falsity of the utterance: 
[T]he speaker, in presenting his utterance as an assertion, one with 
the force of telling the audience something, presents himself as 
accountable for the truth of what he says, and in doing so he oﬀers 
a kind of guarantee for this truth. 
(Moran 2006, p. 283) 
This shows why Moran is committed to the second point: that acts of 
telling are the only source of testimonial knowledge.  Since (1) 
illocutionary acts are individuated by the intentions with which they are 
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performed, (2) the reasons for acceptance are generated by an assumption 
of justificatory responsibility, and (3) the assumption of justificatory 
responsibility is achieved by the audience recognising one’s intention to 
assume epistemic responsibility for the belief one intends them to acquire 
(i.e. recognising one’s MR-intention), it follows that the kind of non-
evidential knowledge sustaining reasons required for the acquisition of 
testimonial knowledge can only be generated by acting with these 
intentions (i.e. acts of ‘telling’). 
III. b. 
Rumfitt’s Case 
When discussing Grice’s analysis of meaning, Ian Rumfitt presents the 
following case: 
In the course of their interrogation by the police, it must have 
become clear very quickly to the members of the Birmingham Six 
that nothing they could do or say would persuade their 
interlocutors either that they (the suspects) had not planted the 
bombs or that they (the suspects again) believed that they had not 
planted the bombs.  For all that, when they uttered the words “We 
did not plant the bombs”, the suspects certainly meant that they 
did not plant the bombs, and asserted as much. 
(Rumfitt 1995, p. 834) 
  
Rumfitt presents this case as a counterexample to a Gricean analysis of 
(utterer’s) meaning in terms of audience directed intentions, and is not 
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concerned with the epistemology of testimony.  But given the 
relationship between Moran’s notion of telling and the Gricean analysis, a 
similar case has application here.   
Did the Birmingham Six tell (in Moran’s sense) their interrogators that 
they did not plant the bombs?  S does not tell A that p, if S does not 
possess intentions to induce certain beliefs.  Grice has a plausible general 
principle concerning intentions: “it is in general true that one cannot 
have intentions to achieve results which one sees no chance of 
achieving” (Grice 1969, p. 158, cf. Rumfitt 1995, p. 833).  On the 
assumption that Grice is right about this, it would seem to follow that 
the Birmingham Six did not tell their interlocutors that they did not 
plant the bombs, and, as such, did not perform an act which could 
transmit their knowledge that they did not (supposing they do know 
this).   
Now suppose, unbeknownst to the Birmingham Six, that, among their 
audience, there’s an individual who does not possess the scepticism 
towards their utterances that others in the room do; they are receptive to 
what the Birmingham Six have to say.  Nonetheless, the situation so far 
as the suspects are concerned is just as hopeless as in the case as Rumfitt 
presents it.  So, as in Rumfitt’s presentation, they say, “we did not plant 
the bombs”, without intending to induce any beliefs in their audience 
(because they see no chance of achieving that end).  The non-sceptical 
individual in their audience decides to believe that they are uttering the 
truth, and so via uptake of their expressing something that they know, 
comes to know that the Birmingham Six did not plant the bombs.   
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If such an audience is able to come to possess knowledge in this way, it 
looks like a paradigm case of knowledge transmission—if they acquire 
any knowledge at all, it is irreducibly testimonial knowledge.  As such, 
the Birmingham Six performed a speech-act which made available this 
knowledge.  But they did not perform an act with MR-intentions (in 
other words, intentions to induce beliefs in their audience—by way of 
recognising that intention—and assuming responsibility for the beliefs 
they intended to bring about).  So, these intentions of the speaker are not 
the ultimate source of reasons required to sustain knowledge acquisition 
from testimony. 
III. c. 
Grice’s Principle 
Is Grice’s plausible principle true?  To answer that question, as Rumfitt 
himself points out (p. 835), an ambiguity needs to be recognised in the 
what is being said of one who is ‘acting with an intention’.  David 
Velleman (1989, p. 112-3) observes that it could be that ‘intention’ here 
picks out one’s “ultimate motivating desire”—i.e. their goal in so acting
—or it could be what the agent settles upon doing—i.e. their making the 
decision to imminently so act.  On the former reading of ‘acting with an 
intention’, Grice’s principle is not clearly true—there is some plausibility 
to the claim that one can set oneself a goal that one does not believe that 
one can achieve.  On the latter reading, by contrast, the principle is 
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clearly true—one cannot settle upon a course of action one believes one 
cannot achieve.   30
Which sense of ‘acting with an intention’ is relevant to Moran’s account 
of telling?  It is surely the sense in which it is the goal of the speaker to 
induce in their audience a certain belief, for it is not usually in one’s 
control to induce beliefs in others, in the sense required for one to 
properly decide to do so—this would involve a faith in one’s powers of 
persuasion that not all of us will have.   For all that, though, one may still 
be able act with the goal of getting one’s audience to believe something, 
even if one does not regard that as an achievable goal.   
It might, therefore, be thought that one can intend to do something, in 
the relevant sense of ‘intend’, that one does not think it is possible for 
one to achieve.  It is, then, an open possibility that the Birmingham Six 
acted with an intention to get their interrogators to believe that they did 
not plant the bombs, and it is in virtue of their possessing such 
intentions that the unknown, non-sceptical member of the audience was 
given access to their knowledge.  
 Though it is probably worth noting that Elizabeth Anscombe  (1957,  p. 94) appears 30
to give us putative counterexamples when she says, “[A] man hanging by his fingers 
from a precipice may be as certain as possible that he must let go and fall, and yet 
determined not to let go.  Here, however, we might say: ‘In the end his fingers let go, 
not he’.  But a man could be as certain as possible that he will break down under 
torture, and yet determined not to break down.  And St. Peter might perhaps have 
calculated ‘Since he says it, it is true’; and yet said ‘I will not do it’.  The possible in this 
case arises from ignorance as to the way in which the prophecy would be fulfilled, thus 
St. Peter could do what he intended not to, without changing his mind, and yet do it 
intentionally.”  Even if these really are counterexamples to Grice’s principle so 
understood, this does not aﬀect the point I trying to make.
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Does this mean that the Birmingham Six case is not a counterexample to 
Moran’s account of telling after all?  For the threat it poses to be 
neutralised, it would have to be the case that an intention that is thought 
to be doomed must be attributed to the members of the Birmingham Six 
when they produce their utterances, if they are to make available 
testimonial knowledge.  But that looks like it would be a diﬃcult claim 
to defend, because there are a number of equally, if not more, plausible 
explanations as why they acted as they did, than their possessing those 
intentions. For example, the members of Birmingham Six might have felt 
it important that their protestations of innocence were on record, or that 
it is important to tell the truth for its own sake, or whatever.  Their acting 
with these intentions doesn’t look like it should preclude such actions 
from making available testimonial knowledge; it looks like we can easily 
imagine cases in which they do not act with the Grice-style intentions 
that are meant to be constitutive of acts of telling, and nonetheless make 
available to a receptive subject the knowledge they possess (that they did 
not plant the bombs).  And that is all that is needed to generate the 
counterexample. 
IV. 
Voicing Knowledge 
I think that the susceptibility of Moran’s view to this kind of 
counterexample is symptomatic of a more general issue that applies 
equally to non-reductionist views like Burge's.  As I tried to make 
plausible in the last chapter, at the heart of the notion of irreducibly 
testimonial knowledge, there is a division of labour that legislates against 
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an enabling principle that places substantial constraints on when uptake 
can beget knowledge.  I think that there is a class of views that has been 
generally overlooked, views that take there to be no substantial enabling 
principle in eﬀect.  These are views that take seriously the independence 
of the epistemic status of what is acquired on the basis of uptake from 
the status of epistemic support one has for believing that the speaker’s 
utterance is true, that is at the core of the notion of irreducibly 
testimonial knowledge.  Using some of the conceptual framework found 
in Moran’s account, I’ll now put forward, respectively, my own proposal 
of how it is that we make available testimonial knowledge in speech, as 
well as what I think is required of audiences for them to avail themselves 
of the testimonial knowledge that speakers make available.  
S makes available testimonial knowledge that p if and only if S gives voice 
to knowledge that p.  One way to do that is to give voice to what oneself 
knows; another way to do that is to give voice to what someone knows. 
One can only voice knowledge with a testimonial utterance.  What is 
distinctive about testimonial utterances is that in uttering them, one 
assumes epistemic responsibility for whatever one’s audience acquires, if 
they take the utterance up.  They are those acts whose performance 
constitutively involves the assumption of epistemic responsibility for 
those who choose to defer responsibility for their beliefs to a speaker. 
Testimonial knowledge is acquired by an audience for whom a speaker 
assumes epistemic responsibility, when the speaker discharges that 
responsibility.  Something needs, then, to be said both about what it is to 
assume epistemic responsibility for another, and was is needed for one to 
discharge the epistemic responsibility assumed.  I’ll take these in turn. 
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One cannot assume epistemic responsibility for another unless they defer 
epistemic responsibility to one.  It is a cooperative endeavour.  Such 
deference, here, takes the form of uptake—uptake of a testimonial 
utterance is, in eﬀect, to act so as to defer epistemic responsibility for 
what one acquires on that basis, to the speaker of that utterance.  So what 
is needed is some explication of what is required of a speaker for them to 
produce an utterance for which an audience’s uptake has these results.  In 
particular, what is required for them to do this in such a way that their 
audience’s uptake can result in their acquiring testimonial knowledge.  
There are two ways of performing a testimonial utterance and discharge 
the epistemic responsibility that one can assume: one can voice one’s own 
knowledge, or one can voice the knowledge of another.  In both cases 
epistemic responsibility is discharged (if assumed), but in diﬀerent ways. 
But one can also perform a testimonial utterance without discharging 
epistemic responsibility.  For example, when one lies, one is performing a 
testimonial utterance without voicing knowledge—roughly speaking, one 
attempts to assume epistemic responsibility for one’s audience, with the 
deliberate aim of failing to discharge that responsibility.  One can also 
perform a testimonial utterance honestly, but fail to discharge epistemic 
responsibility by ignorance (i.e. one took oneself to know what one 
claimed to be so, but was wrong about what one knew).  
As such, one’s producing a testimonial utterance, and so putting oneself 
in a position to assume epistemic responsibility for one’s audience, is 
consistent with one doing at least four distinct kinds of things.  I’ll now 
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say a little about each of these things to be done by assuming epistemic 
responsibility, by way of illustrating what is required of speakers to do 
each of those things.  I’ll start with the two ways of making available 
testimonial knowledge, and then move on to the two ways to fail to 
discharge epistemic responsibility. 
IV. a. 
Voicing One’s Own Knowledge 
I want to suggest that we can explain what it is for one to voice 
knowledge, if knowledge that things are as the speaker said them to be 
can feature appropriately in a causal explanation of why the speaker 
produced the particular utterance, on the occasion of production, that 
they did.  Let me begin with voicing one’s own knowledge.   
I will articulate what I have in mind here by appeal to what is known as a 
‘practical syllogism’: articulations of instances of practical reasoning in 
the form of a particular kind of argument.  Given that we rarely consider 
the arguments explicitly in the course of acting reasonably, practical 
syllogisms are specifications of reasons that inevitably involve a certain 
level of idealisation.  These, then, will be descriptions under which 
speech actions can be thought to be rationalised in the spirit of this more 
or less mild idealisation.  The premises of such a syllogism serve to 
articulate, in this more or less idealised way, and in combination with the 
other premises, what it was that caused the speaker to produce the 
particular utterance under consideration. To that extent such structures 
can be employed to answer the question, perhaps only partially, of why it 
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was that the speaker ended up producing the particular utterance that 
they did.  The kind of premises I have in mind are those that articulate 
certain attitudes—beliefs and knowledge states, as well as other kinds of 
attitudes—that serve to rationalise the production of the utterance that 
the speaker utilises in performing the speech action they do.   I will pick 
out the relevant attitudes with the operator ‘it is desirable that’ which I 
take to articulate a range of more specific pro-attitudes.   In this, I am 31
making use of some aspects of Rumfitt’s (1995) way of using practical 
syllogisms to articulate the reasons why speakers produce their 
utterances.   
I take something akin to the following articulation of why it is that a 
speaker produces the utterance that they do, in the circumstances that 
they do this, when they voice their knowledge: 
(1) It is desirable that my audience hear me say something true  
 (concerning some subject matter M).  32
 ‘Pro-attitude’ is a notion utilised by Donald Davidson to cover those attitudes that 31
one might have that would prompt one to act in a certain way—such as desiring, 
possessing an urge, a recognition of a duty that one has, etc. See Davidson 1963, pp. 
685-6. 
 I originally had in mind an articulation that attributed to speakers a desire that their 32
audience hear something that the speaker knew to be true.  I gratefully acknowledge a 
debt I owe to Edgar Phillips who not only pointed out to me that this would fail to 
apply to many—indeed most—cases that I would want to classify as a speaker voicing 
their knowledge, but also pointed me in the direction that I have now taken in 
attributing to speakers the intention to say something true.  Speakers rarely engage 
with what they take themselves to know in ordinary cases in which they engage in 
communicative exchanges of informative purport.  For all that, their knowledge does 
have a role to play in explaining how it is that they made available testimonial 
knowledge to their audience.  It is that role that I am presently trying to articulate.
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(2) If, in the present circumstances, they understand me to have said 
 that p, then they will have heard me say something true   
 (concerning M). 
 ————————————————————————— 
(3) It is desirable that my audience understand that I have said that p. 
(4) If, in the present circumstances, they hear me utter S1, they will  
 understand me to have said that p. 
 ————————————————————————— 
(5) It is desirable that my audience hear me utter S1 (in the present  
 circumstances). 
Voicing one’s own knowledge that p involves one’s knowing that p.  That 
one knows that p explains why one knows something akin to (2).  As 
such, when one possesses knowledge that one’s saying that p is the case, 
in the circumstances, would be to state truth, one is in a position to 
make available knowledge that p in this way.  One will end up doing 
what one is in a position to do only if that knowledge interacts in a way 
akin to that articulated above with other pro-attitudes that one possesses.  
How plausible is the attribution of (1)?  I take this to be an articulation 
that encompasses a desire that a speaker might have to inform their 
audience; the informative intention is captured by the desire to utter 
truth to an audience, about some topic.  That obviously says nothing as 
to what motivates one to be informative—there will be more specific 
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desires of that are encompassed by what is articulated here as the desire to 
be informative.  That just goes to show that (1)-(5) is not a full 
articulation of why a speaker would tell someone, knowledgeably, that p. 
There may be any number of reasons to do that, because (at least) there 
may be any number of reasons that the speaker wishes to be informative. 
It is for this reason, incidentally, that the Birmingham Six case can be 
accommodated, as well as the kinds of cases that Moran had in mind in 
setting out his notion of ‘telling’ (what motivates the speaker to attempt 
to speak truth diﬀers in these cases).  One might have the kinds of 
intentions that Moran focuses on, and that would then be an unpacking 
of what motivated one to be informative, but one need not.  Whatever 
further details are needed to provide a full articulation of why the speaker 
produced their utterance, I want to suggest that if they are going to this 
in such a way as to make available testimonial knowledge, then their 
reasons had better cohere—to the extent to which it is an idealisation—
with the rational reconstruction of their reasons for utterance that I have 
just given. 
The belief, or knowledge, articulated at (4) is only rational given certain 
expectations that the speaker has of their audience.  The expectation will 
precisely be that their audience will be capable of discerning what it is 
that the speaker was trying to do (though perhaps not all they were 
trying to do), by uttering the sentence that they utter.  If the speaker 
were not to possess such an expectation, then it is not clear that (1)-(5) 
would serve to articulate why it was that they uttered the sentence that 
they did—their uttering that particular sentence is explained by their 
possessing an expectation of this kind.  I will explore what it is for an 
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audience to count as having met this expectation at length in the next 
couple of chapters—i.e. what is required of audiences such that the belief 
articulated by (4) (‘if, in the present circumstances, they hear me utter S1, 
they will understand me to have told them that p’) comes out true. 
This conception of what it is to voice one’s own knowledge attempts to 
capture the thought that there is a kind of intentional engagement 
between what the speaker knows, and what it is that they say to be so, 
when they act so as to make available testimonial knowledge.  That 
intentional engagement is important, because it is in terms of this that 
we can distinguish between cases which intuitively are cases of voicing 
knowledge and those which are not.  Suppose that I am given a list of 
claims at random, and am told the read them out.  As it turns out I know 
some of these claims to be true, and I don’t know some of them to be 
true (I may even know some of them to be false).  For those claims that I 
do know, there is a sense in which I am voicing something that I know. 
But, intuitively, we don’t want to say that such voicings are cases of 
voicing one’s knowledge (i.e. utterances with which testimonial 
knowledge is made available).  Why not?  The diagnosis that this view 
oﬀers is that my knowing those claims did not feature appropriately in 
why I produced the utterance in question.  I wasn’t motivated to utter the 
sentence that I did utter by my knowing that, if my audience were to 
glean what it is that I am doing in producing that utterance, they would 
be exposed to my telling them something true.   
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This gives the basic shape of the view with regards to the central cases of 
voicing one’s own knowledge.  I’ll now say a few brief things about the 
other acts one can perform by producing a testimonial utterance.  
IV. b. 
Voicing Another’s Knowledge 
So, first up, what about cases in which one voices not one’s own 
knowledge, but the knowledge of another?  I have in mind cases in which 
a speaker seems to make available knowledge by transmission despite 
their failing to possess the knowledge in question.  Jennifer Lackey has a 
much discussed case of this kind.   In it, a devout Christian teacher 33
believes that the theory of evolution is false, but nonetheless teaches it to 
her pupils.  For some (true) claim of evolutionary theory, p, we can say 
that, though the teacher does not know that p (because she does not 
believe it), she puts her pupils in a position to know that p by producing 
an utterance that, in the circumstances, states that p.  The question to be 
asked is, how has she done that?  The thinking is that, if she puts them in 
a position to acquire testimonial knowledge that p (i.e. knowledge by 
transmission), she has done so in the absence of knowledge that p. 
Which, so far as Lackey is concerned, is just a reductio ad absurdum of 
the notion of knowledge transmission. 
I said that one makes available testimonial knowledge by voicing 
knowledge, and one voices one’s own knowledge that p only when one’s 
knowing that p features in an explanation of why it was that one 
 Lackey 2008, p. 48.33
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produced the utterance that one did.  This entails that one must know 
what it is that one intends to say is so.  But in the kinds of cases that we 
are considering here, the operative speaker does not possess the 
knowledge at hand, so it cannot be a requirement on them that they 
know that what they intend to say is true.  Notice, though, that no such 
thing has been demanded of speakers in order for them to make available 
testimonial knowledge: the necessary condition on testimonial 
knowledge that I committed to referred to testimonial chains.  That is, I 
maintained that when some audience, A, comes to believe that p by way 
of taking up some utterance, u, of a speaker, S, which constitutes 
testimony to p, A comes to possess testimonial knowledge that p only if a 
prior speaker in S’s testimonial chain knew that p.  The reference to 
testimonial chains is there to allow for the acquisition of testimonial 
knowledge, so to speak, by proxy.  In other words, one can voice the 
knowledge of another in the absence of possessing that knowledge.  In so 
doing one makes available the knowledge of another to one’s audience.   
If that is to be defensible then one’s own knowledge, and so intentions of 
the kind articulated in (2), are not required to make available testimonial 
knowledge, when the knowledge they make available is not their own. 
There has got to be a way of voicing knowledge which allows it to be 
derivative on the prior (knowledgable) link in the testimonial chain.  But 
an explanation of what it is to voice knowledge in this derivative way 
cannot appeal to one’s knowing something akin to (2), since, ex 
hypothesis, one possesses no such knowledge but nonetheless makes 
available testimonial knowledge to one’s audience.  I think the solution is 
pretty straightforward.  Instead of (1) and (2) as that which serves to 
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rationalise the production of the relevant testimonial utterance it is, 
rather, 
(1)’ It is desirable that my audience hear me say what X said   
 (concerning some subject matter M). 
(2)’ If, in the present circumstances, they were to hear me say that p, 
 then they would hear me say what X said (concerning M). 
(where (3)-(5) are as before).  For one so motivated, to succeed in making 
available testimonial knowledge, it needs to be the case that X voiced 
knowledge by saying what they said about the relevant subject matter. 
That is, X needs to have either voiced their own knowledge or voiced the 
knowledge of another.  This allows for testimonial chains to get as long as 
they need to be.  Such chains will end in a speaker, or group of speakers, 
voicing their own knowledge.   34
 The qualification here which references groups of speakers is meant to allow for 34
testimonial knowledge acquisition when the relevant knowledge is not had by any one 
speakers, but by a group speakers.  The kinds of cases I have in mind are those which 
are discussed in, for example, Faulkner (2000), pp. 595-9, where he discusses a case 
found in Hardwig (1985) in which an experiment is conducted by a number of 
scientists, each with diﬀerent expertise, that could not have been conducted by one 
alone, whose collaboration results in some claim p.  Though no one of the scientists 
has non-testimonial knowledge that p, that they all together contributed to the claim 
by the knowledge that they collectively come to possess, we still want to allow that one 
can acquire testimonial knowledge that p from the group of scientists as a whole.  I see 
no reason why this cannot be brought in the current fold.  
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IV. c. 
Speaking from Ignorance 
Let me now turn to cases in which speakers fail to make available 
testimonial knowledge by producing a testimonial utterance.  In cases in 
which one is not saying something that someone else in one’s testimonial 
chain knows, one fails to make available testimonial knowledge when one 
does not know what one is talking about.  That will be because one will 
be driven to produce that utterance in a way akin to that which was 
articulated in (1)-(5), but in such cases one will not know that p, so the 
mental state articulated in (2) will not be a state of knowledge.  Of 
course, when one is sincere, but ignorant, what will fill the gap left in the 
rationalisation of one’s utterance of the sentence in question will be one’s 
taking oneself to possess such knowledge, but, as it happens, one is 
mistaken about what it is that one knows.  And as a result, one rationally, 
but not knowingly, speaks non-knowledgeably at best, or, at worst, 
falsely.   
Similarly, when one is passing on what another has said, one fails to 
make available testimonial knowledge if they failed to make available 
testimonial knowledge by either failing to voice their own knowledge or 
failing to voice the knowledge of another. 
 87
IV. d. 
Lying 
Finally, I’ll make a couple of brief remarks about lying.  Lying is a 
complex phenomenon, the precise details of which are disputed.   I 35
won’t attempt a comprehensive account of lying, by any means, but I do 
want to give some indication of how I think it should be thought of in 
the present framework.  I want to suggest that there is a slightly diﬀerent, 
but closely related rationalisation of the production of testimonial 
utterances in the course of lying where we again drop (1) and (2) and 
replace them with something else.  I suggest, 
(1)* It is desirable that my audience hear me say something false. 
(2)* If, in the present circumstances, they hear me say that p, they  
 would hear me say something false.  
Here (2)* need not be known by the speaker, but only believed for them 
to be regarded as lying to their audience.  This, though, is not suﬃcient 
for the speaker to be lying.  For there are cases in which one, for example, 
may make an ironical statement by acting in such a way that the 
rationalisation of the production of the utterance with which one makes 
such a statement can similarly be articulated.  Ironical statements are 
those which can plausibly be rationalised in a way consonant with the 
articulation starting with (1)* and (2)*, but we do not want to say that 
 See Sokke 2013 for an up to date discussion of some of the complications involved 35
in defining lying. 
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being ironic is thereby a case of one lying.  One can make an ironic 
statement without lying.   
What will make the diﬀerence here will be the expectations that the 
speaker has of their audience, that underpins their possession of the 
various states of belief and knowledge, and other attitudinal states, that 
rationalise their action. A noteworthy diﬀerence between cases of voicing 
knowledge and cases of lying is that, unlike voicing knowledge, lying 
seems to me to require of a speaker that they possess an intention to 
induce in their audience a certain belief.  That, again, just goes to show 
that the rationalisations of utterances articulated in (1)-(5), and its 
variants, are not full articulations of why the speaker produced their 
utterance.  In cases of lying, why it is that the speaker takes it to be 
desirable that their audience hear them say something false is that they 
intend that their hearing this will result in their coming to possess a false 
belief that what they (the speaker) say is so.  With regards to ironical 
statements, there will be no such intention, but rather an expectation 
that, in the circumstances the audience recognise that in saying what they 
do, the speaker is being ironic. 
V. 
Receptivity to Knowledge Voiced 
I have emphasised the cooperative nature of testimonial knowledge 
acquisition by insisting that it requires of the speaker that they assume 
epistemic responsibility for their audience, and from the audience that 
they defer epistemic responsibility to the speaker.  I have said a few 
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things both about what it is for a speaker to assume epistemic 
responsibility, by producing testimonial utterances, and about what is 
needed for a speaker to discharge the epistemic responsibility they 
assume.  It is now time to look at what is required of audiences for them 
to defer epistemic responsibility to a speaker. 
I said in the last chapter that some version of the enabling principle is 
almost universally accepted.  That is, it is almost universally accepted that 
in order to avail oneself of the knowledge made available by a speaker (in 
whatever way one thinks that happens), it is necessary for one to have 
some antecedent epistemic support for the claim that the speaker is 
uttering the truth.  That is, unsupported beliefs to that eﬀect will not 
yield knowledge that things are as the speaker says them to be.  That 
principle, recall, is thought to be met in a number of diﬀerent ways by 
the diﬀerent kinds of accounts of how we acquire knowledge from 
others.  So on a Burgean kind of non-reductionism, the enabling 
principle is met by one’s possessing no, or suﬃciently little, evidence for 
the supposition that the speaker is somehow being misleading.  On a 
Moran-style account, by contrast, the enabling principle takes the form 
of requiring that the audience’s uptake of the testimonial utterance of 
another is reasonable given their other attitudes.  This requires more than 
the standard form of non-reductionism requires (an absence of 
contravening reasons is not suﬃcient to render one capable of acquiring 
testimonial knowledge by uptake), but the attitudes that it recognises as 
able to provide the requisite support for uptake extend beyond that 
which the reductionist is prepared to recognise.  However, what makes it 
the case that uptake can yield knowledge, according to Moran’s version of 
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non-reductionism, is not what constitutes epistemic support for that 
which is acquired on its basis.  That is dependent on the status conferred 
on it by the relevant party in the testimonial chain. 
Consider, again, the Birmingham Six.  I suggested that in the absence of 
the speaker providing reasons to accept what they say—at least, those 
reasons isolated by Moran as required for testimonial knowledge 
acquisition—an audience could still avail themselves of testimonial 
knowledge made available in the course of their protestation of 
innocence.  Given the audience had every reason to suppose that they 
were not speaking truth in protesting their innocence, it is a plausible 
description of the situation that they did not lack suﬃcient reason to 
suppose they were misleading them.  Nonetheless, it is at least arguable 
that they acquired testimonial knowledge by taking up the utterance with 
which the protestation was made; at least, I’ll be making that argument. 
Accordingly, I think even non-reductionist accounts like Burge’s preclude 
the possibility of testimonial knowledge acquisition in cases in which it is 
made available. 
So, in the spirit of the account I have already given, I want to suggest 
that audience’s reasons for taking up a speaker’s utterance have, then, no 
bearing on the epistemic status of what they acquire on the basis of such 
uptake.  The epistemic status of the upshot of uptake is, rather, entirely 
dependent upon the extent to which the speaker has discharged the 
epistemic responsibility that the audience has deferred to them.  That 
means that deference occurs when uptake does.  And uptake begets 
testimonial knowledge regardless of the evidence in one’s possession for 
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the claim that the speaker is uttering something false, when it is uptake 
of an utterance in which the speaker voices knowledge.  That is, in cases 
in which the speaker discharges the epistemic responsibility conferred on 
the by their audience’s deference (i.e. uptake). 
I am now going to turn to two possible objections to this aspect of the 
view—the thought that audiences can acquire testimonial knowledge on 
what appears to be a pretty undemanding basis—I have just sketched. 
V. a. 
Unsafe Testimonial Knowledge 
Stated as baldly as this, this account is likely to strike some as obviously 
false.  Couldn’t there be cases in which there are many close possible 
worlds in which one acquires a false belief, yet still counts as knowing, 
according to this account?  Consider the Hall of Morons: a hall chocked 
full of the ignorant, each of whom, invariably, speaks falsely when 
producing testimonial utterances.  The hall, though, does have one sage 
in it; that is, one who only says things to be as she knows them to be.  A 
consequence of the view that I have been outlining appears to be this: so 
long as the audience takes up a testimonial utterance that constitutes a 
voicing of knowledge, they can avail themselves of the knowledge made 
available by the speaker.  If one were to approach the sage in the Hall of 
Morons, then taking up her testimonial utterance would allow one to 
acquire the knowledge she gives voice to (despite the, say, million-plus 
morons one could so easily have approached).  But since, one might 
suppose, one only knows something if it is not the case that there are 
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(too many) close possible worlds in which one acquires a false belief, then 
the view I have been proﬀering predicts knowledge where there is none. 
As such, it should be rejected. 
This objection relies on the idea that there is a safety condition on 
knowledge—that is, roughly, that it is a necessary condition of knowing 
that p that there are no close possible worlds in which one acquires a false 
belief.  That is meant to capture the thought that in knowing something, 
it couldn’t have easily been the case that one’s taking things to be as one 
knows them to be, was wrong.  This is widely thought to hold true of 
states of knowledge, but the view I have presented about how it is that 
we can acquire knowledge from testimony appears to violate this safety 
condition.  That’s because it appears to allow one to acquire knowledge in 
the hall of morons (if one approaches, by chance, the sage), and any view 
that allows this does not look like it is consistent with the thought that 
one can only acquire knowledge in cases in which one could not have 
easily been wrong.  That’s because it looks like one could have easily been 
wrong in taking up an utterance in the hall of morons.    
There is, though, a way of bringing the present account in line with at 
least some of these views that impose a safety condition on states of 
knowledge.  It involves making two additional commitments to the view 
I articulated above.  First, we need to relativise knowledge attributions to 
methods of belief formation; and second we need to be radically 
externalist about method individuation (something to this eﬀect is 
suggested in Williamson 2000, pp. 152-6).    36
 I owe a debt both here and in §V. b., even more than elsewhere, to Rory Madden.36
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What are methods?  When Robert Nozick (1980) first presented his 
sensitivity based account of knowledge, he had to qualify the view by 
relativising to methods, so as not to preclude knowledge acquisition 
when it has obviously been acquired.  Nozick’s view was that, so long as 
one’s beliefs were sensitive in the right way to the truth, then that belief 
counts as a knowledgable one.  The manner in which he initially 
characterised that view is well known; according to it A knows that p, just 
in case, (i) p; (ii) A believes that p; (iii) if p were not the case, A would 
not believe that p; and (iv) if p were the case, A would believe that p.  The 
counterfactuals in (iii) & (iv) are to be understood in terms of what is 
true at possible worlds that are close to the actual world, on some 
understanding of what that amounts to.   Sensitivity, though, is not 37
safety.  Safety can be represented as the contrapositive of (iii), namely 
that if A were to believe that p, p would be the case (i.e. there are no close 
possible worlds to the one in which A believes that p, and p is false).  But 
on the majority of semantics for counterfactuals, they don’t contrapose. 
The two conditions therefore amount to diﬀerent requirements.   
Though it is widely held that there is a safety condition on knowledge, it 
is much less widely held that there is a sensitivity condition on 
knowledge.  But the relativisation to methods that Nozick employed can 
open an avenue to make the present account of testimonial knowledge 
consistent with a safety constraint.  
 See Williamson 2000, Ch. 7 for what it does, ultimately, amount to for Nozick.37
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Nozick introduced methods because he foresaw a problem with 
condition (iii), giving the following counterexample:   
A grandmother sees her grandson is well when he comes to visit; 
but if he were sick or dead, others would tell her he was well to 
spare her upset.  Yet this does not mean she doesn't know he is well 
(or at least ambulatory) when she sees him. 
(Nozick, 1980, p. 179) 
The thought is that the grandmother’s false belief that her grandson is 
well in the (relatively) close possibility that her grandson is sick is 
consistent with her knowing the he is well when he comes to see her. 
Thus, it looks like if p were not the case (if her grandson was sick), the 
grandmother would still believe that p (that her grandson is well), and 
she nonetheless still knows that p. 
The problem also aﬀects condition (iv).  Take the following case.  Sam is 
having an aﬀair with Pat.  I don’t know this—in fact, Sam and Pat are so 
good at hiding this fact that I am convinced that they hate each other, 
and believe that they are not having an aﬀair (as opposed to withholding 
judgement).  I am taking my usual commute into town on the Tube.  I’m 
punctual, and every morning I take the train that arrives at, say, 08:03. 
Take it, too, that Sam and Pat are travelling on the route that takes them 
past my station on this particular day only because a freak accident 
caused their usual travel arrangements to be disrupted.  They are, then, 
canoodling on the train that arrives at my station at 08:06.  Now, 
punctual as ever, I am descending the steps to the platform at 08:02.  But 
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halfway down a child, who is walking up, drops all her marbles. I’m 
normally extraordinarily selfish, but get a quite uncharacteristic urge to 
be altruistic, and help the child pick up her marbles.  This takes a couple 
of minutes, so I miss my usual train.  When the next train arrives, I spot 
Sam and Pat in embrace, and infer knowledgeably that they are having 
an aﬀair.   
There is at least one close possible world in which Sam and Pat are having 
an aﬀair and I don’t believe that they are.  There are many close possible 
worlds in which I am not delayed on my way to the way to the platform, 
or there is no freak accident on their usual communte.  And in such 
worlds I don’t believe that Sam and Pat are having an aﬀair (in fact, I 
believe that they aren’t).  So it is not the case that, if Sam and Pat were 
having an aﬀair, I would believe that they were.  So, according to the 
conditions as originally stated, I do not know this—I fail to meet the 
fourth condition.   But, I do know that they are having an aﬀair on the 
basis of seeing them embrace, so the view precludes knowledge where it 
occurs, and so is to be rejected.  
The introduction of methods of belief acquisition are meant to help here, 
because if we relativise to such methods, the counterexample can be 
neutralised.  The kind of belief that should be under scrutiny is not the 
belief (by whatever means) that Sam and Pat are having an aﬀair, but the 
belief, based on one’s seeing their embrace, that Sam and Pat are having 
an aﬀair.  We can now just look at the close possible worlds in which you 
acquired the belief that Sam and Pat are having an aﬀair by seeing their 
embracing on the train.  In all those worlds, I get delayed in such a way 
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that I take the 08:06 train (and their travel plans are disrupted), and so in 
all those worlds, I believe that they are having an aﬀair.  I now meet the 
fourth condition, and so, according to Nozick, come by knowledge.   
Once we have methods in the picture, we can make the view I have put 
forward consistent with there being a safety condition on knowledge. 
We can do so by committing to the claim that believing a speaker who 
voices knowledge is to employ a diﬀerent method to the method one 
employs when believing a moron (or a liar, or anyone who is not voicing 
knowledge).  A safety condition relativised to methods demands that 
when one knows something, there are no relevantly close possible worlds 
in which one acquires a false belief by employing the same method of 
belief formation.  When methods are individuated in such a way that 
believing one who voices knowledge is to employ a diﬀerent method to 
believing one who does not, we then get the result that believing the sage 
in the hall of morons is to employ a diﬀerent method to believing a 
moron.  And since there is no close possible world in which one acquires 
a false belief in believing what the sage tells one (since the sage is giving 
voice to a belief that, ex hypothesis, satisfies a safety condition), one can 
count as knowing that things are as the sage said them to be.  
But is the above individuation of methods in testimonial contexts 
plausible?  One may worry that something fishy going on because one 
would not be able to tell whether one was using one method rather than 
another in the hall of morons.  That is, one cannot tell if one is 
confronted with the sage, or just another moron, and if one cannot tell 
which one is confronted with, then one cannot be said to be employing 
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diﬀerent methods in believing the sage and the moron respectively.   To 
avoid this kind of objection, we need to be externalist with respect to 
method individuation, in the sense that it is not transparent to the 
subject which method of belief acquisition they are employing.  There is 
independent plausibility for the claim that we should be externalists 
about method individuation.  As Williamson has argued, if we are not 
externalist about method individuation, then sceptical consequences 
appear to follow.  Williamson provides the following consideration: 
Suppose that in the good case one believes via M that one is not in 
the bad case.  Then [the counterfactual: necessarily, if S knows p via 
method M then if p were false, S would not believe p via M] 
forbids this true belief to constitute knowledge that one is not in 
the bad case via M only if in the bad case one believes via M that 
one is not in the bad case.  
(Williamson 2000, p. 155) 
The good case is one in which one sees one’s hands, the bad case is one 
which is indistinguishable from the good case, but in which one does not 
have hands.  The idea is that in the when one is in the good case, one 
may believe that one is not in the bad case by seeing one’s hands.  But 
one won’t come to believe this in the bad case by seeing one’s hands, since 
one doesn’t have any hands in the bad case.  One can then insist that one 
is employing diﬀerent methods in each of these cases, and in the good 
case one knows that one has hands, even if that is not known in the bad 
case.   If one is to avoid sceptical results, it is not plausible that one is 
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always able to discern what method one is employing, so it is not 
plausible to individuate methods by what one can discern.   
For all that, I do not endorse this elaboration of the account I have given. 
I am only demonstrating that it can, with some additional theses, 
accommodate a conception of knowledge on which our knowledge states 
satisfy a safety condition.  Nonetheless, going externalist about methods 
(or employing a similar such manoeuvre) does cohere with the 
conception of testimonial utterances that I have already indicated is 
needed on my account.  That conception is this: it is distinctive of 
testimonial utterances that, in the event of their being taken up, the 
utterer assumes epistemic responsibility for the uptaker.  If the 
testimonial utterance constitutes a voicing of knowledge, then the 
epistemic responsibility assumed is discharged, and, as such, the uptaker 
has availed themselves of the knowledge the speaker gives voice to.  If the 
testimonial utterance constitutes something other than a voicing of 
knowledge—a voicing of mere belief, say, or a lie—then the speaker has 
failed to discharge the epistemic responsibility they have assumed for the 
uptaker.  As such, the uptaker is unable to avail themselves of any 
(testimonial) knowledge, because none has been made available. 
According to the line of thought I have been considering, these mark 
diﬀerent methods of uptake—one method is by way of a testimonial 
utterance that constitutes a voicing of knowledge, the other method is by 
way of a testimonial utterance that does not constitute a voicing of 
knowledge.  Uptakers may not be in a position to tell which method they 
are employing, but for all that, they employ diﬀerent methods of belief 
formation in the diﬀerent cases.  As such, in the Hall of Morons, there is 
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no close possible world in which the audience comes by a false belief by 
employing the same method of belief acquisition.    
V. b. 
Easy Knowledge 
Another potential problem arises when we consider the possible 
interaction between the alleged knowledge that the view allows to be 
acquired, and the kinds of inferences that one can make on the basis of 
possessing that knowledge.  In knowing that Jim smokes, on the basis of 
having been told by one who voices knowledge, I should then be able to 
infer all sorts of thinks that I know to be implied by this.  One of the 
things, particular to testimony, that I will know that is implied by things 
being as the speaker said them to be is that the speaker spoke truth with 
their utterance.  So, since (1) I know, on the basis of being told, that Jim 
smokes, and (2) I know that my knowing that Jim smokes on this basis 
implies that the utterance with which that knowledge made available is 
true, then (3) I am in a position to know that that utterance is true.  38
Prior to my acquisition of knowledge that Jim smokes by accepting your 
testimonial knowledge, that constituted a voicing of knowledge, I cannot 
be said to have been in a position to know that you uttered truth.  I, 
though, am allowing knowledge acquisition even in the presence of 
 Notice that this argument does not rely on any Closure principle, we can remain 38
neutral on whether the principle holds, and the problem is still generated.  All it relies 
on is two plausible claims about what one knows, and one’s making the relevant 
inference given the relation between them.  In this I have taken inspiration from 
Zalabardo’s (2005) presentation of the problem of easy knowledge (pace Cohen 
(2002)).  
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(discounted) reasons to suppose that the speaker is being misleading.  I 
should now be in a position to knowledgeably infer that the speaker 
uttered truth.  That’s because I know that Jim’s being a smoker implies 
that your utterance is true, so it follows that I am in a position to know 
that your utterance is true (if I know what the relevant implications are). 
It looks like, then, by force of will alone, I have managed to move from 
having reasons to suppose that it is not the case that the speaker uttered 
truth to being in a position to know that the speaker (you) uttered truth. 
Just because I happened to accept something that in fact was an 
expression of knowledge, my decision, potentially based on a mere whim, 
puts me in a position to know something I wasn’t in a position to know 
before.  So the objection goes, I cannot put myself in that position in this 
way, so the account I have oﬀed is false. 
Why can I not put myself in that position in that way?  It prima facie 
looks troubling that the view can allow for knowledge to be so easily 
available, on the basis of our whims about who to believe, because then it 
might seem that we debase knowledge to the point that it no longer 
occupies the conceptual space that is distinctive of it—i.e. that it is that 
most elevated of epistemic statuses.  Is knowledge so debased on the view 
I recommend?  Notice that testimonial knowledge is only made available 
in cases in which the speaker voices knowledge.  They do that by saying 
something that they, or someone else, knows to be true.  So the view has 
it that, when it comes to testimony, only knowledge begets testimonial 
knowledge.  As such, the knowledge in which the testimonial chain is 
grounded is that which satisfies whatever conditions that are distinctive 
of it (for example, they satisfy a safety condition).  This means that one is 
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only in a position to acquire knowledge that the speaker uttered truth, 
when what they give voice to with that utterance is something that 
satisfies all the conditions one imposes on a state being knowledgable.   
In eﬀect, the response that I want to recommend is an exercise in bullet-
biting.  The bullet that needs to be bitten, though, is only as hard as what 
is needed to accept non-reductionism in the first place.  Non-
reductionism says that we can acquire distinctively testimonial 
knowledge—knowledge that we can only acquire from one who 
themselves is in possession of it (or someone who is in the testimonial 
chain of one who possesses it).  It is a commitment to one’s acquiring 
knowledge when one has insuﬃcient evidence to establish what is being 
claimed for oneself.  The point that I am making is that the acquisition of 
knowledge that the speaker uttered truth acquired in this way is no easier 
to acquire than testimonial knowledge that things are as the speaker said 
them to be (when they voice knowledge).   
VI. 
Conclusion 
That concludes my initial characterisation of the epistemology of 
testimony I am defending in this thesis.  
Relying, in part, on an argument made by Michael Dummett, I claimed 
in Chapter 1 that we should accept that there is such a thing as 
irreducibly testimonial knowledge.  That is, a kind of knowledge that one 
can acquire from a knowledgable source, even when one does not have a 
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conclusive inductive argument for the belief that the speaker uttered 
truth.  I showed that views that agree that we can acquire knowledge of 
this kind from what others tell us, tend to accept what I called ‘the 
enabling principle’.  This principle says that one must have a suﬃciently 
epistemically supported belief that the speaker uttered truth in order for 
one to acquire the knowledge that a speaker can make available by 
speaking knowledgeably.  I have tried to show that the enabling principle 
is strictly optional; given the epistemic dependences that non-
reductionism as such is committed to, further argument is needed to 
show that there are restrictions on our acquiring testimonial knowledge 
beyond whether knowledge has been present at some appropriate point 
in the testimonial chain.  The absence of such an argument opens up the 
possibility that there are no restrictions of the kind imposed by the 
enabling principle on when we can acquire irreducibly testimonial 
knowledge.  
In this chapter I have put forward a view of this kind.  Extracting further 
motivation in favour of such a view in light of counterexamples I gave to 
Moran’s account, I then employed some of his conceptual framework in 
setting out the view that I favour.  I suggested that irreducibly testimonial 
knowledge was made available by a speaker voicing knowledge, where one 
voices knowledge in uttering something when the knowledge in question 
features in the appropriate way in a casual explanation of why one 
produced that utterance.  In particular, one counts as voicing knowledge 
when one utters something because one knows that what one is saying is 
true, or because one is saying something that someone else said in the 
course of voicing knowledge.  I showed how we can understand failures 
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of testimonial knowledge acquisition, and addressed a couple of 
objections that might be thought to aﬀect the account I oﬀered.   
I’m now going to attempt to orientate this account in a wider cognitive 
landscape by turning to the role that our understanding the utterances of 
others can play in sustaining this (putative) way of acquiring knowledge 
from what others tell us.   
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3. 
Expectations, Intentions, and the Things Done 
with Words 
I. 
Introduction 
I have started to build the case for an account of how it is that we come 
to possess knowledge from what others tell us that takes the epistemic 
status of what is acquired on the basis of uptake of a testimonial 
utterance to be independent of the epistemic support one may have for 
believing that the utterance is true.  Allowing for genuinely (irreducible) 
testimonial knowledge acquisition is to allow for knowledge acquisition 
from what someone says that is of a kind that is only possible if the 
speaker knows what they are talking about (or someone in their 
testimonial chain does).  I wanted to suggest that if we take seriously the 
possibility that we can acquire testimonial knowledge of this distinctive 
kind, we can then take the epistemic status of what is acquired on the 
basis of uptake—the belief that things are as the speaker said them to be
—to be entirely dependent on the epistemic status of what is taken up—
the belief, or knowledge, that the speaker gave voice to.  And it is a 
corollary of this that the epistemic status of what is taken up is unaﬀected 
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by the quality of one’s evidence for, or against, the claim that the speaker 
uttered truth.  I have presented an account which aﬃrms this conception 
of the structure of the epistemic dependencies involved in coming by 
knowledge from others.  
According to that account, a speaker makes available testimonial 
knowledge to their audience by voicing knowledge.  I said that there are 
two ways to do that: in the basic cases, one voices one’s own knowledge 
and in the derivative cases one voices the knowledge of another.   A 
speaker voices knowledge, in either way, by producing a testimonial 
utterance that constitutes a relational speech act that makes available 
testimonial knowledge.  In other words, by telling them something that 
oneself, or someone else, knows to be true.   Sticking with the basic 39
cases, a speaker voices their own knowledge, in the course of telling 
someone something, when they produce a particular (testimonial) 
utterance because they know that what they tell their audience, in the 
course of doing this, is true.   The ‘because’ here is meant to capture the 
idea that such knowledge will feature in a causal explanation of why they 
produced that utterance in those circumstances.  Such an explanation can 
take the form of a rational reconstruction of the speaker’s reasons for so 
acting.  When voicing their own knowledge, the speaker’s knowing what 
they are talking about will contribute in the required way to that 
explanation.  When the speaker is voicing knowledge that is not their 
own, the explanation will appeal to the knowledge possessed by someone 
in their testimonial chain. 
 The notion of ‘telling’ I am employing is meant to be a pre-theoretical, ordinary 39
notion; one that, the arguments in the last chapter suggest, is not captured by Moran’s 
account of ‘telling’.  
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But I also mentioned that voicing one’s own knowledge involves having 
an expectation that, on producing some particular utterance, in some 
particular circumstance, one’s audience will understand what one has 
done in producing that utterance.  What, precisely, is one meant to be 
expecting here?  And what would it be for one’s audience to meet an 
expectation of this kind?  That is, what would it be for the expectation to 
be met in such a way that the audience can avail themselves of the 
knowledge made available when a speaker produces a testimonial 
utterance that constitutes a voicing of knowledge?  It is to these questions 
that I turn in this chapter.    40
This chapter can be seen as being in two parts.  From §II until §VI, I 
focus on a way of classifying kinds of speech acts that J. L. Austin gave us 
in his How To Do Things With Words.  From §VI onwards, I’ll be focusing 
on elements of Paul Grice’s program of analysis of the notion of ‘utterer’s 
meaning’.   
In the first part, I’ll start (§II) by considering a sample rational 
reconstruction of a speaker’s reasons for producing a particular 
testimonial utterance to draw out what sort of things we tend to expect 
of our audiences.  I will isolate one expectation that it is reasonable to 
attribute to speakers in general, that serves as a foundation of (attempted) 
communicative interactions.  In §III I mark a distinction that Jennifer 
Hornsby has made between acts and actions.  Having done so I 
 The full picture, or at least, the fuller picture, won’t emerge until the end of the next 40
chapter, once Ian Rumfitt’s account of the relevant level of understanding has been 
explained and defended.  
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introduce, in §IV, the framework for thinking about the kinds of things 
to be done in speaking that was given to us by Austin, and has been 
taken up by Hornsby.  I discuss some diﬀerent ways we might think that 
we can specify what Austin calls the rhetic act performed.  I then turn, in 
§V, to an influential claim of John Searle’s—the claim that it is both 
necessary and suﬃcient for success in performing certain kinds of acts 
that one can perform in speaking, that one’s audience recognise what act 
one is trying to perform.  I assess the extent to which Searle’s claim is 
true, and conclude that it holds good for the rhetic acts performed by 
speakers.  This suggests that the relevant expectation of the speaker is one 
which can be met by the audience recognising what the speaker means to 
be doing, at the level of description of the rhetic thing that they have 
done.   
In the second part, I start, in §VI, with the Gricean analysis of ‘utterer's 
meaning’.  I remark on the connection between the rhetic act performed 
and ‘what’s said’, as well as the connection between the so-called ‘literal 
meaning’ of words and what’s said with them, on particular occasions. 
§VII turns to John McDowell’s (1980) criticisms of Grice’s account.  I 
think that McDowell’s criticisms are valid, but, using the resources from 
the preceding discussion, I show why McDowell’s reaction to Grice is, in 
one important respect, an overreaction.  I conclude in §VIII, by saying 
what kind of account might take its place.  In the next chapter I’ll outline 
a view that one might think can play the relevant explanatory role, that is 
found in Rumfitt (2005). 
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II. 
Speakers’ Expectations 
Suppose that S knows that the Foreign Secretary has resigned.  If S is to 
make available that knowledge to A, by giving voice to what she knows 
with an utterance of the sentence, ‘the Foreign Secretary has resigned’, 
then, from S’s perspective, something akin to the following practical 
syllogism serves to at least partially articulate why it was that, in the 
circumstances, S uttered that sentence: 
(1) It is desirable that A hear me speak the truth (about the Foreign  
 Secretary’s resignation). 
(2) If, in the present circumstances, A understands me to have  
 said that the Foreign Secretary has resigned, will A have heard me 
 speak the truth (about the Foreign Secretary’s resignation). 
 ————————————————————————— 
(3) It is desirable that A understand me to have said that the Foreign 
 Secretary has resigned. 
(4) If, in the present circumstances, they hear me utter “the Foreign  
 Secretary has resigned”, they will understand me to have said that 
 the Foreign Secretary has resigned. 
 ————————————————————————— 
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(5) It is desirable that my audience hear me utter “the Foreign  
 Secretary has resigned” (in the present circumstances). 
Each of (1)-(5) are more or less idealised representations of the content of 
various pro-attitudes that speakers can possess.  So long as the causal 
explanation for why the speaker uttered “the Foreign Secretary has 
resigned” is something akin to that as represented in (1)-(5), and so long 
as they possess knowledge that underwrites (2), then the speaker can 
truly be said to have voiced their own knowledge.   It is only when 41
speakers are motivated to speak in a way that is captured by a rational 
reconstruction of their reasons for speaking on these lines, and when it is 
the speaker’s knowledge of the relevant fact that explains the presence of 
(2) in it, that they voice (their own) knowledge.   
At (4), I have attributed to the speaker a belief about what her audience 
will take her to have done, if she were to produce a given utterance.  In 
the last chapter, I said that a speaker’s possessing beliefs of that kind is 
rational only given the expectation that their audience is capable of 
understanding the utterance that constitutes the particular (speech) 
action performed.  In the absence of their having these expectations, the 
rationality of the speaker’s action is put in doubt.  So the first question to 
ask is, what, precisely, are speakers expecting of their audiences here? 
 Recall that the attribution of (1) is a kind of catch-all for more specific motivations 41
for speakers to be informative when speaking to their audience (see below).  And I said 
that one voices the knowledge of another when (1) is replaced with something akin to 
“It is desirable for A to hear me say something that X said”, for some X who themselves 
voices knowledge (either their own or another’s).  Whether one is voicing one’s own 
knowledge, or someone else’s, it makes no diﬀerence for my purposes in this chapter. 
For ease of exposition, I will continue to primarily deal with the basic case of a speaker 
voicing their own knowledge.
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Of course, there are many things that speakers may well expect of their 
audience.  They might expect them to laugh, or to keep quite and listen, 
or to try to see one’s own point of view.  There are, though certain 
expectations that can seem more central than others—central, that is, to 
the purpose of engaging in the activity of speaking at all.   The uttering 42
of something is an intentional action; in so acting, a speaker tends to 
have certain goals.  An enabling condition on their achieving those goals, 
I will suggest, is that the expectation which underwrites (4) is met; the 
expectation, that is, that makes it rational to believe that in their uttering 
a certain sentence, in the circumstances of speaking, they will be 
recognisably, doing something that furthers their broader aims (in a 
distinctive way).  It is the meeting of this expectation that contributes so 
centrally to those things occurring that I’m most interested in here, 
namely to the very success of the distinctively communicative goals that 
the speaker had in speaking.  
Suppose that the expectation that underwrites (4) in the relevant 
practical syllogism is not met.  A will not have taken S to have said that 
the Foreign Secretary has resigned, on the basis of hearing S utter ‘the 
Foreign Secretary has resigned’.  There might be any number of reasons 
why A fails to so take S’s action, some of which will come under scrutiny 
in what is to follow.  But however that failure comes about, one 
consequence will be that whatever else S sought to be doing in telling A 
about the former Foreign Secretary’s career decisions, they will not be 
 I am leaving soliloquy to one side, though I think that it is derivative on our 42
communicative speech.
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achieved—at least, not in the manner that S intended.  So we can get a 
handle on what it is that the speakers are expecting here by discerning 
what it would be for them to have facilitated the achievement of these 
goals. 
III. 
Basic Communicative Acts 
I am going to start by saying something about what we can think of as 
basic communicative acts.  But before I do, there are some structural 
points about actions in general, and so speech actions in particular, that 
are worth setting out up front. 
III. a. 
Acts & Actions 
Jennifer Hornsby distinguishes between ‘actions’ and ‘acts’, and I will do 
the same (her application of this distinction to speech can be found in 
her (1994), pp. 187-8).  Actions are particular events in which acts are 
performed.  Acts are the things done, actions are the doing of those 
things.  So, when I perform the action in which, on some occasion, I 
move a carved piece of bone on a checkered board, there may be any 
number of other things that I do—that is, acts that I perform.  I can, for 
example, put my opponent in check, or show how much of an amateur I 
am.  You can do those things too, if you were to also move a carved piece 
on a board in some appropriate way, in the appropriate circumstances—
that is, perform the same acts as me (but with a diﬀerent action).  When 
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it comes to language, I will take utterances to be actions (particular 
datable events) where there are many acts (properties of those events) to 
be performed with an utterance. 
We can, in general, impose an ordering of acts performed when acting on 
an occasion; some such acts stand in a more basic than relation to others. 
In moving the bone from one place to another, I put you in check.  The 
use of ‘in’ here indicates the ordering along the more-basic-than scale—
my moving the bone is a more basic act than putting you in check. 
What goes for acts in general, goes for acts performed with utterances in 
particular.  For example, we can suppose that in telling A that the Foreign 
Secretary has resigned, S persuaded A that the government is on the verge 
of collapse.  And in so persuading A, S caused A to weep.  In the practical 
syllogism above, the lower down the argument that it is articulated with, 
the more basic the act which it is the goal of the speaker to perform. 
Thus, the desire expressed in (3) pertains to a more basic act than the one 
expressed in (1).  And (5) to a more basic act than (3).   
I have already mentioned, in the last chapter, that (1)-(5) is incomplete as 
an articulation of the reasons why S produces her utterance in those 
circumstances.  It is, plainly, only a partial rational reconstruction of her 
reasons.  Something like (1) (the desire that her audience hear her speak 
the truth about something in particular), is an articulation of the goal 
that a speaker might have—the goal of having her audience be informed 
by her—but that there may be any number of reasons why she has that 
goal.  In accordance with the above, this is to be understood in terms of 
the relative basicness of acts.  For example, S might find it desirable that 
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A hear her say truth concerning the recent changes in Cabinet, because A 
will be attending a recording of a popular television news quiz, and S 
thinks that in informing A of this, S will lower the chances of A making a 
fool of himself.  In this case, the act of informing is more basic than the 
act of preventing A from looking a fool.    43
There is a certain point in this ordering where the acts that feature at that 
point are those whose performances are, in an important sense, central to 
the speaker; there are some very central aims of the speaker that need to 
be met for these ancillary acts to have any chance of succeeding.  If the 
speaker’s belief in (4) turns out to be false—if her audience fails to have 
figured out, at an as yet unspecified basic level, what she was trying to do 
in making the sounds that she did—none of the multifaceted goals that 
people have in speaking have a chance of being achieved.   
III. b. 
The Primary Communicative Intention 
I take as my point of departure here, some remarks about 
communication that have been made by John McDowell.  The 
performance of a speech act is, McDowell tells us, is a kind of 
publication of one’s communicative intentions:  
 The more comprehensive rational reconstruction, then, will include attributions of 43
beliefs to the eﬀect that if the audience hear one speak truth about the Foreign 
Secretary’s resignation, they will believe that the Foreign Secretary has resigned.  Since 
their believing so much will contribute to their not looking a fool, it is desirable that 
they believe that the Foreign Secretary has resigned (given its desirable that they not 
look a fool).
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the primary aim of a speech act is to produce an object—the 
speech act itself—which is perceptible publicly, and in particular to 
the audience, embodying an intention whose content is precisely a 
recognisable performance of that very speech act.  
(McDowell 1980, p. 41)   
The aim of communication is a form of mutual awareness—it is the 
sharing of something between the speaker and her audience.  It comes 
about when audience is aware of something that the speaker wanted 
them to be aware of.  The unusual thing about communication is that it 
is the audience’s awareness of what those aims are, that is a vital part of 
what one is trying to achieve.  In uttering “the Foreign Secretary has 
resigned”, there is something that you want me to recognise.  The very 
least that you want, is for me to recognise that there is something that 
you are trying to convey with your words.  The point is that, absent the 
aim of getting me to see what it is that you are trying to convey, you 
cannot be thought of as engaging in a communicative pursuit at all.  
If that is right, we can think of the primary communicative intention as 
the aim of achieving such mutual awareness.  When that is achieved, 
some basic form of communication has occurred between speaker and 
audience.  The primary requirement of success, then, is that what one is 
intending one’s audience to become aware of is recognised.  And that is 
done by one’s audience recognising that intention.  When recognised, 
one has succeeded in doing that basic communicative thing.  It is basic in 
the sense that it serves as the basis upon which all the other kinds of acts 
that we attempt to perform in speaking.  Absent success at this level—
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absent the awareness in one’s audience that one is attempting to convey 
something to them—no other goals that one might be hoping to advance 
in speaking can be pursued.  It is, so to speak, the starting point from 
which all the other things we attempt in speaking must take their 
departure; which is just another way of saying that it is what it is to be 
engaging in communication at all.  
The conjecture that I am working with in this chapter is that such a 
‘primary communicative intention' is what underwrites the expectation 
that makes one’s holding something like (4) rational.  That is, what one is 
expecting is, in part, that such an intention will be realised—that one is 
understood to have performed an act of a particular kind that one means 
to be performing (though not necessarily every act that they mean to be 
performing). 
What is required for one’s audience to cooperate in the required way—
that is, meet the expectation one has of them?  The central claim I’ll be 
making is that it is for an audience to meet the relevant expectation of 
the speaker, when the speaker is trying to tell somebody something, is for 
them to recognise something in particular—what Austin calls the ‘rhetic’ 
thing—that the speaker means to be doing, in the course of their trying 
to do this.   On basis of this, I’ll say something about what, more 44
specifically, it is that speakers and audiences need to do, for acts of this 
kind to succeed. 
 A view of this kind has many ancestors.  Two can be found in Searle (1969) and 44
Rumfitt (1995).
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IV. 
The Things Done With Words 
Not everything that a speaker can do with an utterance will be relevant to 
their achieving the basic level of success with respect to some of their 
goals in speaking.  That’s because recognition of only some of the things 
that a speaker can (intent to) do in uttering something matter to the 
speaker’s achieving that basic level of success.  
To see more clearly what the relevant level of success is, as well as why 
recognition of this kind is so key to its achievement, it will help to 
impose some structure on the sorts of things that we can do with our 
utterances.  I am going to make use of a classification of the sorts of 
things to be done in speaking that has been given to us by Austin, and, 
more specifically, by way of an interpretation of how best to implement 
that classification given by Hornsby.   Having done so, I will focus on 45
the category of things done that Austin calls the ‘rhetic’ acts.  As I’ve said, 
it is the rhetic acts that we perform, I will suggest, which are vital to our 
achieving the basic level of success that I’m concerned with. 
Austin distinguished between the locutionary, illocutionary and 
perlocutionary things done (i.e. acts) in the uttering of something (the 
action).  As we’ll see, these are determinable acts to be performed with an 
utterance, of which, with the exception of the perlocutionary, there will 
be determinates of each of these determinable acts performed whenever 
we succeed in uttering something (on the significance of the employment 
 In particular, in her (1988) & (1994).45
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of the determinate/determinable distinction here, see §IV. a. below).  The 
perlocutionary is excluded because not every utterance involves the doing 
of some perlocutionary thing, but every significant (linguistic) utterance 
does, necessarily, involve the doing of a locutionary and an illocutionary 
thing.  
I’ll start by looking at how we might understand more precisely the 
category of the locutionary by examining what Austin told us are the 
determinable acts that compose the locutionary things done.  I’ll then 
turn to the illocutionary things done, in particular by looking at in the 
way that Hornsby’s claim that the distinctive feature of determinate 
illocutionary acts is that success in performing them can be secured by 
one’s audience’s recognising what one is trying to do.  If that were true, 
then illocutionary acts might start looking like they have those success 
conditions that I’ve said are distinctive of basic communicative acts.  I 
will cast doubt on Hornsby's claim, at least to the extent that what are 
normally thought of as illocutionary acts have the success conditions that 
she says is distinctive of the illocutionary as such.  I will then turn, 
briefly, to perlocutionary acts when I look at Grice in §VI. 
IV. a. 
The Phatic & The Rhetic 
So what, more exactly, is done in doing a locutionary thing?  Austin used 
‘locutionary’ as an umbrella term to encompass three distinct 
determinable things to be done when uttering something: a phonetic act, 
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a phatic act and a rhetic act (Austin 1962, p. 109).  Here is how Austin 
marked oﬀ each of these acts: 
[T]o say something is 
(a) always to perform the act of uttering certain noises (a ‘phonetic’ 
act), and the utterance is a phone; 
(b) always to perform the act of uttering certain vocables or words, 
i.e. noises of certain types belonging to and as belonging to a 
certain vocabulary, in a certain construction, i.e. conforming to 
and as conforming to a certain grammar, with certain 
intonation &c.  This act we may call a ‘phatic’ act, and the 
utterance which it is the act of utterance a ‘pheme’ [...]; and 
(c) generally to perform the act of using that pheme or its 
constituents with a certain more or less definite ‘sense’ and 
more or less definite ‘reference’ (which together are equivalent 
to ‘meaning’).  This act we may call a ‘rhetic’ act, and the 
utterance which it is the act of uttering a ‘rheme’. 
(Austin 1962, pp. 92-3) 
The two important categories for my purposes are the phatic and the 
rhetic.  Restricting our attention to those utterances that are the speaking 
of a sentence of a language in a context, the phatic thing done is the 
uttering of the words of a language, whereas the rhetic thing done is the 
uttering of them with a certain kind of significance.   A description of 46
 Austin himself invokes the Fregean notions of ‘sense’ and ‘reference’. Though it is 46
not necessary to do so, this does indicate what kind of features of utterances Austin 
wanted to pick out with the notion.  It is a description of what one does by producing 
an utterance at the level of what it is that is being spoken about: specifically, that about 
which something is being said or asked or commanded, etc..
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the phatic thing that is done in the course of a speaker’s uttering 
something is a description of what one does, for example, by uttering 
“Jim smokes”, that is pre-theoretically captured with the description, 
‘speaking (the words), “Jim smokes”’.  A description of the rhetic thing 
that is done in the course of a speaker’s uttering something is a 
description of what one does that is pre-theoretically captured with the 
description, ‘saying that Jim smokes’.  In accordance with this, I’m going 
to use a notion of ‘saying’ that marks out (at least) the rhetic thing 
typically done by an utterance of an indicative sentence in the course of 
making assertions.  It is, perhaps, a somewhat artificially thin notion, 
though I don’t think it strays too far from ordinary usage. 
So conceiving of the distinction between the phatic and the rhetic is 
suggestive of how we can think of the relationship between them.  A 
description of the phatic things done is, so to speak, a description of the 
vehicles, whereas a description of the rhetic thing done says what some of 
the significance of the occurrences of these vehicles are.   That suggests 
that a description of the rhetic things done by speakers will say what 
some of the significance is of the phatic thing done (in that language) in 
that context.  Only some of the significance of the action that is the 
utterance in question will thereby be specified because a fully developed 
linguistic theory will ultimately involve a portion that is dedicated to the 
uses to which the sounds that are significant in that language can be 
put.   This is, in eﬀect, a partitioning of theoretical responsibility of 47
describing acts that stand at diﬀerent points on the more-basic-than 
scale.  In saying the words ‘Jim smokes’ (the phatic thing), one said that 
 Hornsby 1988, pp. 31-3; see also her 1994, p. 188, and 1986, p. 92.47
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Jim smokes (the rhetic thing), and in saying that Jim smokes, one told 
one’s audience (for example) that Jim is a smoker (the illocutionary 
thing).  This provides at least prima facie reason to suppose that we have a 
well demarcated set of domains about which to conduct our theorising. 
IV. b. 
The Rhetic & The Illocutionary 
But not everyone agrees that this kind of categorisation of putative things 
done in speaking is correct.  Indeed, some don’t think that is really a 
good distinction to be made between the rhetic things done and the 
illocutionary things done.  A view of this kind was once put forward by 
John Searle (1968) on the grounds that Austin had not properly 
motivated the locutionary/illocutionary distinction.  Why Searle was 
mistaken here will help bring into sharper focus just what lies on either 
side of this distinction.  
The grounds Searle had for so criticising Austin are generated by the 
thought that there was something suspect in relying on something that 
was meant to be an abstraction from the total speech act performed.    As 
Searle conceives of the way that one could draw such a distinction, he is 
convinced Austin was mistaken in thinking that there is a discernible 
(rhetic) thing that we can truly say to have been done over and above the 
illocutionary act performed: 
The concepts locutionary act and illocutionary act are indeed 
diﬀerent, just as the concepts terrier and dog are diﬀerent.  But the 
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conceptual diﬀerence is not suﬃcient to establish a distinction 
between separate classes of acts, because just as every terrier is a 
dog, so every locutionary act is an illocutionary act.  
(Searle 1968, p. 413) 
The idea seems to be that acts that count as locutionary stand to acts that 
count as illocutionary, as particular animals that are terriers stand to 
animals that are dogs.  That is, that they stand to each other in some 
form of the way that species stand to a genus.  There are a few diﬀerent 
kinds of species/genus distinction.   One is the determinate/48
determinable distinction.  We can think of the determinate/determinable 
distinction as a specific form of the species/genus distinction, when we 
understand the latter in the following way.   We can take B to be a 49
species of A, and A to be a genus of B when something’s being B entails 
its being A, but its being A does not entail its being B.  The determinate/
determinable distinction holds between B and A when they stand in the 
species/genus relation by virtue of B being a form of things that are A can 
take.  Terrier is a species of the genus dog, because terriers are a form that 
dogs can take.   
To see what this comes to, it might be helpful to contrast the 
determinate/determinable distinction from other forms of the species/
genus distinction.  One of these distinctions Anton Ford has recently 
 That is, there are diﬀerent species of the genus, species/genus distinction.  As it 48
happens, they are determinate of the determinable, species/genus distinction (where the 
determinate/determinable distinction is itself a species of that genus).
 I am taking this way of drawing the species/genus distinction, and the location of 49
the determinate/determinable distinction with respect to it, from Ford (2011). 
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labelled ‘accidental’ generality as against ‘accidental’ specificity.  The 
species in such instances is derivative in kind on its genus—that is, 
something belongs to the species, in virtue of belonging to the relevant 
genus.  For example, one is a brother in virtue of one being male, not the 
other way round; a brother is a male sibling—to be a brother is to be 
male plus something else (a sibling), and it is in virtue of this that 
brothers are species of males.  This is not the kind of generality that 
applies in the determinate/determinable structure; things here go in the 
opposite direction.   Something is a determinate of a determinable when 50
it belongs to the genus in virtue of belonging to the relevant species. 
Something is a dog in virtue of being a terrier, not the other way round. 
And that’s precisely because terriers are forms that dogs can take.   
Searle appears to think that what Austin picks out is just diﬀerent ways of 
classifying the very same act on something like the determinate/
determinable distinction, so understood.  But that doesn’t seem to get 
Austin’s distinction between the locutionary and illocutionary right.  In 
the first place, the ordering suggested in Searle gets things topside down: 
the quotation suggests that some illocutionary act is going to be the 
genus of some locutionary act which is a species.  Take the (putative) 
rhetic act of saying and the illocutionary act of asserting.  That would be 
the idea that saying that Jim smokes is a species of the genus, asserting 
that Jim smokes.  Accordingly, it must be that every case of saying that 
Jim smokes is a case of asserting that Jim smokes, and not every case of 
asserting that Jim smokes is a case of saying that Jim smokes.  But, if 
anything, the opposite is true—arguably, every asserting is a saying, but 
 Ford prefers to call this ‘categorical generality’ vs. ‘categorical specificity’.50
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not every saying is an asserting, because one can say something—in jest, 
for example—without putting it forward in a way distinctive of 
assertions.  
For all that, might there be really only one act being performed here, not 
two?  Just as we are not saying that there are two things in saying that, of 
some creature, it is a terrier and a dog, there are not two acts being 
described when we specify, of some utterance, the locutionary thing done 
and the illocutionary thing done in the course of its production.  But 
Austin’s classification is meant to pick out a number of diﬀerent acts, each 
of which are determinates of diﬀerent determinables, that we perform in 
uttering something.  Hornsby brings out why this is in her discussion of 
explicit performatives: 
Picturing two theoretical taxonomies, one for animals and one for 
utterances, we imagine dog taking its place above terrier in a 
hierarchy of levels, but we imagine saying that one promises to return 
the book and promising to return the book as on some same level in 
the other taxonomic hierarchy.  These two speech acts are 
subsumed by the rhetic and the illocutionary act respectively, and 
the rhetic and the illocutionary act are both at some same (high) 
level. 
(Hornsby 1988, pp. 34-5) 
When I promise to return the book, in uttering “I promise to return the 
book”, my promising to return the book is the illocutionary act I perform, 
and I do this by performing the rhetic act of saying that I promise to 
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return the book.  One promises something, by way of speaking, by saying 
that one promises, but for all that promising and saying that one promises 
are diﬀerent acts.  But if illocutionary acts were determinate acts of 
determinable rhetic acts, there would not be two acts performed here.  So 
we should think of the rhetic acts and the illocutionary acts in the course 
of uttering things as determinable acts, where one does at least two 
distinct things in producing one’s utterance.   
I’m now going to focus specifically on the rhetic thing done, and say 
something about the nature of these acts, on the basis of considerations 
adduced about how we should go about specifying them. 
IV. c. 
Rhetic Acts & Mood 
The way that Hornsby proposes that we should seek to specify the rhetic 
thing done in uttering something is to follow divisions that are present in 
what is known as mood.  Mood is a syntactic property that applies to 
sentences—sentences have a certain mood, utterances make use of 
sentences in a certain mood, but do not themselves have a mood.  What 
utterances do have is an illocutionary force.  The connection between 
mood and illocutionary force is, at least, that utterances of sentences that 
have certain moods are typically used to perform certain kinds of 
illocutionary acts.    51
 For discussion of the relationship between mood and force see Hornsby 1988, 51
Wilson & Sperber 1988 and Boisvert & Ludwig, 2005.
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The reasons for so specifying rhetic acts, are brought out when 
considering whether the kinds of acts typically performed with utterances 
of non-indicative sentences can be assimilated by acts of the kind 
typically performed with indicative sentences.  There are two prime 
candidate accounts that attempt this: the explicit performative account 
found in Lewis (1970), and Donald Davidson’s (1979) paratactic 
account.  Davidson shows us why Lewis’ account fails; Hornsby (1986) 
has shown why Davidson’s account fails.  I will concentrate on the latter. 
The reasons for the failure of such an attempted assimilation 
demonstrates why we should think of rhetic acts in a way that ties what 
rhetic acts there are to do with mood in something like the way Hornsby 
suggests. 
Davidson’s idea is that “an utterance of a non-indicative sentence can be 
decomposed into two distinct speech acts”, where Davidson is picking 
out what I’m calling actions (i.e. utterances) with his use of “speech 
acts”.   The decomposition is constituted by the first utterance making 52
reference to the second, by (performatively) saying what kind of 
illocutionary force it (putatively) has.  Each utterance is declarative—i.e. 
can be accurately represented as an utterance of an indicative sentence. 
The second ‘utterance’ is of a putative indicative core of the non-
indicative sentence, and the first ‘utterance’ makes reference to that 
indicative core.  When one utters “Put your hat on!” to command 
someone to put their hat on, Davidson says that this should be thought 
of as constituted by, or at least equivalent to, two declarative utterances: 
(i) “my next utterance is imperative” which is followed by (ii) “you will 
 Davidson 1979 p. 119.  See §VI. a. for elaboration on this point.52
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put on your hat”.  In this way, Davidson takes himself to be able to say 
that the meaning of non-indicatives can be accounted for in the same 
way as indicatives: by employment of suitably constrained truth-theories 
(see Chapter 5). 
Hornsby picks out two connected problems with this.  In the first 
instance, it is diﬃcult to see how Davidson can avoid commitment to the 
claim that all utterances of non-indicates have truth-values.  Davidson 
sought to avoid just that conclusion, while aﬀording non-indicatives a 
truth-conditional treatment.  Consider the explicit performative account. 
That tells us that “Put on your hat!” is equivalent to “I command you to 
put on your hat”.  But if they are equivalent, then “Put on your hat!” 
turns out to be true, since the explicit performative “I command you to 
put on your hat” is true.  But the utterance of the imperative isn’t true—
imperatival speech acts are not truth-apt.  So the two cannot be 
equivalent. 
Davidson seeks to avoid this consequence, though it is not clear that he 
succeeds.  The first sentence says “my next utterance is imperative”, and, 
it turns out, that it “is true if and only if the utterance of the indicative 
sentence is imperatival in force” (Davidson 1979, p. 120).  Since that 
first sentence is what makes the second imperatival in force, then the 
utterance of the indicative sentence is imperatival in force.  For all that, 
both utterances have truth conditions, and those conditions either will, 
or will not, fail to be fulfilled.  Suppose we were to include a conjunction 
where the hidden full-stop is supposed to be.  If you did do what was 
putatively ordered of you, then the utterance of the conjunctive sentence 
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would come out true, since the conditions for the truth of the second 
conjunct would be fulfilled.  But Davidson wants to say that though 
both utterances have conditions under which they come out true, “the 
combined utterance is not the utterance of a conjunction” (p. 121).  As a 
result this combination itself doesn’t have a truth value.   
It is a little puzzling to see what possible grounds there are for Davidson 
to insist this (consider, “The bath is full.  The water is hot.”)  But the 
important point is that this oddity points to a deeper diﬃculty with 
Davidson's approach.  The issue turns on whether we can regard the two 
utterances that such uses are supposed to be equivalent to saying 
anything.   And it is on this front that the second, and more troubling 
objection that Hornsby raises bites.  When we take some issuing of an 
order, such as “put on your hat!”, Davidson’s paratactic treatment 
attempts to assimilate this into two uses of indicative sentences.  But, 
typically, indicative sentences are used to say things.  So if such utterances 
can be assimilated in this way, does that mean that, despite appearances 
we say what utterances of the indicative sentences extracted would 
typically say?  That is, does the speaker say, first, that the next utterance is 
imperative, and, second that you will put on your hat?   
No combinations of answers to these questions is acceptable here. 
Suppose that both utterances are instances of saying things.  In that case 
the first utterance turns out to be false, since the second would not be 
imperitival in force.  And if it is not imperitival in force, it is unclear how 
it could be distinguished from the prediction that the audience will put 
on their hat, and so could be issued as an order to do anything.    
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Suppose the first utterance is a saying that is true.  Then the next 
utterance is imperatival.  But that is inconsistent with the second 
utterance being indicative; that is, the next utterance (“you will put on 
your hat”) does not say anything.  If the mood-setting utterance is true, 
and so an order is issued in our example, then the next utterance does not 
say anything in the sense that an utterance of an indicative sentence 
typically says something.  What it does is to classify the utterance as an 
imperative one, and so straightforwardly ascribe the property of its being 
imperative to it, that the mood-setting utterance was meant to. But then 
it is not clear why the paratactic treatment is called for at all, since “put 
on your hat!” could itself be deemed (surely correctly) to be imperatival. 
Then there is no need to say that the utterance is imperative, and no need 
to get the indicative core out—it could be done in the imperative mood.   
If this is right, then it looks like what is needed is some way of 
distinguishing the kinds of (determinable) rhetic things done according 
to those (determinable) rhetic things that are typically done with 
utterances of sentences of diﬀerent moods.  This is exactly what Hornsby 
proposes.  She suggests that we should take these diﬀerent determinable 
rhetic acts track the distinctions we find in the moods of sentences.  We 
take there to be a class of rhetic acts that are performed, at least typically, 
with indicative sentences.  We can then attach to utterances with which 
acts of that class are performed a verb that specifies the rhetic thing done 
in the course of uttering something of that kind.  For those acts 
associated with utterances of indicative sentences, we can employ a 
relatively thin sense of ‘saying’ whereby utterances of that kind are said to 
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say that such-and-such (such a notion of saying would be, to all intents 
and purposes, the notion of ‘saying’ that I’ve been using to this point).   
But we can then take it that there is a class of rhetic acts that are 
performed, at least typically, with impertival sentences, which are 
typically done by the performance of a rhetic act that is specified by 
claims that make use of a thin sense of, for example, ‘enjoining’, which 
attaches to utterances of this kind where they order, command, advise or 
whatever.  For interrogatives, and perhaps optatives and exclamatives, we 
might find similarly appropriately thin notions with which to specify the 
rhetic things done by utterances of the relevant kinds.    So conceived, 53
rhetic acts fall into diﬀerent categories, categories that are reflected in the 
diﬀerent moods that sentences can bear.  These moods of sentences are 
those syntactic properties that they have, sentences with these properties 
are those with which acts of these diﬀerent categories are typically 
performed. 
That suﬃces as an initial characterisation of the sort of thing that I mean 
to be picking out with my use of Austin’s category of the rhetic thing 
done.  I am now going to move on and consider the conditions under 
which acts of the rhetic kinds and acts of the illocutionary kinds can be 
said to be successful.  I’ve claimed that the our basic communicative 
intentions have got to be such as to be those whose recognition is both 
necessary and suﬃcient for their success.  We shall see that Searle thought 
 Hornsby employs, instead, various notions of ‘saying’—indicative saying, 53
interrogative saying, optative saying—each of which roughly correspond to the kinds 
of verbs that were employed on the moderate approach in specifying the rhetic things 
done by utterances that constitute illocutionary acts of the various corresponding 
kinds.
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such recognition was both necessary and suﬃcient for the success of our 
performing acts of the illocutionary kind; Hornsby has followed Searle to 
the extent that she agrees that such recognition is suﬃcient for success in 
one’s illocutionary aims.  I will discuss some putative counterexamples to 
this weaker thesis of Hornsby's that Jane Heal has recently given.  What I 
take these to show is that not everything that is usually referred to as an 
illocutionary act has the success conditions that Hornsby thinks is 
distinctive of the illocutionary as such.  However, rhetic acts do have these 
success conditions.  This, I think, lends support to the claim that what is, 
fundamentally, expected by a speaker is that their audience recognise 
their rhetic intentions.  
V. 
Searle’s Extraordinary Properties 
We typically make available testimonial knowledge by performing an 
utterance with an indicative sentence.  I have employed the term ‘saying’ 
in specifying what rhetic thing is done with utterances of the kind that 
are typically performed with indicative sentences.  With respect to the 
utterances of simple sentences that I have mainly concentrated on, such 
specifications will specify what thing is referred to and what property is 
being attributed to that thing (i.e. what properties it is said to have).  A 
paradigmatic illocutionary act that itself tends to be performed in one’s 
doing a rhetic thing of this kind, is telling someone something.   They 54
are also speech-acts with which we inform our audiences of things; that 
 At least, what tends to be classed as an illocutionary act.  Some reasons one might 54
have for thinking that not all acts of telling someone something are illocutionary acts will 
be discussed shortly.  
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is, make available knowledge to them.  They therefore seem like a good 
place to start.   
Searle famously defended the claim that communicative acts in general, 
and acts of telling in particular, have certain ‘extraordinary properties’: 
If I am trying to tell someone something, then (assuming certain 
conditions are satisfied) as soon as he recognises that I am trying to 
tell him something and exactly what it is that I am trying to tell 
him, I have succeeded in telling it to him.  Furthermore, unless he 
recognises that I am trying to tell him something and what I am 
trying to tell him, I do not fully succeed in telling it to him. 
(Searle 1969, p. 47)  
Searle suggests here that it is both necessary and suﬃcient for the success 
of the illocutionary act that the speaker means to be performing that 
their audience recognise what they are trying to do by uttering those 
words.   Searle’s claim therefore amounts to the idea that, with regards 55
to telling, one succeeds in telling one’s audience something when, and 
only when, it is common knowledge between oneself and one’s audience 
what one intended to be doing—namely, telling them something—in 
producing one’s utterance.   
This would suggest an unpacking of the content of the expectation that I 
have said the speaker has, and that their audience must meet, for the 
 Modulo the implicit distinction drawn between succeeding and fully succeeding in 55
the quotation; cf. Heal 2013, p. 149.
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primary requirement of the success for communication to likewise be 
met.  Because that primary requirement of success is met by audiences 
recognising what the speaker means to be doing, that serves as the basis 
for their attempting to achieve whatever myriad goals that have in 
speaking.  And I said that there is an important connection between this 
basic level of success, and the kinds of acts whose success is secured by 
the recognition of one’s intention to so act, because that basic level of 
success is achieved by performing acts with these conditions for success. 
This is at least suggestive that, if illocutionary acts possess Searle’s 
extraordinary properties, the expectation of the speaker, then, that I have 
isolated would be met if, and only if, speaker and audience are in 
possession of common knowledge of what illocutionary act the speaker is 
trying to perform. 
But putative counterexamples abound to the attribution of these 
properties both to acts of telling, in terms of which Searle presents these 
properties, and to paradigmatic illocutionary acts of other kinds, like 
warning somebody.  Both the necessity claim—that in order to tell 
someone something, they need to recognise what one is trying to tell 
them—and the suﬃciency claim—that it is enough to have told someone 
something that they recognise that one was trying to do so—have come 
under pressure.  I’ll look at some cases in a moment.  But before I do, I 
want to note that Hornsby agrees with Searle to the extent that she 
thinks that the suﬃciency claim holds of illocutionary acts in general.  In 
fact, she thinks that it is this feature of those acts which distinguishes 
them from the perlocutionary things done by one’s uttering something, 
because  perlocutionary acts do not have these success conditions.  
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To see why, we first need to understand the role of what Hornsby calls 
‘reciprocity’.  She introduces that notion with a discussion of the 
illocutionary act of warning.  When a speaker performs the less basic act 
of warning somebody of something by doing the more basic act of 
‘expressing a thought’ to them, 
it seems that the speaker relies only on a certain receptiveness on 
her audience’s part for her utterance to work for her as 
illocutionarily meant: the audience takes her to have done what she 
meant to.  The audience’s being warned appears to depend on 
nothing more than the audience and the speaker being parties of a 
normal linguistic exchange. 
(Hornsby 1994, p. 192) 
What we are then told, is that reciprocity is a relation that holds between 
people that “provides for the particular way, just illustrated, in which one 
speech act can arise from another, more basic one”.  Reciprocity is thus 
thought to be an enabling condition on illocutionary acts having the 
success conditions that Hornsby thinks is distinctive of them.  Since 
telling someone something is likewise thought to be an illocutionary act, 
the same holds for utterances with which acts of telling are performed: 
[W]hat a person relies on to tell A something is A’s being open to 
the idea that she might be telling him what in fact she means to tell 
him: unless A can readily entertain the idea that she might be 
doing this, A could hardly take her to be doing it; when A does 
take her so, she is in a state of mind suﬃcient, with her utterance, 
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for her to have done it.  What reciprocity provides for on this 
account is the success of attempts to do certain speech acts.  It 
allows there to be things that speakers can do simply by being 
heard as (attempting to and thus) doing them.   
(Hornsby 1994, p. 193) 
But, is it true that illocutionary acts, in general, have the kinds of success 
conditions that reciprocity putatively provides for?  Jane Heal has 
recently pointed out that there may be diﬀerent things that we are willing 
to say about how success is achieved when the audience takes the speaker 
to be insincere or unreliable.   I say, “there’s a bull in that field”, 56
intending to warn you of the bull in the field you are about to enter.  The 
necessity claim in Searle’s statement is meant to be undermined by cases 
in which you take me to be joking.  We can imagine such a case in which 
one does so, and so one enters the bull’s field without caution.  Seeing 
the on-rushing bull you exit the field in haste.  Did I succeed in warning 
you or not?  If I did, then it is not necessary that you recognise what I 
was trying to do for me to have succeeded in doing that.  Suppose, 
alternatively, that you took me to be unreliable about where the bulls are 
around here (say, as opposed to cows).  You recognise that I am trying to 
warn you of a bull in the field, but you don’t pay it much mind—it’ll 
only be a cow.  Again you enter and then exit swiftly on being confronted 
by the fast approaching bull.  Did I succeed in warning you or not?  If I 
didn’t, because I failed to persuade you that I am reliable in this case, 
then it is not suﬃcient that you recognise what I was trying to do for me 
to have succeeded in doing that.   
 Heal, 2013, pp. 147-5056
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Heal’s point here is that, sometimes, recognition of what we typically 
think of as the illocutionary thing the speaker intended to be doing, isn’t 
enough for it to be true that they thereby did what they were trying to. 
In some situations, it is sometimes right to say, “I warned you, but you 
thought that I was being neurotic”.  That is, sometimes, either one, or 
both, of Searle’s extraordinary properties are exhibited by the acts 
performed by speakers at what is intuitively the level of the illocutionary, 
but not always.  Heal’s diagnosis is that the appropriateness of the 
judgements about success and failure here are dependent on various 
contextual factors about what is at stake in the situations in which the 
utterance is made.  If what matters is whether I have discharged my duty 
to warn you, then we may suppose that I succeeded in acting so as to 
issue a warning.  On the other hand, if what matters is that I protect you 
from danger in the way I wanted to, then we may suppose that I failed.  
What are we to make of this?  In these kinds of cases, it seems right that 
one has failed to do something that one meant to do in producing one’s 
utterance.  But we might think that whatever that failure is, it can’t be 
such as to be a failure of one successfully performing the illocutionary act 
that one intended to perform, if Hornsby is right, and it suﬃces for the 
success of an illocutionary act that one’s audience recognise which 
illocutionary act one means to be performing.  If this is the right way to 
take Heal’s case, then it’ll turn out that a number kinds of acts that are 
usually taken a paradigmatically illocutionary acts—acts that, in 
significant number of cases we are inclined to call acts of telling, or 
warning, etc.—are not such.  Alternatively, we take those success 
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conditions not to in fact be distinctive of the category of the 
illocutionary at all—what Heal’s examples show is that these success 
conditions don’t universally hold of illocutionary acts, so the 
illocutionary as a category cannot be distinguished according to its 
inclusion of only acts with those success conditions.  
So far as I am concerned, it doesn’t really matter which of these options 
are taken up.  The point I want focus on is that what I have classed as 
rhetic will have Searle’s extraordinary properties.  Consider saying 
something, in the thin sense of ‘saying’ which specifies the rhetic thing 
typically done by speakers producing utterances of indicative sentences. 
Does it suﬃce for one to have said to someone such-and-such for them 
to have recognised that one means to be saying such-and-such?  At first 
glance, it would appear so.  Take an arbitrary speech act whose rhetic 
element is properly specified by this notion of saying—for example, one 
in which one asserts that there is a bull in the field by saying that there is 
a bull in the field. What is one trying to do, in trying to say something to 
one’s audience?  Remember that one can do a range of determinate 
illocutionary things in one's saying something.  In each of the rhetic acts 
of saying by which those diﬀerent illocutionary acts are performed, one 
will be referring to something, and saying of it that it is some way or 
other.  So, to come to discern what rhetic thing the speaker has done in 
producing their utterance, would be to recognise that it is an utterance 
with which the speaker is referring to some object, and attributing some 
property to it, though, without necessarily recognising that in the course 
of doing so, the speaker intends to be putting forward a hypothesis, or 
making an assertion, or joking or making an ironical statement.  What 
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one thus recognises is the speaker doing something in which things of 
that more specific type can be done.   
  
If my audience recognises to what I’m intending to refer, and what it is 
that I want to say is true of that thing, nothing more would seem to be 
needed for me to have succeeded in saying to them that that thing is that 
way.  Do Heal-style cases apply?  If one’s audience takes one to be 
unreliable with respect to what one is talking about—about whether 
there is a bull in the field, say—are there any situations in which 
recognition of what rhetic thing one was trying to do won’t be enough 
for one to have in fact said what one intended to to one’s audience?  That 
is, is there a threat to the success of a speaker’s referring to some object 
and saying something of it, that their audience recognise to what they 
intend to refer, and what they mean to be saying about it, but they think 
they are unreliable?  It is not clear how it could—considerations about 
unreliability won’t aﬀect one’s judgements as to what the speaker is 
saying, in the relevant sense, but only how one should take their having 
said that. 
Likewise for the necessity claim.  For me to have said to you, in the sense 
of performing the rhetic act of saying, that there’s a bull in the field, you 
need to have recognised that that is what I intended to say.  Of course, I 
can say the words to you, and you not listen, but then I won’t have done 
that basic communicative thing that is distinctive of saying as I am 
understanding it.  If you fail to recognise to what I am intending to refer, 
and what I am intending to be saying of that thing, then I won’t have 
succeeded in doing that, in the sense that it enables me to pursue the 
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other ends that I had in speaking.  That is, if you don’t even recognise this 
much, very little can be achieved.  And Heal-style cases also don’t 
constitute counterexamples to the necessity claim.  If you take me to be 
joking, that is no block to your recognising what I was trying to say. 
Only, rather, once again, you won’t have taken my having said that in the 
way that I intended.  
If the rhetic things done does have the requisite success conditions, this 
allows that the primary requirement of success in speaking to be that one 
succeeds in performing the rhetic act one intended to.  That might 
suggest that the relevant expectation that the speaker has is that their 
audience discern the rhetic thing they mean to be doing with their 
utterance.  This has considerable plausibility.  After all, all determinate 
illocutionary acts are performed by one’s doing some rhetic thing.  So 
audiences recognising what rhetic thing one means to have done looks 
like it can play the enabling role that was assigned to the speaker’s 
expectations being met.  That is, the meeting of the speakers expectations 
was meant to enable the speaker to pursue all their multifaceted goals in 
speaking, and discerning what rhetic thing the speaker meant to do 
allows speakers to do this. 
That concludes my characterisation of the rhetic acts that we perform in 
speaking.  I’m now going to move on to the question of what it is that 
one is intending to do, in speaking with rhetic intentions, by 
investigating some of the things that Grice has said about what is 
speakers to mean things with their words.  
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VI. 
Grice’s Communicative Intentions 
Grice made it standard to draw a distinction between what was said by a 
speaker uttering some sentence on an occasion, and what the speaker 
meant by their saying that.  The distinction, very roughly is that our 
words, by way of convention, have meaning.  The meaning that our 
words possess determines something that, in the right kinds of 
combinations, when uttered on an occasion, can say things.  When that 
utterance is of a kind that is typically performed with an indicative 
sentence, those words, so combined, can say something capable of truth 
or falsity.  But sometimes speakers use their words to say, or mean, 
something other than what that conventional meaning determines. 
When this happens, what a speaker means to be saying is not, or not 
only, what those words, as used on that occasion, do say.  For all that, the 
words, so combined do say what their conventional meaning determines 
that they do.    57
This distinction was employed by Grice in an attempt to carry through 
an ambitious analytical project.  Grice thought that the conventional 
meaning of our words was ultimately to be analysed in terms of what a 
speaker means by way of using those words.   And this ‘utterer’s meaning’ 
was itself to be analysed in terms that are not overtly semantical in 
character; in particular, by appeal to the intentions that the speakers have 
when they produce their utterances.  Given that the analysans, for Grice, 
 For some trenchant criticism of this distinction, at least as Grice draws it, see Travis 57
(1991).  See also his (1985).
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is the notion of utterer’s meaning, the research program that he instigated 
is one that seeks to fill the gap in the following schema:  
 A speaker, S, utterer means that p, with an utterance, u, if and  
 only if ______ .  
Grice’s precise motivation for conducting an analysis of this kind is a 
matter of some dispute.  One seeking to reduce semantic vocabulary to 
mentalistic vocabulary, of course, will be enthusiastic about Grice’s 
program, but Grice himself denied possessing such reductionist 
motivations (Grice 1987, p. 350).  Grice’s objective was analysis, and, 
where possible, analysis should not be conducted in a circle.  For Grice, 
an analysis of semantical terms that employs the same, or closely related, 
notions in the analysans would be circular.   
The desideratum of non-circularity that Grice insists upon precludes the 
employment of the notion of meaning (or a ‘close relative’—e.g. saying, 
stating, etc.) within the scope of the propositional attitudes in terms of 
which Grice thought that analysandum should be analysed.  If such 
semantical vocabulary were allowed to be so employed, the gap above 
could be filled with something akin to ‘the speaker intended to mean 
(better: say, state, command, etc.) that (/whether, etc.) p by uttering u’. 
But such an account, we are told, will be problematically circular: 
a position hardly seems satisfactory when we see that it involves 
attributing to speakers an intention which is specified in terms of 
the very notion of meaning which is being analysed (or in terms of 
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a dangerously close relative of that notion).  Circularity seems to be 
blatantly abroad.   
(Grice 1987, p. 352) 
If a non-circular account is available, it is to be preferred in the course of 
analysis (indeed, it is questionable that a filling of the gap that creates a 
circle small enough is an analysis at all).  So what Grice sought was a way 
of specifying intentions with which a speaker produced their utterance 
which captures what they do, in uttering that, where the content of these 
specifications is itself devoid of semantical terms.  Grice himself, and 
others following him, have had a few goes at this in light of a 
propagation of counterexamples to Grice’s original (1957) proposal that 
have necessitated alterations.  I will stick, for the ease of illustration with 
that original proposal.  This is permissible, in the present context, given 
that the real object of enquiry is the requirement of non-circularity, and 
whether it is correct to demand that a proper account of speaker meaning 
employ no semantic notions.    58
That first proposal, roughly, was that a speaker means so-and-so by their 
words, if and only if they intend to induce in their audience such-and-
such a certain reaction, by their recognising that very intention of the 
speaker to induce that reaction.  When the vehicle involved is an 
 The initial shift, in light of these counterexamples, was to an analysis in terms of 58
intentions to induce beliefs about the speaker’s beliefs.  But, perhaps unsurprisingly, in 
hindsight, this is subject to counterexamples of its own.  McDowell captures what is 
fundamentally wrong with this suggestion: “the primary point of making assertions is 
not to instil into others beliefs about one’s beliefs, but to inform others […] about the 
subject matter of one’s assertions (which need not be, though of course it may be, the 
asserter’s beliefs)” (McDowell 1980, p. 127).  
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“indicative-type” utterance, the intended reaction is the formation of a 
belief about how some particular things stand in the world—in 
particular, how the speaker believes them to be.   Earlier we saw that 
Moran employed something close to Grice’s notion of ‘non-natural 
meaning’, and there I employed the abbreviation of ‘M-intention’ for the 
intentions.  To non-naturally mean that p, a speaker, S, must produce an 
utterance, u, with an M-intention, that is with the intention that, 
 (1) their audience, A, believe that p; 
 (2) A believe that S intends A to believe that p; 
 (3) A believe that p on the basis of his believing that S intends 
  (1) & (2). 
I will continue to use ‘M-intention’ to pick out intentions of this kind. 
This is a proposed analysis of utterer’s meaning, and since utterer’s 
meaning is what we are concerned with in considering communication, it 
is one's acting with M-intentions that are meant to constitute one's act as 
communicative—those intentions that I have called the fundamental 
communicative intentions.  As such, on the Grician picture, in the absence 
of acting with M-intentions, the subject cannot be thought to be 
engaging in a communicative act at all.  
This is a claim that I’ll end up rejecting, because it does not allow for 
rhetic acts to have the success conditions that they manifestly have.  To 
help show this I want to say a couple of things, first, about how it is that 
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this Grician conception of communication can be subsumed under the 
Austinian framework that I’m operating with.  Having said a few things 
about the relationship between the rhetic act of saying things, and what’s 
said with utterances in which one does that, I’ll be able to say more 
exactly what I think is mistaken about Grice’s picture. 
VI. a. 
Rhetic Acts & What’s Said 
If the rhetic acts typically performed by utterances of indicative sentences 
are acts of saying, then what’s said will be picked out by correct indirect 
speech reports of those utterances.  For example, suppose that Galileo 
had uttered, just once, “Si muove la terra” in the course of his 
conversation with Bellarmine.  We can correctly report (some of ) what 
Galileo did there, by uttering “Galileo said that the earth moves”, to say 
that Galileo said that the earth moves.  Given this, we can infer that one 
of the things said by Galileo was that the earth moves.  I will now make a 
few remarks about what we might think those things are.  On the basis of 
this, I’ll be able to more accurately express one of the key problems that I 
have with Grice’s account.  But the conception of the things that are said 
that I’ll be working with here will also have a role to play later in the 
thesis, so I’ll take this opportunity to set it out in some detail.   I’ll first 59
briefly describe one particular way of accounting for indirect speech 
reports that was first proposed by Donald Davidson (1969).  Given 
problems that that view faces, I’ll then consider some amendments, 
 See Chapter 4, §§IV-V; Chapter 5, §V.59
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which tie the things that are said very closely with the rhetic acts of 
saying, as they are here being conceived.  
One of the main things that I want to suggest is that, since rhetic acts of 
saying something are tied inextricably to the communicative intentions of 
speakers, the things that are said are also tied to the intentions of speakers. 
And given the role that rhetic acts have to play in our communicative 
economy, that determines that the things that are said are not wholly 
determined by the literal meaning of the sentences used to say those 
things.  So the things that are said will be conceived of as standing in a 
one-to-one relationship with the rhetic acts of saying.  I’ll then turn to 
the issue of which speaker’s intentions are said to determine the things 
that they say. 
I am going to rely on some elements of an account of how rhetic acts of 
saying something relate to the things that are said in performing them 
that has is suggested by some things that David Wiggins (1992) and Ian 
Rumfitt (1993) have claimed about indirect speech reports.  Wiggins and 
Rumfitt employ something close to Davidson’s paratactic account of 
(indirect) reports of what’s said.   We have already seen the character of 60
an account of this kind as applied to utterances of non-indicative 
sentences, and why that account is lacking.  But things stand diﬀerently 
with regards to indirect speech reports—at least for cases of indirect 
reports of what someone says.  The account in this context runs, roughly, 
as follows.  When it is uttered, “Galileo said that the earth moves”, to 
 Davidson 1969; for further discussion of some of the problematic consequences of 60
the view that Davidson articulates here, and why something similar to Wiggins’ 
solution is called for to avoid them, see Burge 1986. 
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report what Galileo once said, what is really happening here (according 
to the paratactic account) is that there is an utterance of two type 
sentences.  The first is “Galileo said that.”, where the “that” demonstrates 
something—it is up for grabs just what is demonstrated—that is 
represented by, or manifest in, the production of the next type sentence 
“The earth moves” by the one doing the reporting.  
Davidson’s own idea was that when a reporter does this, they are 
attributing to some speaker their production of an utterance: that is, the 
first utterance of “Galileo said that.” is a demonstration of an utterance 
(the following “The earth moves”) to which Galileo bears a certain 
relation.  This allows him to construe the claim made by “Galileo said 
that.” as expressing a relation that holds between Galileo’s utterance and 
another event—namely, the next utterance of “The earth moves”.   This is 
a relation that obtains just in case that utterance, and Galileo’s utterance 
of the sentence, “Si muove la terra” make ‘samesayers’ of the reporter and 
Galileo.  
There are many advantages to Davidson’s account, but it has come into 
some disrepute, because it has become clear that what’s putatively 
demonstrated with the first three words of the report cannot be an 
utterance.  That’s because this leads, in more than one way, to paradox.   
Perhaps the most straightforward articulation of why this view has 
paradoxical consequences is brought out by Ian McFetridge (1975), in 
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what has come to be known as ‘the counting problem’.    Galileo said, 61
just once, “Si muove la terra” in the course of his conversation with 
Bellarmine.  If reports such as “Galileo said that the earth moves” do 
involve a demonstration in something like the way Davidson suggests, 
and what is demonstrated were an utterance—that is a datable, non-
repeatable action—then we would get the result that, in a case in which 
some speaker says, twice, “the earth moves”, on the first occasion their 
audience could truly say “that’s something that Galileo said”, and on the 
second occasion of utterance their audience could truly say “that’s another 
thing that Galileo said”.  But that is absurd—Galileo, any way we cut it, 
said just one thing on the occasion of his conversation with Bellarmine.   
The desired result is that on both occasions the speaker saying the self 
same thing that Galileo said when he uttered the words, “Si muove la 
terra”.  McFetridge thinks that to accommodate this we should employ 
Quine’s notion of ‘deferred ostension’ and conceive of the putative 
demonstration in the report as a kind of ‘deferred ostension’ to 
something that those utterances are related to in the right kind of way.  62
Deferred ostension, generally, is commonplace.   When I point to my 
copy of How To Do Things With Words, and say “that’s a strange book”, I 
 See Wiggins 1992, fn. 32.  For further discussion of McFetridge’s argument, 61
Rumfitt 1993, pp. 446-9; for a reply to McFetridge’s objection of Davidson’s behalf, 
see Holton 1996 (with a counter-reply from Rumfitt 1996).  There have been many 
other problems raised for Davidson’s view.  See, for example, Higginbotham (1986) 
and Schiﬀer (1987).  For a survey of some of the standard objections to this element of 
Davidson, as well as some responses to these objections by way of amendments to 
Davidson’s account, see Lepore & Ludwig, 2007, pp. 246-61.  Rumfitt (1993) also 
amends Davidson’s account to deal with objections from Higginbotham and Schiﬀer.
 As it happens, for McFetridge this turns out to be the set of utterances of which 62
Galileo’s is a member.  There are some problems in doing so; see Rumfitt 1993, pp. 
447-8. 
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am not saying of my copy of that text that it is strange.  I am, rather, to 
be understood as predicating strangeness to the book-type that my token 
copy instantiates.  This suggests that what is needed in this context is not 
a particular, but something more like a property.   And this we have 
already seen is how rhetic acts should be thought of.   Accordingly, 
Wiggins writes, “what my ‘Galileo said that …’ harks forward to is 
something that the coming utterance of ‘the earth moves’ itself 
exemplifies” (Wiggins 1992, p. 82); what is being “harked forward to” is 
not the action (i.e. the utterance) but something close to the (rhetic) act 
of saying that the earth moves: 
[W]hen I say “Galileo said that the earth moves” and I produce my 
token of “the earth moves”, what I display or exemplify is not my 
own particular utterance or my particular token of “the earth 
moves” but some act of saying, a narrowly drawn specific rhetic act 
(but not a speech action, for that is a particular), an act that one 
who can interpret English speech will know issues in truth if and 
only if the earth moves.  
(ibid., p.83) 
What Wiggins is suggesting is that we could think of the putative 
demonstration enacted by the uttering of “Galileo said that…” as a case 
of deferred ostentation to something closely related to the rhetic act that 
Galileo performed.  In saying that Galileo said that the earth moves we 
are, roughly, saying that Galileo does the same thing we do when we 
perform the following act of saying: The earth moves.   
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I’ve hedged in saying that reports of what's said involve deferred 
ostentation to something closely related to the rhetic act of saying that is 
performed with the utterance.  That’s because we can’t think of the 
putative demonstration involved in indirect speech reports of sayings as 
pointing to the (rhetic) act of saying such-and-such itself.   What is 63
demonstrated is what’s said in the course of the speaker producing their 
utterance, but what’s said by one who produces a declarative utterance 
can’t be identical to the thing done.  The thing done is the speaker’s saying 
that so-and-so is the case, whereas what’s said is that so-and-so is the case.   
This points to one way in which we might think of what’s said, and its 
relation to the rhetic acts performed.  The things that are said will be 
something that stands in a one-to-one relation to rhetic acts of saying. 
For ease of expression, let’s call the things that are said, propositions.  So 
conceived, we can think of propositions, with Wiggins, the following 
way.  If we have some proposition, p, associated with some rhetic act r, 
and some proposition p’, associated with some rhetoric act r’, then, p = p’ 
if and only if r = r’.  If, and only if, to do r is to do r’ will r = r’, and so 
will the associated propositions (p and p’) be identical.   64
The idea is that what bears truth here are the acts (r and r’), so to do r is 
to do r’ just in case r and r’ are recognisable as acts of saying something, 
and they are both true under the very same conditions.  To get some 
 Though it should probably be noted that attempts have been made to tie propositions 63
to types that are here being called ‘acts’; see Dummett (1996) and Hanks (2011).  
 Wiggins, 1992, p. 88.  Wiggins does suggest that one may think of the rhetic act 64
performed as tied to the literal meaning meaning, but given that I have tied the notion 
of the rhetic thing done with the fundamental communicative intentions of speakers, I 
cannot follow him here.  For an argument, see §IV. b.
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traction on this (see Chapter 5), we can think in these terms: one who 
understands the utterance as an act of saying, will take the utterance to 
be true under certain conditions, and the very same act of saying is 
performed just when one who understands (possibly distinct) utterance 
as an act of saying, will take that utterance to be true under the very same 
conditions.  That is, one who understands an utterance in which r is 
performed will take things to be some way (p) when they take the 
utterance to be true, and if, on understanding an utterance in with which 
the speaker performed r’ they would take things to be the very same way 
on the supposition that that utterance is true, then to do r is to do r’.  So 
thinking of the things that are said allows for them to cut as finely as one 
chooses.  An appeal to speakers taking things to be some way on 
understanding the utterance, allows propositions to be conceived of as 
‘Russelian’—i.e. carving only as finely as reference—or as ‘non-
Russelian’—i.e. carving finer than reference.   65
IV. b. 
What’s Said & Literal Meaning 
According to Grice’s account, we can think of the propositions expressed, 
so conceived, as determined in one of two ways.  Either they are 
determined by the literal meaning of the words that make up the 
sentences we utter, and their modes of combination, or they are 
determined by the fundamental communicative intentions with which 
speakers utter their words (conceived of as M-intentions).  Neither will 
 See Rumfitt (1993) for an elaboration of this conception of propositions that falls 65
into the latter category.
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do.  I’ll first set out why propositions expressed can't be thought to be 
determined by literal meaning, then, in the next section, I’ll say why they 
can’t be determined by the kinds of intentions he appeals to.  
It is important that the rhetic things done by uttering a sentence can 
diverge from what might be thought to be determined by the 
conventional meanings that words bear, when combined into sentences, 
and uttered on occasions. If we accept that the rhetic acts speakers 
perform are determined by the conventional meanings that the words of 
the sentence, combined in the ways that they are, then rhetic acts cannot 
play the fundamental role that I have assigned to them in 
communication.  That’s for reasons already advertised: what's said has got 
to line up in the right way with rhetic intentions, and the literal meaning 
of sentences used by speakers need not line up with their intentions.  
Suppose I say that “Jim’s pallet is colourful”, intending to say that Jim’s 
palette is colourful.  My audience might recognise that I’m intending to 
refer to Jim's artist’s palette with my use of the word ‘pallet’.  However, 
what I (apparently) literally referred to was a wooden platform.  But if 
what I did is determined by the literal meaning of the words I employed, 
then I can succeed in doing what I do, irrespective of the intentions that 
I had in producing those words.  Since it is both necessary and suﬃcient 
for the success of one’s performing a rhetic act that one’s audience 
recognise one’s rhetic intentions, that means that, if one’s words can 
function in this way, independent of one’s communicative intentions, 
their so functioning cannot be identified with the rhetic act one 
performs.  That is, if we allow for literal meaning to determine the rhetic 
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things done, then one will be able to perform some rhetic act in the 
absence of it being recognised what rhetic act one intends to perform.  As 
such, rhetic acts, so conceived couldn’t play the role of being the basic 
communicative acts. 
That is not to say that literal meaning is not important to our successfully 
performing rhetic acts.  It has a vital role in making manifest one’s rhetic 
intentions to others who are similarly habituated.  What literal meaning 
does is, amongst other things, facilitate the recognition of our rhetic 
intentions—most of the time our rhetic intentions do line up with what 
the words we employ to manifest them literally mean.  It will only be 
possible, in many circumstances, to succeed in achieving one’s rhetic aims 
when one uses the right words in the right constructions.  But there will 
be circumstances in which one need not do this.  And when one doesn’t, 
that may or may not be a bar to one’s succeeding, depending on whether 
circumstances conspire to allow for one’s intentions to nonetheless be 
recognised by one’s audience.  That just goes to show that the rhetic acts 
one performs are not wholly determined by the literal meaning of the 
words, in their constructions, that one uses.   
VI. c. 
What’s Said & M-Intentions 
A second problem with the Grician picture concerns the kinds of 
counterexamples that I raised in the last chapter against Moran’s account. 
If Grice is right that the fundamental communicative intentions are to 
induce in others beliefs of the kind he isolates, and rhetic intentions are 
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the fundamental communicative intentions, then the utterances with 
which one voices knowledge will necessarily involve intentions of this 
kind.  But then the counterexamples that I raised against Moran's view 
would also be counterexamples to my own.  
I rejected Moran’s account of telling (chapter 2, §III) on the grounds that 
it required speakers to intend to induce certain kinds of beliefs in their 
audience in order to make available testimonial knowledge to them. 
This, I argued, is mistaken because one can make available testimonial 
knowledge in the absence of acting with those intentions.  But if Grice is 
right, then any communicative act whatsoever involves acting with 
intentions of this kind—including those communicative acts with which 
one makes available testimonial knowledge.  In that case my account 
would be no less vulnerable to the putative counterexamples that I 
mobilised against Moran.   
But there are problems facing this way of taking the Gricean proposal. 
To get them properly in view, we need to have a closer look at Austin’s 
category of perlocutionary acts performed.  The way that Austin 
introduces the notion of the perlocutionary things done with utterances, 
is by telling us that they are those things that are less basic than the acts 
that Searle thinks have his extraordinary properties: “what we bring 
about or achieve by saying something, such as convincing, persuading, 
deterring, and even, say, surprising or misleading” (Austin 1962, p. 
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109).   And, in fact, one thing that serves to distinguish the 66
perlocutionary acts performed when one utters something from the kinds 
of acts that are more basic than them, is that they don’t have Searle’s 
extraordinary properties.  I may mean to persuade you that there are 
counterexamples to Leibniz’s Law, and you may recognise this, but, for 
all that, you fail to be persuaded.  Indeed, such recognition can be an 
obstacle to one’s achieving that end.  We might then say that one of the 
perlocutionary eﬀects that my telling somebody something might have is 
to persuade them that things are as I told them to be.   
Of course, in the last section, we saw that there are some reasons to 
doubt that what are usually thought to be illocutionary acts are always 
subject to the success conditions that follow from the suﬃciency claim in 
Searle’s articulation of his extraordinary properties.  But, at least, it is 
clear that perlocutionary acts are not going to be subject to success 
conditions of this kind.  This means that a speaker’s meaning to be 
performing some perlocutionary act cannot play the role of 
underpinning the relevant expectation of the speaker, if the recognition 
of what the speaker is expecting suﬃces for the expectation to be met. 
And we have already seen that the relevant expectation just is one which 
is met by one who recognises what the speaker is expecting of their 
audience.   
 Austin tried to devise a test for determining which acts are illocutionary and which 66
acts are perlocutionary according to whether one does something in saying something, 
or one does something by saying something.  That looks like it probably can’t be made 
to work (see Hornsby 1994, pp. 189-90), but what’s important here is the examples 
that Austin gives us—examples of acts that are less basic than those we have been 
considering so far.  
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Searle argued a long time ago that the Gricean analysis of speaker meaning 
is mistaken because the kind of act that Grice associates with a speaker 
meaning something is a perlocutionary act:   
the account says that saying something and meaning it is a matter 
of intending to perform a perlocutionary act.  In the examples 
Grice gives, the eﬀects cited are invariable perlocutionary. [But] 
saying something and meaning it is a matter of intending to 
perform an illocutionary act.  
(Searle 1969, p. 46) 
Is Searle right?  Is acting with the aim of inducing a belief that things are 
as one believes them to be a perlocutionary act?   When things go well 
(that is, when communication occurs) speaker and audience are both 
aware of (at least some of ) what the speaker’s intentions are in uttering 
what they do.  Since communication as such is the publication of 
intentions, once it is known by the audience what the speakers intentions 
are, at least some basic form of communication will have been achieved. 
If this is right, then these communicative intentions will have Searle’s 
extraordinary properties. 
Now, when these intentions are conceived of as intentions to induce in 
one’s audience certain beliefs, that idea amounts to this: that both the 
speaker and her audience are aware that the speaker intends to induce in 
the audience those beliefs.  But one striking feature of this is that the 
audience could come to recognise this intention of the speaker—the 
intention to induce in them a certain belief—and the speaker not achieve 
what they intended to achieve (i.e. the audience could fail to form the 
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relevant belief ).  The problem with this is it divorces the fulfilment of the 
putative Gricean communicative intention from the mutual awareness of 
that intention.  That means that it cannot be that for one to 
meaningfully utter something, in the course of attempting to 
communicate, that one must intend to induce in one’s audience a belief 
of this kind.  And the feature that gives rise to this problem is a hallmark 
of the perlocutionary. 
VII. 
McDowell’s Communicative Intentions 
John McDowell has employed the reasoning I’ve just rehearsed (1980, 
pp. 40-2) to argue for a certain claim about how to understand speaker’s 
basic communicative intentions. McDowell draws the conclusion that 
the only kinds of intentions that do have the right success conditions are 
those that employ semantical notions within the scope of the speaker’s 
propositional attitudes—for example, the intention to say such-and-such 
(as opposed to the intention to induce such-and-such a belief in one’s 
audience (by way of their recognising that intention)).  
McDowell seems to think that the only intention that does have these 
success conditions are intentions to say such-and-such.  For, just before 
his remarks concerning the nature of speech-acts as publications of 
intentions, he tells us that “the primary communicative intention [in 
assertoric discourse] is the intention […] to say such-and-such to the 
audience”.  If that is the right way of reading McDowell here, that would 
suggest that there is no other intention that could do the job.  That is, 
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there is nothing more to say about what that intention is an intention to 
do, that would serve these purposes.  And why should we think that 
there must be?  As Charles Travis remarks, in this connection,  
[W]hy should to intend X be, in the nature of the concepts, to 
intend Y, Y distinct from X?  Why should intending (one’s words) 
to say X be just the same as intending anything else? 
(Travis 1991, p. 259) 
I have already given an argument that rhetic intentions have Seattle’s 
extraordinary properties.  And that might be thought to vindicate 
McDowell’s conclusion: since the rhetic act performed by any given 
illocutionary act typically performed by an utterance of an indicative 
sentence is saying something (in the thin sense), the intentions distinctive 
of performance of acts of those kinds might be thought to be intentions 
to say such-and-such.  But I’m going to conclude this chapter with a few 
remarks about what more there is to say here. 
What is being sought by the speaker, according to the McDowellian 
thought, is that for which mutual awareness on the part of the speaker 
and hearer allows for communication to have occurred between them. 
What the speaker expects is that their audience will achieve such 
awareness—whatever it comes to—on the occasion of their producing a 
particular utterance in the circumstances of speaking.  So the meeting the 
expectation by their audience just is what is aimed at by the speaker. 
What is expected, and what is needed to meet it in such a way that the 
primary requirement of success is fulfilled, is this mutual awareness. 
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What more there is to say here will come from what we are able to say 
about what such awareness would amount to. 
McDowell is surely right that they will both be aware of what the speaker 
intended to be saying.  But in being aware of that, the audience will be 
able to make use of what the speaker has done in some distinctive ways. 
This can translate over to the nature of the expectation that the speaker 
has.  For, what it is, at least in part, to expect that one’s audience be 
aware of what one intended to be doing here is that they will be able to 
so take what they have done, and themselves make use of it in those 
distinctive ways.   And plausibly, the use they can put it to will be 
diﬀerent for the diﬀerent kind of rhetic acts that are performed in the 
course of speakers uttering things.  For example, one who is aware of 
what rhetic thing the speaker is trying to do in producing an utterance to 
assert something will be able to draw the conclusion that things must be 
a certain way if the speaker uttered truth.  So one of the things that the 
speaker will expect is that certain conclusions will be made by their 
audience if they come to believe that they have uttered truth.   
This is reflected in the conception of propositions that I have borrowed 
from Wiggins and Rumfitt.  I said that we could get a grip on when 
speakers perform the same rhetic acts by appeal one who understands the 
utterance as an act of saying taking it to be true under the very same 
conditions.  We can understand this—and here I am prefiguring some of 
the central themes that I’ll be exploring in the next couple of chapters—
in terms of one who understands an utterance in which r is performed 
taking things to be some way (p) when they take the utterance to be true. 
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That means, the same inferences between p (and ¬p) and r’s truth (and 
falsity), will be licensed for one who possesses rhetic understanding of 
any of the utterances in which r is performed.  Their being so capable of 
performing such inferences can then provide some explanation of what it 
is that the speaker is intending to be do. 
When it comes to an utterance with which the speaker issues an order, 
things will stand a little diﬀerently.  At least in the paradigm cases of 
speakers doing such a thing in producing their utterance, the awareness 
that their audience will have to achieve for the primary requirement of 
success to fulfilled is that they are capable of discerning what would 
happen if the order issued is to be obeyed.  As such, a speaker performing 
the rhetic act of ‘ordering’ (in a suitably thin sense appropriate for 
specifying the rhetic thing done) will expect that their audience will be 
capable this.  And when it comes to performing (at least certain kinds of ) 
interrogative rhetic acts, they will expect their audience to be capable of 
discerning what sort of thing would provide what is lacking when the 
speaker asks certain kinds of questions.    In general, then, an explanation 
of what it is that the speakers mean to be doing, in such a way that they 
expect that their audience will recognise this, is an expectation that can 
be met by their audience being capable of doing those things which are 
necessary for the success of the illocutionary acts they mean to be 
performing—namely, their succeeding in performing the rhetic acts by 
which they do these illocutionary things.   
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VIII. 
Conclusion 
McDowell is right in saying that basic communicative success is secured 
when a speaker’s audience recognises what the speaker intends at the 
rhetic level.  When one intends to say something, recognition of that 
intention at least suﬃces for one’s saying that.  But we can say more 
about what one who achieves such recognition is capable of.  They are 
capable of discerning how things stand in the world, according to 
diﬀerent statuses that the utterances in which those things are said can 
bear.  In the next chapter I’m going to consider a view that the kind of 
recognition, or knowledge, that one associates with one’s understanding 
the utterances at others, at least at the rhetic level, is constituted by one’s 
possessing capacities of this sort.  It is a view that has been put forward 
recently by Ian Rumfitt, and it is a view that I will end up endorsing.   
Let me end with a brief recap of various threads that I’ve been following 
in this chapter.  In the first half, I set out my understanding of the 
distinctions that Austin draws between some of the diﬀerent kinds of 
determinable acts that one can perform in speaking.  I have tried to make 
plausible the claim that what falls under the category of the rhetic things 
done are the basic communicative act.  I said that the primary 
requirement of success in performing these basic communicative acts are 
that one’s intention to be performing them is recognised.  I then set out a 
conception of rhetic acts, following Hornbsy’s interpretation, that was 
reflected in the moods that sentences typically used to perform them can 
bear.  I argued that rhetic acts display Searle’s extraordinary properties, 
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which meant that we cannot conceive of the rhetic acts performed as 
either determined by literal meaning or by M-intentions.  I ended by 
examining McDowell’s suggestion that we should conceive of these 
intentions as simply intentions to perform rhetic acts, and indicated what 
more we might be able to say about what it is for one to intend so much, 
and what is required of audience’s to count as having recognised them.   
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4. 
Rumfitt’s Proposal 
I. 
Introduction 
A speaker makes available testimonial knowledge when she voices 
knowledge.  She voices knowledge only when she says something because 
she knows it (or someone in her testimonial chain does).  Her audience 
comes to be in possession of that knowledge, only if they meet certain 
expectations that she has of them.  In the last chapter I focused on this 
last point, and said that to meet the relevant expectations of the speaker 
is for her audience to come to recognise what rhetic act she meant to 
perform.  She succeeds in performing the rhetic act that she was meaning 
to perform, when these intentions are recognised by her audience; that is, 
when these expectations are met.  At the end of the last chapter I gave 
some indication of what sort of thing the audience needs to be capable of 
doing, in order to count as meeting this expectation—namely, capable of 
performing kinds of inferences peculiar to the rhetic thing the speaker 
meant to do.  For example, one who is aware of what rhetic thing the 
speaker is trying to do in producing an utterance to say something will be 
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able to draw the conclusion that things must be a certain way if the 
speaker uttered truth. A view identifying states of rhetic understanding 
with one’s being capable of making these kinds of inferences was first 
proposed in some recent work by Ian Rumfitt.  I will be looking in detail 
at that proposal in this chapter, assessing its motivations and considering 
some objections.    
In the next section, I will briefly discuss, in very general terms, the 
relationship between the capacities we possess and the knowledge that 
putatively constitutes such capacities.  Given that, in general, we need 
not think of capacities we possess as necessarily constituted by our 
possessing knowledge of some proposition, it is an open question 
whether the capacities to make the kinds of inferences discussed at the 
end of the last chapter should be understood in terms of one possessing 
such knowledge.  In §III I set out the barebones of Rumfitt’s account of 
rhetic understanding that gives a negative answer to that open question. 
In §IV I elaborate on the proposal by way of a comparison with our 
inferential capacities more generally, and continue, in §V, with a 
discussion of what conception of linguistic competence will attend 
Rumfitt’s proposal.  Here we find an explanation of the systematic 
productivity that we display in our understanding the utterances of 
others.  At the end of the chapter I look at two objections.  In §VI I 
consider at some length an objection that has been raised by Guy 
Longworth and in §VII I consider a line of reasoning to the eﬀect that 
Rumfitt’s proposal commits us to a form of reductionism in the 
epistemology of testimony.  I reply to both of these objections.  In so 
doing, I’ll provide a more complete picture of what the audience needs to 
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do to acquire distinctively testimonial knowledge than the one I gave in 
Chapter 2.  §VIII concludes. 
II. 
Knowledge and Capacities 
Given what I have said, it looks like to meet the relevant expectation of a 
speaker involves the audience doing at least two things: first, recognising 
something that the speaker means to be doing, and, second, being 
capable of performing certain inferences.  It might be tempting to put an 
order of priority on these cognitive achievements, and take it that it is in 
virtue of one’s recognising what the speaker means to be doing, that one 
possesses the capacities that one is said here to have.   
Take the relatively straightforward case of the speaker performing a rhetic 
act of saying that the Foreign Secretary has resigned in which she tells her 
audience that the Foreign Secretary has resigned.  What the speaker 
expects is that, by uttering the sentence “the Foreign Secretary has 
resigned” in those circumstances, her audience will recognise that she 
means to be saying that the Foreign Secretary has resigned.  To meet this 
expectation, I suggested, the audience must at least be capable of 
discerning how things stand in the world, given either the truth or the 
falsity of the utterance.   The temptation might then be to suppose that 67
an audience comes to be in possession of such a capacity in virtue of their 
 As will be come clear when I turn to look at Rumfitt’s view, they will also be capable 67
of discerning what truth-value the utterance will have, given the way things stand in 
the world (from the claim that the Foreign secretary has resigned, conclude that the 
utterance is true)
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recognising what it is that the speaker means to be doing with her 
utterance.  That is, where the natural interpretation of what that 
recognition comes to, is one’s possessing knowledge that …, where the 
gap is filled by whatever proposition properly captures what it is that the 
speaker means to be doing. 
There are reasons to be wary of making the judgement that, in general, 
for any capacity we choose, one’s possession of that capacity is equivalent 
to one’s knowing some proposition.  Gilbert Ryle is credited with 
bringing to the contemporary philosophical foreground an issue about 
whether one kind of knowledge—a kind that is meant to be picked out 
by the locution ‘knowing how (to)’—can be reduced to propositional 
knowledge, or knowledge that is meant to be picked out with the 
locution ‘knowing that’.  For example, on at least some usages of 
‘knowing how (to)’, what is being attributed to a subject is a capacity; 
your knowing how to touch-type is your possessing a capacity to touch-
type, (something like) a capacity to transfer what words you see or hear 
onto the page via your fingers without looking at your keyboard.  And it 
is an open question whether, for any attribution of a capacity to a subject, 
that attribution can be fully captured by a distinct attribution of 
knowledge that such-and-such is the case (for example, knowledge that 
so-and-so is a way of doing the thing the subject is capable of doing). 
What this shows is that it is at least an open question whether any given 
capacity that one has is itself to be identified with some state of knowing 
some proposition.  Certainly some capacities we possess might be best 
explained in terms of our possessing knowledge that such-and-such, but, 
for some capacities we possess, this form of explanation is not obviously 
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appropriate.  When it comes to one’s capacity to touch-type, especially if 
the capacity to do it has been acquired purely by practice, it is not 
obvious that there is any proposition, knowledge of which is equivalent 
to one’s possessing this capacity.   
All that I mean to be pointing out is that since it is a open question 
whether any given capacity, qua capacity, is constituted by knowledge of 
a proposition, it is, likewise, an open question whether the capacity to 
make the relevant inferences that one possesses on achieving rhetic 
understanding of an utterance should be fundamentally understood in 
terms of one being in a propositional attitude state.   The topic of this 68
chapter is a proposal that returns a negative answer to that question, and 
identifies states of rhetic understanding with one’s possessing the capacity 
to conduct the relevant set of inferences of a kind similar to those I have 
been gesturing towards.  It is an account proposed by Ian Rumfitt 
(2005).  I now turn to setting out Rumfitt’s proposal in detail. 
 An analogous question would still be open, even for those views that attempt to 68
establish that the kind of knowledge that is meant to constitute the kinds of capacities 
that one attributes to subjects in ascribing ‘know how’ to them is ‘a species’ of 
propositional knowledge.  For, on such views, there is still a distinction to be made 
between that propositional knowledge that is practical in character, and that which is 
not. The much discussed view of Stanley and Williamson (2001) invokes ‘practical 
modes of presentation’ to mark this distinction; that propositional knowledge that is 
practical in character is knowledge that, for some way of doing something, w, one 
knows how to do that thing by knowing of w that it is a way of doing it, and 
entertaining w under a practical mode of presentation.  Assuming that the capacity in 
question would be thought of as knowledge of the way to do things one is thereby 
capable of under a practical mode of presentation, then, on this approach, the present 
question could be recast as: does the knowledge that is central to our utterance 
understanding of a proposition need to be ‘entertained under a practical mode of 
presentation’ or not?
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III. 
The Proposal 
What Rumfitt proposes is a view according to which rhetic 
understanding is constituted by one’s possessing a particular kind of 
capacity, where possession of that capacity is not perspicuously captured 
by an attribution of propositional knowledge.   What this does is reverse 69
the order of priority that I said one might be tempted to impose on 
what’s needed to meet the relevant expectations of the speaker.  The 
recognition of what rhetic thing the speaker means to be doing can itself 
be thought to be constituted by the audience’s possessing the capacity in 
question.   
This runs against orthodoxy.  Something that might legitimately be 
regarded as the received view is that utterance understanding, and by 
extension rhetic understanding, is a matter of possessing propositional 
knowledge.  When it comes to utterances of indicative sentences with 
which a speaker performs an illocutionary act of asserting (by saying 
something), the proposition known will be what it is that the speaker 
said.  As we shall see, the perennially popular elaboration on the received 
view is that this will involve propositional knowledge of a truth-
condition for the utterance in question.  So, on that view, one’s 
possessing the capacity to make the relevant inferences will be equivalent 
 It is not captured by an attribution of ‘knowledge how (to)’ either.  Which goes to 69
show that there is non-propositional knowledge that is practical in character, that can 
constitute one’s possessing a capacity, but is not an instance of ‘knowledge how (to)’, if 
it really is true that such a locution picks out a kind of knowledge.
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to one’s knowing a proposition concerning the conditions under which 
the utterance is true.   
It will be the opposition between the received view, so elaborated, and 
Rumfitt’s proposal that will occupy me for the rest of the thesis.  But the 
account that Rumfitt proposes does have some baseline agreement with 
the received view.  For example, even though there is no presumption 
that rhetic understanding is a matter of possessing propositional 
knowledge, it is still thought to be a cognitive state.  It is a state whose 
object is the rhetic act performed; what I’ve been calling a state of rhetic 
understanding.  With respect to an utterance, u, of a speaker with which 
the rhetic act of saying that p is done,     
[We can] represent a subject’s state of rhetic understanding of a 
saying as a quartet of quasi-inference rules in the form 
  From the premiss or hypothesis that u is true, infer that 
  P, and vice versa 
and 
  From the premiss or hypothesis that u is false, infer that it 
  is not the case that P, and vice versa. 
(Rumfitt 2005, p. 449) 
Such states have certain epistemologically interesting characteristics: 
(a) it gives me reason to believe that P, in the event of my 
  having reason to take u to be true;  
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(b) it gives me reason to take u to be true, in the event of my 
  having reason to believe that P; 
(c) it gives me reason to believe that not P, in the event of my 
  having reason to take u to be false;  
(d) it gives me reason to take u to be false, in the event of my 
  having reason to believe that not P. 
(Rumfitt, 2005, pp. 442-3) 
Rumfitt continues: 
What goes for reasons for belief also goes, pari passu, for 
knowledge.  My understanding an utterance u as saying that P puts 
me in a position 
(a) to know that P, in the event of my coming to know that 
  u is true;  
(b) to know that u is true, in the event of my coming to  
  know that P;  
(c) to know that u is false, in the event of my coming to  
  know that not P; and 
(d) to know that not P, in the event of my coming to know 
  that u is false. 
For now, I’m going to concentrate on states of rhetic understanding 
appropriate to rhetic acts of saying something.   Such states of rhetic 70
 I will later discuss some of the remarks that Rumfitt makes concerning states of 70
rhetic understanding appropriate to rhetic acts of diﬀerent kinds too (in §V of this 
chapter).  Such states—such as those appropriate to rhetic acts of ordering (in some 
thin sense), or asking (whether, why, where etc.)—have interestingly diﬀerent 
characterisations.
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understanding are here being conceived of as states of possession of a 
capacity to move back and forth between making a semantic assessment 
of an utterance, such as the assessment of it as true, and conclusions 
about how things stand in the world.  It is a capacity whose exercise, 
when successful, can be codified in the way Rumfitt expresses in the first 
quotation I gave.   
Rumfitt uses the language of constitution to express the mildly radical 
nature of the proposal which puts it in opposition to the received view: 
we should take a person’s possessing such a capacity as constituting 
his enjoying a rhetic understanding of an utterance.  On the view I 
am recommending, then, a state of rhetic understanding is a way of 
gaining new knowledge (or new reasons for belief ) from old.  [...] 
[R]hetic understanding may be classified as a second-order 
cognitive capacity: one who possesses it is in a position to gain new 
knowledge from old. 
(Rumfitt 2005, p. 444, emphasis added) 
The natural, pre-theoretic way of expressing what it is to achieve rhetic 
understanding of an utterance with which a speaker says something, is 
that one comes to know what it is that the speaker says.  This provides 
the intuitive support for the received view.  But according to Rumfitt’s 
proposal, one counts as possessing the relevant knowledge—being in the 
relevant cognitive state—only if one is capable of reasoning, or thinking, 
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in accordance with the rules that govern the ‘quasi-inferences’ 
appropriate to acts of this kind.    71
I’ve said that Rumfitt’s proposal inverts the standard ordering of the 
primacy of these kinds of cognitive states.  Instead of thinking, as is 
standard, that one possesses a capacity of this kind in virtue of possessing 
knowledge of what the speaker says, the knowledge that we are inclined 
to attribute to subjects who achieve rhetic understanding is here being 
thought of as constituted by the possession of a cognitive capacity, one 
whose exercise accords with what the rules prescribe.  And it is to that 
extent counter-intuitive. 
Rumfitt justifies the abandonment of what might seem intuitive here by, 
in eﬀect, setting out a desideratum on our account of rhetic 
understanding and showing how his view meets it and how others fail to. 
The desideratum is that, for whatever account we choose, it must have 
the consequence that on entering a state of rhetic understanding, the 
subject is said to be capable of making the quasi-inferences that Rumfitt 
isolates.  And there is certainly intuitive support for the claim that those 
 In the general statement of the rules that codify the exercising of the capacity, 71
possession of which is to be identified with one’s understanding an (indicative) saying, 
Rumfitt describes these as ‘quasi-inference rules’.  I will follow Rumfitt’s terminology 
here, and mark the distinction between, on the one hand, inferences and deductions as 
they feature in our everyday reasoning, and, on the other, the distinct kind of quasi-
inferences and quasi-deductions that are putatively specific to our capacity for 
utterance understanding.  They are quasi-inferences because they do not share all the 
properties of inferences—for example, the relations that they track are not relations of 
implication as such, but relations that hold between the truth of (utterances of ) 
sentences and the state of things according to such utterances.  Finally, and somewhat 
sloppily, I’ll use ‘inference’ and ‘deduction’ more or less interchangeably. On a 
distinction that can be drawn between inferences and deductions see Rumfitt 2011, 
pp. 337–40 and White 1971.
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who achieve understanding of an utterance with which the speaker says 
something are capable of the things that Rumfitt concentrates on.  If I 
know that you are trustworthy, serious and reliable about matters party 
political, when you say to me, “the Foreign Secretary has resigned”, my 
having understood you will mean that I can treat your uttering that in 
such a way as to have good reason to suppose that the Foreign Secretary 
has resigned.  If I were unable to so treat your utterance, it is not clear in 
what sense I could count as having understood your utterance.  That 
means that any account of understanding that we choose has got to 
explain how it is that we are capable of making these kinds of inferences, 
since, if our account does not have the consequence that we are so 
capable, then there is something missing in the account.   
The manner in which Rumfitt attempts to motivate his own proposal 
over certain rivals is by claiming that only a view of the kind he suggests 
meets this desideratum.  In particular, the received view—the view that 
rhetic understanding is a matter of possessing knowledge of a proposition
—fails because “no proposition presents itself, knowledge of which is 
equivalent to possessing the cognitive state described” (p. 444).  That is 
going to be a contentious claim—one that I’ll have reason to assess at 
greater length in the next chapter.  But it is worth quickly setting out 
Rumfitt’s stated reasons for saying this now, and we can postpone, in the 
main, our assessment of his argument until then.  
The most obvious candidate proposition, knowledge of which, one might 
think, will put one in the cognitive position that Rumfitt describes, is 
propositional knowledge with the appropriate truth-condition as content. 
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If one knew the conditions under which an utterance is true, then it 
looks like one would then know that things are a certain way—the way 
things would be were those conditions fulfilled—in knowing that the 
utterance is true.  But what, precisely, would that proposition be? 
Rumfitt claims (pp. 447-8) that it cannot be a straightforward 
proposition of the form ‘u is true iﬀ p’, where the ‘iﬀ’ is construed as the 
material biconditional.  That is because the proposition proposed would 
be equivalent to ‘(either ¬(u is true) or p) and (either u is true or ¬p)’ . 
And it is perfectly possible for one to know that proposition, and fail to 
understand the utterance in question.  Precisely what is missing, or so 
says Rumfitt, is one’s being capable of making the inferences of the kind 
he isolates.  As such, knowing this proposition is not equivalent to 
possessing the cognitive state described. 
So what is required is some way of interpreting the biconditional in the 
statement of truth-conditions in such as way that knowledge of that 
proposition would put one in the cognitive position that Rumfitt 
describes.  Whether there is any suitable candidate proposition is 
something, as I’ve said, that I’ll have to give a more extended treatment 
of in the next chapter.   But for now we can retreat to a weaker position 72
than that occupied by Rumfitt and allow that it is a desideratum on our 
 Rumfitt is convinced that so-called ‘Foster problems’ present an insurmountable 72
diﬃculty to attempts to employ truth-conditions with the restrictions placed on their 
construction by Davidson.  I’ll explore Davidson’s proposal later.  An oddity in that 
proposal is that Davidson himself makes no attempt to say what one who achieves 
(rhetic) understanding knows, only what one could know that would suﬃce for one to 
achieve such understanding.  Ways of patching up Davidson’s account for the present 
purposes themselves face problems.  The propositions that are isolated are such that, 
attributions of knowledge of them to those who achieve rhetic understanding fail to be 
at all explanatory.  I pick up on these themes in Chapter 5; see esp. §IV.
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account of rhetic understanding that one who possesses it is capable of 
making Rumfitt’s ‘quasi-inferences’.  And what Rumfitt has provided us 
with is at least one candidate view concerning the nature of rhetic 
understanding; one according to which one’s possessing rhetic 
understanding of an utterance is constituted by one’s possessing the 
capacity to make these quasi-inferences.   
IV. 
Understanding and Inference 
In allowing Rumfitt’s view to at least be one candidate account of rhetic 
understanding amongst many, I am making two assumptions.  The first is 
that it is an open question whether one’s possession of a capacity, in 
general, is to be identified with some state of propositional knowledge. 
The second is that a state of rhetic understanding could be a state of 
capacity possession of the kind that is not to be so identified.  The 
question that I want to turn to, given these assumptions, is this: are there 
any positive reasons why should we think that being in a state of rhetic 
understanding of an utterance is constituted by our occupying a state of 
possessing a capacity of this kind?   
If achieving rhetic understanding of an utterance is to enter into a 
cognitive state of this, one would expect there to be marked similarities 
between those who achieve states of rhetic understanding, and those who 
are in diﬀerent cognitive states of the same kind (that is, the kind of 
states of possession of other capacities that are not identified with a state 
of knowing a proposition).  I’m going to look at one such putative 
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similarity that Rumfitt emphasises; a putative similarity between our state 
of rhetic understanding and our possession of the capacity, or capacities, 
to make inferences in standard deductive reasoning.  
We are perhaps more used to the idea that one can conceive of our 
inferential, or deductive, capacities as capacities that are not themselves 
identified with further propositional knowledge.  That’s because, if we 
conceive of one’s possessing such a capacity as one’s possessing some 
propositional knowledge, then a familiar problem, first discussed in 
Lewis Carroll’s (1895) fable, ‘What the Tortoise said to Achilles’, can be 
thought to arise.  A certain family of solutions to the problems raised by 
Carroll provide close analogies what Rumfitt is proposing about rhetic 
understanding. 
Carroll tells us a story in which a tortoise engages in sophistry with his 
interlocutor, Achilles.  The sophistry he engages in seems to render 
Achilles unable to impel him to accept some claim, on the basis of others, 
that we would have thought that the tortoise was compelled to accept. 
There are a number of ways to uncover the tortoise’s sophistry for what it 
is.  I will follow J. F. Thomson’s (1960) treatment of the story.    73
Here is a claim: 
 (A)  Things that are equal to the same are equal to each other; 
 For a view of reasoning of this kind that takes it that our capacity for such reasoning 73
can be understood in terms of propositional knowledge see Valaris (2014).
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Now consider this (isosceles) triangle, and the subsequent claim that is 
true of it: 
  
 (B) The two sides of this triangle are things that are equal to 
  the same; 
From (A) and (B) we can infer, 
 (Z) The two sides of this triangle are equal to each other 
But, according to Carroll’s fable, this is not so.  What the Tortoise tells 
Achilles is that he accepts (A) and (B), but does not accept the further 
claim: 
 (C) If things that are equal to the same are equal to each other, 
  and if the two sides of this triangle are equal to the same, 
  then the two sides of this triangle are equal to each other. 
Only with (C) in place, such is the tortoise’s thought, could (Z) be 
inferred from (A) and (B).  But then a regress starts.  If (C) is needed to 
make the inference from (A) and (B) to (Z), then isn’t a further claim, 
(D)—I won’t spell it out—needed to make the inference (A), (B) and (C) 
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to (Z)?  And so, then, isn’t (E) needed to make the inference from (A), 
(B), (C) and (D) to (Z)? (And so on.)  The answer, of course, is no.  Here 
is Thompson’s diagnosis: 
The Tortoise represents himself as someone who accepts (A) and 
(B) but not (C) and he says that, being in this position, he is not as 
yet under any logical necessity to accept (Z). This is wrong. 
Whether or not he accepts (C), it is logically true. That means that 
the argument from (A) and (B) to (Z) is logically valid and that the 
Tortoise in accepting (A) and (B) commits himself to accepting 
(Z). 
(Thompson 1960, p. 98) 
The central point, at least for current purposes, is that our capacity to 
infer (Z) from (A) and (B) shouldn’t be thought of a consisting in our 
knowing a proposition like (C).  Rather, we should think of it in terms of 
our appreciating the relation of implication that holds between claims 
(A) and (B), and the conclusion, (Z).  That relation of implication 
holding is what means that the tortoise is committed to accepting (Z), 
once he accepts (A) and (B).  That appreciation of that relation is 
codified in terms of the rules that govern inferences.  In the example 
we’ve been using, (A) is an expression of the transitivity of identity in 
general, and (B) is a statement of something specific that stands in 
structurally appropriate relations (that is, relations of identity).  In which 
case we can apply the rule to the specific instance without needing a 
further premise that the rule applies in this case.  It just does. 
Appreciating so much is not another step in the inference, it is just what 
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it is to perform the inference in question.   Our capacity to infer (Z) 74
from (A) and (B) should be thought of just in terms of one’s possessing 
the capacity to draw conclusions that follow from one’s premises.  As 
Rumfitt points out in a number of places, it is a capacity to gain new 
knowledge from old; in these simple cases of deduction, it is just such a 
capacity (and nothing else), one whose exercise accords with the relevant 
rule. 
When it comes to our possessing rhetic understanding, it is not relations 
of implication that are at issue, but relations of quasi-implication. 
Relations of implication and relations of quasi-implication diﬀer in so far 
as relations of quasi-implication do not pertain to logical validity, as 
Thompson suggests that relations of implication do, but to the kind of 
relations that hold between states of the world, and utterances of 
sentences that represent them.  Either way, for claims that stand in 
relations of this kind, one incurs certain commitments about each of the 
relata, by accepting either one of the claims.  The idea is that there is 
some relation, not unlike implication in this respect, between the truth 
(or falsity) of an utterance and the world’s being some way, such that, in 
the event of one’s possessing reasons to suppose the one, one has reason 
to suppose the other—at least one does so, once one appreciates the 
connection between the relata.  
 One may want to demur from the present claims as the correct diagnosis of what is 74
going on in Carroll’s fable.  I don’t wish to foreclose debate on this.  The present 
interpretation is owed to a significant degree to Rumfitt’s own (2011) discussion of 
logical competence.  But this is apposite in the current context since this discussion is 
meant to be illustrative of Rumfitt’s account of utterance understanding, which he 
thinks has many interesting similarities to our capacity for making inferences so 
concieved.
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These remarks are nothing more than suggestive in the direction for 
supposing that there is some structural similarities between states of 
rhetic understanding and states of possessing certain inferential 
capacities.  For the comparison to be one that speaks in favour of 
Rumfitt’s view, it must be able to sustain a view of rhetic understanding 
that meets certain important desiderata that, it is universally agreed, any 
such theory must meet.  It is to whether Rumfitt’s view can do this that I 
now turn. 
V. 
Linguistic Competence 
If Rumfitt’s proposal is to be at all plausible it must possess the resources 
to accommodate the productivity that we display in our linguistic 
behaviour—that is, the fact that with a finite stock of words and modes 
of combining those words, there is a potential infinity of distinct 
sentences to be uttered, each of which we are, at least in principle, 
capable of understanding.  That means that, when uttered, each of them 
can be used in the service of doing any of the indefinitely many things to 
be done in speaking, each of which can (in principle) be discerned by the 
competent.  To do this we need some explanation of the capacity we have 
that enables us to possess rhetic understanding of any given utterance—
that is, what it is, on this view to understand a language. 
I think its helpful here to have a look back to one of Rumfitt’s earlier 
papers, where he makes some remarks about linguistic competence, 
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though the view he articulates does not have the current proposal as a 
constituent.  But showing how his view has changed I think will help to 
shed light on what the relationship is between our capacity for utterance 
understanding, and the state achieved by way of an exercise of that 
capacity, according to the current proposal.  This relationship is 
important because it will be where we can locate the explanation of the 
productivity, of the kind I just mentioned, that manifestly occurs in our 
comprehension of speech. 
In his 2001 paper, ‘Semantic Theory and Necessary Truth’, Rumfitt 
makes a number of remarks about logical competence that bear a striking 
similarity to current proposal concerning utterance understanding.  He 
says, 
A logical competence is a competence to gain new propositional 
knowledge from old; it is not, or not primarily, a matter of 
knowing logical propositions.  And the task of the logician is to 
codify this competence by explicitly formulating the rules in 
accordance with which a logically competent thinker reasons.  
(Rumfitt, 2001, pp. 302–3) 
In the context of this remark, it is clear that Rumfitt thinks there are 
interesting parallels between our logical competence and our linguistic 
competence.  ‘Linguistic competence’, as that phrase applies here, picks 
out our capacity for utterance understanding—that is, the capacity we 
have to enter states of rhetic understanding of particular utterances. 
Taking seriously the analogy with the conception of logical competence 
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just quoted, then, what emerges is the view that linguistic competence is 
a capacity to acquire propositional knowledge.  The proposition that is 
allegedly known is one with a truth condition as content.  Where claim T 
is the claim that the utterance by the German speaker, Kurt, of ‘Schnee 
ist weiss’ is true iﬀ snow is white, 
if Peter has an ordinary sort of training in German, he will know 
that the word ‘Schnee’ denotes snow, and that the predicate ‘____ 
ist weiss’ is true of an object iﬀ it is white; and this propositional 
knowledge can help to account for his knowing T. […] Peter 
should be able to combine the propositional knowledge that he has 
concerning Kurt’s words to attain further propositional knowledge 
about Kurt’s complete sentences. 
(ibid., p. 302) 
Even though, at this point, Rumfitt seems to squarely endorse a version 
of the received view that he would later come to cast doubt on, not 
everything he says here is in conflict with the proposal we’re considering. 
Because he then goes on to say, that “as in the logical case, though, there 
is no reason to identify possession of this ability with possession of any 
propositional knowledge: the ability in question can equally well be 
codified by (properly) semantical rules.”  The ability he speaks of will still 
be codified in terms of semantical rules, but in more recent work, 
Rumfitt has returned to the notion of logical competence in a way that is 
instructive as to the shift in his thinking about utterance understanding 
since 2001.  There he says, 
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logical competence […] is a higher order intellectual capacity: its 
application yields new deductive capacities from old. [As such,] 
logical rules are generally applicable rules for forming new 
deductions from old, not rules that regulate the activity of 
specifically logical deduction.  
(Rumfitt 2011, pp. 347-8) 
Regardless of whether one agrees with Rumfitt that this is the best way to 
understand logical competence, this helps clarify the claim that a state of 
utterance understanding is a state of possessing a capacity to gain new 
knowledge from old, and not fundamentally a state of propositional 
knowledge.  Like logical competence, we should think of our capacity for 
utterance understanding—our linguistic competence—in terms of its 
application yielding new quasi-deductive capacities from old.  Indicative 
quasi-deductive capacities are capacities that allow one to track quasi-
implicative relations between the semantic properties of an utterance, 
and what way the world is, or would be, according to it (at least, for 
sayings).  
What does this mean?  It means that what linguistic competence yields is 
the second-order cognitive capacity of the kind Rumfitt sets out with 
respect to particular utterances.  And it is at this point that we get some 
indication of how the proposal handles productivity as manifest in our 
understanding.  Given the various parallels that he draws between our 
linguistic competence and our logical competence, it is perhaps hardly 
surprising that such an explanation will take its cue from productivity in 
logical reasoning: “the relation between derived and primitive rules in a 
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logical system may be a helpful model as we describe how our rhetic 
understanding of complete sayings depends upon our understanding of 
their parts” (Rumfitt 2005, p. 445).   
To take a very simple example, our linguistic competence with English 
will (typically) involve competence with proper names—like ‘Jim’—and 
competence with predicates—like ‘____ smokes’.  This contributes to 
our possessing the capacity to understand a given utterance, by S, of “Jim 
smokes” (on some occasion).  According to Rumfitt’s view, then, when 
we understand that utterance, we have quasi-deductive capacities with 
respect to (utterances of ) these words.   For ‘Jim’ we will have 75
something like the following rule of quasi-deduction: for an utterance, u, 
that makes reference to a particular (perhaps (partially) contextually 
determined) individual, Jim,  
 From the premise or hypothesis that u is true, infer that some   
 utterance of a predicate, v, is true of Jim, and vice versa. 
and 
 From the premise or hypothesis that u is false, infer that some  
 utterance of a predicate, v, is false of Jim, and vice versa. 
What is v here?  It is an utterance of some incomplete expression.  In our 
example, it will be an utterance of the predicate expression ‘____ 
smokes’.  Rumfitt draws on certain views about how to best think of 
 The essentials of this element of the account can be found in Rumfitt 2005, pp. 75
449–451.
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WH-questions in order to account for predication.  Considering a 
slightly diﬀerent, but importantly similar, view, he says,   
To a first approximation, the utterance of a WH-question may be 
understood as an utterance of an incomplete expression, together 
with a request to supply something of which the incomplete 
expression is true.  Thus an utterance of “Who killed Cock 
Robin?” may be understood as an utterance of the predicative 
expression “𝜉 killed Cock Robin”, together with a request to name 
or describe something of which that incomplete expression is 
true.  76
(ibid., p. 440-1) 
Extrapolating from this we can formulate the relevant rule that handles 
predication in sayings.  There will be a (relatively) primitive rule for 
‘____ smokes’, that might run as follows: 
 From the premise or hypothesis that v is true of x, infer that x  
 smokes, and vice versa 
and 
 From the premise or hypothesis that v is false of x, infer that x  
 does not smoke, and vice versa. 
 Rumfitt says this in the context of a discussion of ‘Wittgenstein’s dictum’ that to 76
understand a declarative utterance in use is to know what is the case if it is true.  He 
adapts this dictum for other kinds of rhetic acts, and though he does not endorse these 
pronouncements as they stand, it is from these that he derives his own claims about 
what it is to achieve rhetic understanding of such utterances.  
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Where ‘x’ is whatever it is that could complete the expression such that  a 
predication of ‘____ smokes’ of it, will result in an utterance of the 
completed expression having one of the truth-values it is hypothesised to 
have.  We then have the resources to give the rule governing the utterance 
of the complete expression ‘Jim smokes’, by combining the two more 
primitive rules that I have just given.     
In reasoning in accordance with each of these rules, when the one 
completes the one expression with the other, we then get the following, 
which is the rule in accordance with which we are capable of reasoning 
with respect to the utterance of the complete expression “Jim smokes”:  
 From the premise or hypothesis that u is true, infer that Jim  
 smokes, and vice versa;  
and 
 From the premise or hypothesis that u is false, infer that it is not 
 the case that Jim smokes, and vice versa. 
In this way, we get an explanation of how we possess the capacity, 
utterance understanding of the utterance, by S, of “Jim smokes”, by 
appeal to more basic capacities to utterance understand utterances of 
their parts.    77
 There is the added advantage that the current proposal can easily accommodate the 77
compositionality of natural language operators such as ‘it is necessarily the case that’, 
which motivates Rumfitt’s original appeal to semantical rules in 2001 (see also Rumfitt 
2005, pp. 450–1).
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Before moving on to consider some objections to the view, I want to 
mark one area in which there is more work to do with the proposal. 
When it comes to utterances of non-declaratives, there is a notable lack 
of unity in the account, in the sense that diﬀerent kinds of rhetic acts call 
for diﬀerent explanations of what it is to achieve rhetic understanding of 
utterances with which those things are done.  This may provide the 
grounds for worries about the explanatory potential of the proposal. 
Because we expect our account of rhetic understanding to be where 
systematicity to be displayed in a way that reflects our productivity in 
understanding.  And we may suppose that such productivity occurs across 
the kinds of rhetic acts that speakers perform.  
Let me introduce a thin notion of ‘ordering’ which picks out what the 
imperatival rhetic thing to be done in speaking (Hornsby’s “saying 
imperitivally”, see Chapter 3, §IV. b, & Hornsby 1988, pp. 42-4).  Just 
as there is a thin sense of saying, picking out the rhetic thing typically 
done with utterances of indicative sentences, I am using ‘enjoining’ in an 
analogous way for the rhetic things typically done with utterances of 
sentences in the imperative mood.  Rumfitt is explicit about what set of 
quasi-inferences are those who one possessing rhetic understanding of an 
order is capable of.  He oﬀers the following schematic pair: 
if I understand the utterance u as an order, directed to x, to φ, I 
shall 
 (a)  have reason to believe that x has φ’d, in the event that I 
  have reason to believe that u has been obeyed; and 
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 (b) have reason to believe that x has not φ’d, in the event that 
  I have reason to believe that u has been disobeyed. 
(Rumfitt 2005, p. 443) 
Converting this into what I take to be the most basic expression of the 
rules governing the quasi-inferences one who is possession of rhetic 
understanding of an ordering of something, we get, 
 From the premise or hypothesis that u has been obeyed, infer that 
 x has φ’d; 
and 
 From the premise or hypothesis that u has been disobeyed, infer 
 that x has not φ’d. 
The rules governing rhetic understanding of an order only licences two 
quasi-inferences as opposed to the four that one who is in possession of 
rhetic understanding of a saying is capable of. (We don’t get a quartet of 
quasi-inferences because understanding issueing of an order does not 
allow one to conclude that an order has been obeyed by someone acting 
in a particular way.  They may have done that oﬀ their own accord).  So 
one’s achieving rhetic understanding of an utterance in which an order is 
issued is to enter into a state of a markedly diﬀerent character to that of 
rhetic understanding of a saying.  78
 There will be diﬀerent kinds quasi-inference rules for the other kinds of rhetic acts 78
too, such as exclamative rhetic acts and interrogative rhetic acts of the various kinds 
(e.g. yes-no questions and WH-questions).
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But we should expect that utterances of sentences with which diﬀerent 
kinds of rhetic act are performed concerning the same objects and 
predicates to have something in common.  And we might reasonably 
expect our account of rhetic understanding to reflect this fact.  For 
example, we should expect some common explanation for our rhetic 
understanding an utterance of “the gate is shut” (with which the rhetic 
act of saying to someone that the gate is shut is performed), and our 
rhetic understanding of “shut the gate!” (with which the rhetic act of 
enjoining someone to shut the gate is performed).  
This marks a lacuna in the account, but it need not be a problem for the 
account per se—in fact, this feature may in the end turn out to be an 
advantage of the account.  Recall that in Chapter 3 I set out some 
considerations, first put forward by Hornsby, in favour of a conception of 
the rhetic things done by speakers cannot all be reduced to, or 
assimilated by, acts that one typically performs in uttering indicative 
sentences.  This should be reflected in our account of rhetic 
understanding, since that is meant to be understood in terms of when 
one would count as recognising the rhetic thing a speaker means to be 
doing with their utterance.  What this goes to show is that the view will 
require of audiences that they recognise the kind of rhetic thing that the 
speaker means to be doing, in order to utilise the appropriate relatively 
primitive rules governing complete rhetic acts, in its explanation of 
productivity of our rhetic understanding.  The work to be done moving 
forward, then, is to produce a suitable explanation of how rhetic 
understanding of utterances with which diﬀerent kinds of rhetic acts are 
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performed themselves display the productivity that it is plausible we 
employ when such utterances contain the same predicates.  There is no 
reason to suppose, at this stage, that such an explanation cannot be given. 
But assessment of the full viability of the account will have to wait until 
that work has been done.  
Moving forward, I’ll return to concentrating on rhetic understanding of 
utterances with which speakers say things, because it is in terms of our 
rhetic understanding of these things done that the objections I’ll be 
considering are formulated. 
VI. 
Longworth’s Objection 
I’ll start by considering a worry that has been raised by Guy Longworth. 
It is one of a number of objections to Rumfitt's proposal that can be 
found in Longworth (2009) & (2010).  I will consider what I take the 
most pressing of these, that, I take it, is given its canonical expression in 
the latter of these papers.    79
This objection to is spread over a number of pages of that paper.  I’ll 
provide some quotations that I take to be where the core of the objection 
is located.  Then I’ll give a reading of that argument that can be found 
 The main objection to Rumfitt’s view that Longworth raises in that earlier paper is 79
an ancestor of the objection that I treat in this section, though it is formulated in 
diﬀerent terms (those worries can be found at Longworth 2009, pp. 155-7).  There is, 
also, a slightly diﬀerent emphasis.  Though I think that the reply I give on Rumfitt’s 
behalf can deal with some of the key elements of that objection, there are other claims 
of Longworth’s which are not touched by the response I give here.
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there—a reading to which I’ll be attempting to reply, on Rumfitt’s behalf, 
in §VI. b..  
VI. a. 
Objection 
I take the essence of Longworth’s objection to be contained in the 
following passage: 
[Rumfitt’s proposal] makes no immediate demands on first-order 
stative cognition. To a good first approximation, the crucial 
diﬀerence between first- and second-order stative cognition is that 
only the former has an immediate bearing on occurrent awareness, 
including the capacity to entertain, and to make judgements about, 
expressed content.  In order for second-order stative cognition to 
determine such occurrent awareness it must first issue in first-order 
stative cognition.  According to [Rumfitt’s proposal], then, a 
subject can understand someone’s saying p in the absence of 
awareness of the saying or its content—in the absence, that is, of a 
capacity immediately to entertain, or to judge competently about, 
its content.  First-order cognition only emerges, if it emerges at all, 
where the subject acquires knowledge of, or takes a cognitive stand 
concerning, either the truth of the utterance or the content the 
utterance was in fact used to express.  
(Longworth 2010, pp. 28-9) 
Longworth takes this to have two unwanted consequences.  First, it is 
false to the phenomenology of understanding, and second, it is 
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“incompatible with central features of the normal epistemological 
situation of those who might benefit from testimony”.  I take the second 
supposed consequence to be more pressing than the first, so I’ll 
concentrate on that in the main in what follows.  At the end of this 
section, though, I will say something about the phenomenological point.   
In what way, then, is Rumfitt’s account supposed to be incompatible 
with what Longworth says are the central features of testimonial 
situations for audiences?  I think the crux is found in the following: 
[A]wareness of what a speaker says furnishes access to what one will 
immediately become committed to if one accepts what they say. 
[…] a minimal requirement on rational acceptance of presented 
information [is that] it involves prior cognisance of what one is 
thereby accepting.  
(ibid., p. 30) 
The “central problem” with the view, Longworth tells us, is that Rumfitt’s 
account fails to provide anything that can fulfil this ‘minimal 
requirement’ because, 
it makes one’s first-order cognition of what was said in an utterance 
depend upon one’s taking a particular stand concerning the subject 
matter of what was said, either accepting or rejecting that the 
subject matter is as it is said to be in the utterance. 
(ibid., pp. 31-2) 
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The diagnosis, and so where a solution is to be located, is that, 
What is wanted is precisely what [Rumfitt’s proposal] refuses to 
oﬀer, a form of first-order cognition that can serve as neutral input 
to rational acceptance or rejection. 
(ibid., p. 33) 
This is how I read Longworth’s objection.  Longworth thinks that, 
though Rumfitt has identified some important features of what it is to 
understand some particular utterance, he has not identified what 
fundamentally constitutes this understanding.  That is because the state 
as described by Rumfitt lacks certain features that any state that does 
constitute such understanding must have.  Those features that such states 
must have fall under the banner what Longworth calls “awareness of 
expressed content”.  The overall objection is that one can be in the state 
that Rumfitt describes, and fail to possess “awareness of expressed 
content”—that is, be in a state that fails to have features that states of 
utterance understanding must have.  Since utterance understanding 
requires such awareness, occupying the cognitive position that Rumfitt 
describes cannot be, fundamentally, what it is to achieve utterance 
understanding.  
This state of “awareness of expressed content” has three features: (i) it 
involves “the capacity to entertain, and to make judgements about, 
expressed content” (Longworth 2010, p. 29); (ii) it “can serve as a neutral 
input to rational acceptance or rejection” that things are as they are said 
to be (p. 33); and (iii) it is an instance of “first-order stative 
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cognition” (p. 29).  So the objection is that the state Rumfitt identifies 
does not have these features.  What Rumfitt has described is, rather, a 
capacity we possess in achieving utterance understanding, one that itself 
is grounded in some further cognitive state with these features.  And it is 
that further state which, for Longworth, is properly to be identified with 
a state of utterance understanding. 
I think there is a response that Rumfitt could make to this objection.  It 
takes the form of conceding to Longworth that two of the features of 
“awareness of expressed content” are features that a state of rhetic 
understanding must possess, but denying that third feature is a feature 
that states of rhetic understanding must have.  The two features that 
states of rhetic understanding do have are (i) that those who are in 
possession of it are able to make judgements about expressed content, 
and (ii) that it is a state that serves as a neutral input into rational 
acceptance and rejection.  The third feature that such states need not 
possess (or so I’ll argue) is that its being a ‘first-order’ or ‘occurrent’ state 
in the relevant sense.  I think that there are arguments available for the 
claim that the state that Rumfitt isolates can have these first two features 
without having the third.  Since this third feature is not a feature that 
states of understanding must have, there is no objection to taking the 
state that constitutes our rhetic understanding to be of the kind that 
Rumfitt proposes.   
I’ll go through each of these features in turn; first setting out why 
Longworth thinks that states of understanding must have these features, 
why he thinks the state that Rumfitt isolates cannot have them.  I’ll then 
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say why I think Rumfitt’s state can accommodate the first two features, 
and in so doing I will show why it need not accommodate the third.  I’ll 
end by acknowledging the phenomenological oddities that Longworth 
points out, but I don’t take this to be a decisive reason to reject the 
proposal. 
IV. b.  
Reply 
(i)  Rhetic Understanding involves “the capacity to entertain, and to  
 make judgements about expressed content”. 
To make a judgement as to whether Rumfitt’s proposal can account for 
the fact—if it is a fact—that rhetic understanding involves a capacity “to 
entertain, and make judgements about expressed content” we need to 
know, first, what Longworth means to be picking out with the notion of 
“entertaining expressed content”.  I’m not entirely sure what this comes 
to, but it definitely seems right that rhetic understanding must bring 
with it a capacity to make judgements about the things that are said to 
us.  I think that there is a way that we can interpret the requirement that 
rhetic understanding necessarily involves the capacity to make 
judgements about expressed content in such a way that Rumfitt’s 
proposal meets it.  Whether this interpretation of the requirement is a 
suitable one will turn on the manner in which Rumfitt’s proposal can 
accommodate the second feature of “awareness of expressed content”—
namely, how we can conceive of the state he isolates as serving as a 
neutral input into acceptance or rejection. 
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In Chapter 3 (§IV. a.) we saw what “expressed content” might come to. 
At least when it comes to utterances in which speakers perform the rhetic 
act of saying something, it is that thing that is said in the course of their 
producing that utterance.  I called these things ‘propositions’. 
Propositions are individuated by the rhetic acts that they are associated 
with.  For rhetic acts of saying something, the things that are said (i.e. the 
propositions) are individuated by the rhetic acts performed with a 
speaker’s utterance. Propositions stand in a one-to-one relation with 
rhetic acts of saying something.  What a speaker says is determined by 
their rhetic intentions, so the proposition that is the thing that they said 
is likewise determined by the speaker’s rhetic intentions.  
So the requirement is that rhetic understanding brings with it the 
capacity to ‘entertain’ propositions so understood, if ‘expressed content’ 
can be equated with propositions.  Elsewhere, Longworth uses the notion 
of “entertaining a thought” or a content and, in a footnote, tells us that 
he is employing the term in such a way that it picks out “the most 
general determinable of determinate propositional attitude states.  So 
knowing p, believing p, supposing p, hoping p, etc., are each particular 
ways of entertaining p”.   So understood, entertaining a thought is not 80
anything over and above one’s holding such attitudes (cf. my discussion 
of the determinate/determinable distinction in Chapter 3, §IV. b.). 
Transposed into talk of propositions, as that talk is being understood 
here, that is to hold one of the kinds of determinate attitudes that 
Longworth lists concerning that thing that stands in the relevant relation 
 Longworth 2008, fn. 10.80
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to the rhetic act the speaker performed.  Of course, Longworth may be 
working here with a diﬀerent notion of “entertaining”, but if he isn’t, 
then entertaining the proposition is to have a propositional attitude with 
the proposition associated with the rhetic act the speaker performed as 
content. 
As it stands, it is not clear why Rumfitt would accept this requirement, 
since enforcing it would beg the question against his proposal in favour 
of the received view (i.e. that rhetic understanding is a propositional 
attitude state—most likely, propositional knowledge).  Since his view is 
just a denial of a conception of rhetic understanding as a propositional 
attitude state in general (and a state of propositional knowledge in 
particular), unless we have independent reason to suppose it must be a 
state of this kind (namely, a propositional one), it cannot antecedently be 
a requirement that it is.  As we’ll see, I think that Longworth takes 
himself to have such reasons, but it is no objection to Rumfitt’s view that 
the state he identifies is not a propositional attitude absent those reasons. 
I’ll leave, then, the idea of rhetic understanding requiring those who 
achieve it to “entertain expressed content” to one side (at least for the 
time being.  I will concentrate, instead, on the claim that “awareness of 
expressed content” involves possessing the capacity to make judgements 
about the things that are said (with utterances in which the speaker says 
something) 
Something that rhetic understanding has got to involve is one’s being 
capable of distinguishing utterances according to the rhetic things done 
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with them.  Distinguishing one rhetic thing done from another would 
involve being in a cognitive state whose discernible character depends on 
the particular rhetic thing that the speaker has done.  Rumfitt’s proposal 
allows those who attain rhetic understanding to do this, since rhetic 
understanding is a state of being capable of making the relevant 
inferences particular to the rhetic things the speaker has done, one who 
enters this state, so conceived, is able to distinguish utterances by the 
rhetic things done with them: what inferences they will be capable of will 
vary with the rhetic thing done (indeed, I used this thought to show how 
we might distinguish between doings of rhetic things when I first 
discussed propositions—see Chapter 3, §IV. b. & §VIII). 
But rhetic understanding must involve more than this.  Longworth's 
claim that utterance understanding must furnish us with the capacity to 
make judgements about the proposition expressed by an utterance is 
extremely plausible.  That’s borne out by the fact that rhetic 
understanding enables audiences to provide reports of what’s said with an 
utterance.  Suppose I can understand French, but you cannot.  Pierre 
utters, “Jim fume”.  I understand Pierre’s utterance, and you do not.  You 
ask me what Pierre said, and I tell you that Pierre said that Jim smokes. 
The explanation of my capacity to do this will make appeal to my rhetic 
understanding, because that is what will have furnished me with the 
capacity to make judgements about the rhetic thing that Pierre did.  It is 
on account of understanding his utterance that I am able to make this 
report; that is, I was able to make a judgement as to what the content of 
his utterance was.  
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It may initially seem puzzling how rhetic understanding on its own, 
according to Rumfitt’s proposal, can allow for this, given that it eschews a 
conception of rhetic understanding as a propositional attitude state. 
That puzzlement might come from how it could be that anything but the 
received view could have the resources to account for this—the 
judgements in question here just are judgements about what 
propositional content the utterance has.  And if rhetic understanding 
enables us to make such judgements, then it has got to supply what it is 
that is being judged: what proposition the speaker expressed in uttering 
what they did.  But if understanding is not a propositional state, how is it 
that we could make judgements of this kind on the basis of entering that 
state?  
One who achieves rhetic understanding on Rumfitt’s proposal has 
(amongst other things) the capacity to make quasi-inferences from 
hypotheses about the utterance’s truth.  Let’s suppose that one who 
achieves this is also capable of reporting what it is that they are capable of 
inferring.  If they were to exercise these capacities in tandem, they could 
report what would be the case under the supposition that the utterance is 
true.  Such a report is tantamount to their reporting what's said.  That’s 
because what's said is the proposition that is associated with the rhetic act 
of saying they perform when they produce an indicative utterance to that 
end.  Propositions, recall are determined by whether they are true under 
just the same conditions, because propositions stand in one-to-one 
relations with rhetic acts of saying.  Acts of saying are identical if to say 
the one thing is to say the other, and we can tell when that happens if 
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one says truth with the one under just the same (possibly fine-grained) 
conditions.   
The idea is that by conducting the (quasi-)inferences in question, they 
can be in a position to report what they have inferred from premises 
about the truth or falsity of the utterance—that is, report the things that 
are said.  Being in that position necessarily involves the capacity to make 
judgements about the proposition associated with the rhetic act 
performed, that is making a judgement as to what is quasi-implied by 
one’s premises.  Given the current focus on utterances with which rhetic 
acts of saying are performed, reporting what one is capable of inferring 
here is to report how things are said to be by one who produces the 
utterance in question.  And, given the way that expressed content, 
understood as the thing that is said, depends on what one who 
understands the utterance in question is capable of inferring from the 
premise that it is true, one who conducts the relevant inference will be 
capable of reporting the thing that is said.  We thus have an explanation 
of the capacity that audience’s have to make judgements about the 
expressed content of sayings. 
In this way, then, Rumfitt’s proposal can be said to involve that element 
of “awareness of expressed content” which Longworth picks out with the 
idea that it furnishes us with the “capacity […] to make judgements 
about expressed content”.  The issue now is whether this conception of 
how our rhetic understanding furnishes us with this comes at any costs. 
I take it that Longworth thinks that it does.  It is now time to turn to the 
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second putative feature of the “awareness of expressed content” that 
utterance understanding is supposed to furnish us with. 
(ii)  Rhetic understanding can “serve as a neutral input to rational  
 acceptance and rejection” of the utterance. 
If the above remarks indicate the right way to account for our capacity to 
report what’s said under Rumfitt’s proposal, then one striking feature of 
the view is that the reports cannot be made until the relevant 
(quasi-)inferences have been made.  So it looks like Rumfitt will have to 
appeal to an exercise of the capacity whose mere possession is meant to be 
what rhetic understanding is constituted by.  He needs to do this in order 
to allow for the view to accommodate the ability of one who achieves 
rhetic understanding to report what rhetic thing a speaker has done.     
It seems to be a thought along these lines that drives Longworth’s claim 
that there is something amiss in Rumfitt’s proposal, when he says that the 
state Rumfitt isolates is not one that can serve as a “neutral input into 
rational acceptance or rejection”.  He takes it that, in order to make a 
judgement about what the expressed content of an utterance is, the 
proposal requires that we exercise the capacity that putatively constitutes 
our rhetic understanding.  But, in requiring an exercise of this capacity to 
generate such judgements, rhetic understanding cannot then be thought 
of as the neutral input into such judgements.   Longworth seems to think 
that an exercise of this capacity necessarily involves non-rationally taking 
a stand on either the utterance’s truth-value, or the state of the world: 
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[t]he central problem with [Rumfitt’s proposal] is that it makes 
one’s first-order cognition of what was said in an utterance depend 
upon one’s taking a particular stand concerning the subject matter 
of what was said, either accepting or rejecting that the subject 
matter is as it is said to be in the utterance. 
(Longworth 2010, p. 32) 
If that is right, then it cannot serve, as it should, as a neutral input into 
one’s acceptance or rejection of what’s said.   Judgements about what’s 
said are meant to be the basis on which rational deliberations about what 
to accept are conducted.  It looks like, though, Rumfitt’s account requires 
of us a form of acceptance or rejection prior to rational deliberation, if 
Longworth is right.  As such, the view entails that rhetic understanding 
cannot serve as a neutral input into such rational deliberation as it 
should. 
If there is a problem here, it cannot be quite as Longworth states it to be. 
That’s because Longworth thinks that, according to the proposal, an 
exercise of the capacity that putatively constitutes one’s rhetic 
understanding involves taking a stand on the utterance’s truth, or the 
relevant state of the world.  But it does not.  An exercise of Rumfitt’s 
second-order cognitive capacity (with respect to sayings) need not involve 
non-rational acceptance or rejection.  An exercise of this capacity, rather, 
can be conducted with hypotheses concerning the truth or falsity of 
utterance.  And one can hypothesise that p without taking a stand on 
whether p.  So it doesn't follow that an exercise of the capacity that rhetic 
understanding of a saying furnishes us with inevitably involves 
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acceptance or rejection.  As such, if a capacity to judge the content of a 
saying requires an exercise of the capacity that rhetic understanding 
consists in, then it does not follow that non-rational acceptance or 
rejection is required to make a judgement about what rhetic thing the 
speaker did (e.g. what she said). 
This observation, I think, suﬃces to deal with the letter of that part of 
Longworth’s objection that suggests that Rumfitt cannot provide a 
neutral input to acceptance and rejection.  However, I think that the 
likely response here will be that it fails to deal with its spirit, and properly 
recast, an equally problematic consequence can be derived from this 
articulation of the second-order state that Rumfitt proposes as that which 
constitutes our rhetic understanding of an utterance.  I think this, 
ultimately, relies on Longworth’s claim that states of understanding must 
be first-order cognitive states.  I think that this claim can be rejected, and 
it is to this final part of the objection that I now turn. 
(iii) Rhetic understanding is an instance of “first-order stative cognition” 
The diagnosis that Longworth oﬀers for why Rumfitt's proposal is 
susceptible to the problems that he thinks beset it is that the state that 
Rumfitt appeals to is not of the right kind.  The problems emerge, at root 
from the second-order character of the state that Rumfitt relies upon.  It is 
this feature of the state that, for Longworth, I think, ultimately precludes 
it from allowing us to make judgements concerning what’s said without 
prior non-rational commitment.   
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In the following passage, it looks like Longworth seems to see a link 
between a state’s eligibility as this kind of neutral input he is looking for, 
and its being a first-order, or occurrent state: 
[O]ne’s acceptance [of an utterance] is […] a rational response to 
what one immediately takes in through hearing and 
understanding.  And that requires that one can take something in 
through hearing and understanding whilst remaining neutral about 
its alethic status. […] What is wanted is precisely what [Rumfitt’s 
proposal] refuses to oﬀer, a form of first order cognition that can 
serve as neutral input to rational acceptance or rejection.  I 
conclude that the claim that [Rumfitt’s proposal] models our most 
fundamental engagement with what is said should not be accepted.  
(ibid., p. 33, emphasis added) 
The thought then seems to be that, because Rumfitt’s proposal is one that 
attributes only a second-order state to those who achieve rhetic 
understanding, it simply fails to have the resources needed to supply the 
required neutral state that could serve as the basis of judgements 
concerning what’s said that are rationally made. 
If the problem here is really a consequence of the metaphysics of the 
mental states that Rumfitt isolates, we should expect that a similar 
problem will reemerge for view, in light of the response I gave to (ii). 
The problem would not be so much that making judgements about 
expressed content requires a form of acceptance or rejection (it doesn’t), 
but rather the problem concerns whether judgements about what’s said 
should involve an exercise of this second-order cognitive capacity at all, if 
 203
mere possession of it is meant to be what constitutes our rhetic 
understanding.  For we might suppose that it is not really a good 
response to the initial worry, to fall back on the need to hypothesise 
about the truth value of the utterance, or the state of the world, so that 
such judgements can be made rationally.  That this is needed, we might 
suppose, is no more plausible than if things are as Longworth represents 
them (where non-rational acceptance or rejection is needed to make such 
judgements).  That is, even if it is conceded that Rumfitt’s proposal does 
not require non-rational acceptance or rejection, it still does require 
hypothetical acceptance and rejection.  And since judgments about what 
rhetic things have been done by a speaker, on the basis of one attaining 
rhetic understanding of their utterance, can be made without making 
these hypotheses, the conclusion still follows: Rumfitt’s proposal does not 
model our most fundamental engagement with what is said.   
It is not clear to me that the conclusion does follow on the amended 
argument.  What gives the original objection bite is precisely that one 
needs to non-rationally take stand on the utterances of others to come to 
rationally take a stand on them.  And that would be a problematic 
consequence.   But there is nothing particularly problematic, in general, 81
with one’s making hypotheses, and on the basis of working out the 
consequences of that hypothesis being true or false, making conclusions 
about the truth-values of the hypothesis.  When we consider, again, some 
everyday inferences, from which Rumfitt draws inspiration, this turns 
out to be a rather good explanation of what is going on: suppose I know 
that Jim is either in Bournemouth or Scunthorpe.  I think, “suppose Jim’s 
 Longworth makes a compelling case for this at pp. 30-33.81
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not in Bournemouth”.  Having thought that, I can infer that, on that 
supposition, he is in Scunthorpe.  I can then think, “suppose Jim’s not in 
Scunthorpe”.  Having thought that, I can infer that, on that supposition, 
he is in Bournemouth.  I can then make a rational judgement as to Jim’s 
whereabouts given other information that I have.  
If that is correct, then this shows why one’s state of rhetic understanding, 
according to Rumfitt’s proposal, is able to allow those who possess it to 
make judgements about the rhetic things done, and do so in a way that 
does not involve non-rational stand taking on the status of the utterance 
in question.  The proposal’s being able to do this provides the grounds on 
which we can reject Longworth’s claim that rhetic understanding involves 
the third feature of “awareness of expressed content”—that it is a first-
order occurrent state.  The point is that Longworth’s diagnosis about 
what was going wrong in Rumfitt’s account is that it made appeal to a 
second-order cognitive capacity, when what was needed was a first order 
occurrent state.  But nothing of the kind has been needed to account for 
the rationality of acceptance and rejection on the basis of the hypotheses 
that are actually appealed to in the most fundamental expression of the 
capacity that Rumfitt appeals to.  But in the absence of such reasons to 
accept that our account of rhetic understanding must appeal to a first-
order occurrent state, to insist that rhetic understanding is a state of this 
kind is, as before, to beg the question against Rumfitt’s proposal. 
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(iv)  Rumfitt’s proposal is false to the phenomenology of utterance  
 understanding. 
The final element of Longworth’s case against Rumfitt’s proposal that I 
have not looked at is the accusation that Rumfitt’s account fails to fit well 
with the phenomenology of understanding.   It strikes me that this claim
—that Rumfitt’s proposal is false to the phenomenology of linguistic 
understanding—is perhaps playing an important role for Longworth 
here.  That’s because it might be on these grounds that one could find 
motivation for the putative desideratum that I said begs the question 
against Rumfitt.   
There is certainly some intuitive strangeness to where we end up with 
Rumfitt's proposal.  There are at least two prima facie oddities with it. 
First, one may reasonably feel that it is implausible to suppose that our 
rational acceptance and rejection of utterances requires the complex 
psychological processes of quasi-inferences from hypotheses about the 
semantic properties of speakers’ utterances.  Secondly, one tends to pre-
theoretically conceive of one’s understanding an utterance as a kind of 
occurrent state—a state like perception, perhaps, that has as its object the 
thing that the speaker said, and is occurrent for the time during which 
the speaker is uttering something, or just after.  
On the first point, I think that some the impression of over-
intellectualisation of rhetic understanding’s role in rational acceptance 
can be dispelled, at least to some degree, by noting that the view is 
consistent with the plausible claim that acceptance is often automatic.  In 
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such cases, we can suppose, no such prior hypothesising occurs, and may 
only be called into question some time after the utterance, once reasons 
emerge to doubt whether what has been said to one is acceptable.  That 
requires an allowance of accepting that things are as the speaker says that 
they are, in the absence of one’s embarking on a considered assessment of 
its merits.  That, though, strikes me as a relatively common thing.  In 
most cases, we tend accept what is said to us without deliberation, and 
only when what we have accepted runs up against our other 
commitments, do we reconsider our position.  In the next section, I will 
say more about the automaticity of acceptance, and its import for 
enabling the acquisition of irreducible testimonial knowledge. 
When acceptance isn’t automatic, it will usually be because one has 
antecedent reason to consider whether what someone says to one more 
closely.  And it does not strike me as totally implausible that something 
like the reasoning from hypotheses that I have said is required for rational 
acceptance and rejection is an accurate description of what one does in 
the course of one’s deliberations about whether to take things to be as a 
speaker said that they are.      
On the second point, I admit that I do have some of the same intuitions 
that underpin the phenomenological claim.  However, I do want to cast 
doubt on how decisive such intuitions could be.  There are two 
considerations that I think serve to, at least to some degree, mitigate the 
seriousness of the worry.  The first is that it is unclear, to me at least, just 
what the phenomenology characteristic of utterance understanding is.  So 
it is not entirely clear what intuitive data needs to be accounted for.  It is 
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a point, I suppose, that I am in agreement on with the Wittgenstein of 
the Philosophical Investigations when he casts doubt on the idea that there 
is something that we can discern in all cases of understanding, despite 
what we might be inclined to say before investigating the putative 
phenomena (see, for example §§152-154).  The second consideration is 
that, if we can find some adequate description of the phenomenology at 
work here, there seems to be no reason, in principle, why it could not be 
explained away, in way consistent with Rumfitt’s proposal, by other 
accompanying factors that occur when we engage in conversation.  But 
in the absence of a more concrete conception of what the relevant 
phenomenological facts are, I cannot make good on this optimism.   
In essence, I think that if these phenomenological considerations are the 
extent of the objection to Rumfitt, it strikes me that they are indecisive; 
such phenomenological claims alone, I think, are insuﬃcient to rule out 
the view, and I take myself to have shown that the considerations that 
would rule it out, if Rumfitt’s proposal could not accommodate them, 
can be accommodated by the proposal.   
VII. 
Rumfitt’s Proposal & Testimonial Knowledge 
I want to finally turn to the interaction between rhetic understanding 
and our capacity to acquire testimonial knowledge.  In the last chapter I 
argued that, what was needed for a speaker’s audience to come to 
possesses the testimonial knowledge that they made available by voicing 
knowledge, is for them to meet an expectation that the speaker had that 
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they recognise what they (the speaker) meant to be saying (what rhetic 
thing they meant to be doing) in uttering what they did. According to 
Rumfitt’s proposal, what, then, audiences need to do in order to meet 
this expectation is to be capable of conducting the particular sets of 
quasi-inferences peculiar to the rhetic act that the speaker meant to 
perform.  This means that being so capable has got to enable one to 
acquire testimonial knowledge from a speaker voicing knowledge, when 
one believes that the speaker is uttering the truth.   
I’m going to consider a worry that Rumfitt’s proposal implies a 
reductionist account of how we acquire knowledge from what others tell 
us.  If that worry is well founded, that constitutes a decisive reason, in 
the present dialectical context, to reject Rumfitt’s proposal.  That’s 
because the claim that we can acquire testimonial knowledge from a 
speaker voicing knowledge in the way I have claimed is inconsistent with 
reductionism.   
I don’t think Rumfitt’s account does commit him to reductionism.  The 
reply I oﬀer to the argument that I consider, I think, illuminates how 
some of the structures I have been appealing to throughout this thesis 
can work together to yield the result I want: that rhetic understanding, 
under Rumfitt’s proposal, unproblematically allows for those who achieve 
it to acquire testimonial knowledge from a speaker who voices 
knowledge. 
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VII. a. 
Objection 
Reductionist accounts deny that there is any testimonial knowledge that 
is distinctive in kind, where its distinctiveness derives from the fact that it 
is generally true of knowledge of that kind that the speaker, or someone 
in her testimonial chain, is in possession of it.  What this tends to mean 
is that, according to reductionism, we can only acquire knowledge from 
what others tell us when we have suﬃcient evidence to support an 
inductive argument strong enough to support one’s claim to knowing 
that the speaker has uttered the truth.  It is then supposed to be (only) on 
this basis that we can conclude that things are as the speaker said them to 
be.   
The reason that one might think that Rumfitt’s proposal implies an 
account of this kind is because of what he says are the epistemically 
significant characteristics of states of rhetic understanding of sayings. 
When he turns his attention to knowledge, with respect to an utterance, 
u, with which the speaker says that p, he tells us that rhetic 
understanding puts us in a position to know that p in the event of our 
knowing that u is true and vice versa.  In other words, since rhetic 
understanding is supposed to be a second-order cognitive capacity that 
allows us to gain new knowledge from old, it looks like the way that we 
get knowledge via achieving rhetic understanding of a saying, is by 
antecedently knowing that the speaker uttered truth.  And this is exactly 
what reductionism requires.  Rhetic understanding, for the reductionist, 
must furnish us with the capacity to covert our knowledge in this way. 
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So conceived, understanding enables the transition from knowledge that 
the speaker uttered truth (that we acquire on inductive grounds) to 
knowledge that things are as they said them to be.  And, for 
reductionism, there is no other way to acquire knowledge that things are 
as the speaker says them to be, from their having told us so much. 
The objection would be, then, that since Rumfitt’s proposal only allows 
for knowledge acquisition from what others say in the above way, his 
account cannot sustain the acquisition of distinctively testimonial 
knowledge in the way it should—that is, in the absence of antecedent 
knowledge that the speaker has uttered truth.   
The point can be brought out, again, by way of analogy with our 
inferential capacities.  The possibility of one’s acquiring knowledge that 
Jim is in Scunthorpe, by way of the kind deduction I set out earlier, 
requires knowledge that either Jim is in Scunthorpe or Bournemouth and 
knowledge that Jim is not in Bournemouth.  Only once in possession of 
that knowledge, can an exercise our inferential capacity yield further 
knowledge concerning Jim’s whereabouts.  In the absence of it, one is 
only capable of discerning what one would be committed to in the event 
of one's possessing other hypothetical commitments.  The parallel idea 
would be that in order to come by knowledge that Jim smokes, one needs 
knowledge that the speaker uttered truth in uttering “Jim smokes”.  In the 
absence of that knowledge, one is only capable of discerning hypothetical 
commitments.  If that is right, then Rumfitt’s proposal commits us to 
thinking that this is the only way in which our rhetic understanding can 
contribute to our acquisition of knowledge from what others tell us.    
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VII. b. 
Reply 
The argument is a bad one.  Plainly, it fails to recognise that the proposal 
entails only that the above way of acquiring knowledge from what others 
tell us is a suﬃcient but not necessary way that rhetic understanding can 
put us in a position to acquire knowledge from what someone tells us.  82
The objection goes through only if the proposal precludes knowledge 
acquisition in any other way.  But the proposal does no such thing. 
When Rumfitt gives expression to some of the epistemologically 
interesting characteristics of states of rhetic understanding, all we are, in 
eﬀect, told about is just one way of acquiring knowledge from others; that 
one way of coming to know that p from what someone tells one is that, 
when we are possession knowledge that the utterance is true, we can 
conduct the relevant quasi-inferences to gain that knowledge.    
Even though the argument is bad, it is still interesting because it raises 
the question: what other ways can we acquire knowledge from what 
 I should probably make it clear that, at this point, I’m moving beyond anything that 82
Rumfitt provides us in the papers I’ve been considering.  At one point, Rumfitt does 
express sympathy with a broadly reliablist account of knowledge (see Rumfitt 2011, p. 
352), and this may well be in conflict with the account of how we acquire knowledge 
from others that I have been promoting.  However, this isn’t important for my 
purposes: I want to know whether Rumfitt’s proposal about rhetic understanding 
coheres with my preferred epistemology of testimony.  That investigation can be 
conducted independently of considerations about Rumfitt’s own views about 
knowledge.
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others say on the basis of having understood their utterances?  83
Answering that question will help to bring out the diﬀerent roles that 
rhetic understanding can play in our acquiring knowledge from others. 
In particular, it allows us to see what role it plays in our acquisition of 
irreducibly testimonial knowledge; that is, a kind of knowledge we can 
acquire from what others say, when we are not in possession of 
antecedent knowledge that they have uttered truth.  For my own 
purposes, I am particularly interested in what role we can say it plays 
when we come to acquire distinctively testimonial knowledge from a 
speaker who voices knowledge, that is, when the relevant knowledge 
plays the appropriate role in the causal explanation of their producing a 
particular utterance.   
Consider a case in which, on some occasion, you utter, “the Foreign 
Secretary has resigned”, because you know that the Foreign Secretary has 
resigned, with the expectation that I will recognise that you were trying 
to say that the Foreign Secretary has resigned.  In understanding your 
utterance, I am able to infer that the Foreign Secretary has resigned from 
the claim that you uttered truth.  For that understanding to result in my 
committing to the claim that the Foreign Secretary has resigned, it must 
be paired with acceptance.  Acceptance might come in two forms: either I 
 This is a point that I emphasised when I oﬀered my own account of how we acquire 83
distinctively testimonial knowledge from someone who voices knowledge; I am not 
committed to denying that the method of knowledge acquisition that features in the 
objection is a way of acquiring knowledge from what others say.  The view I have been 
defending is one according to which it is, likewise, only one way in which we can 
acquire knowledge from others is by understanding and accepting an utterance with 
which they voice knowledge.  So all that leaves it open whether we could also acquire 
knowledge from someone by engaging in the kind of inductive reasoning typically 
appealed to by the reductionist too; any number of ways for us to acquire knowledge 
from what someone tells us are, therefore, still open.
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believe that you uttered truth, or I believe that the Foreign Secretary has 
resigned.  If the former, then one of the things that rhetic understanding 
allows me to do is infer (that is, come to believe) that the Foreign 
Secretary has resigned.  If acceptance comes in the latter form, it allows 
me to infer (believe) that your utterance of “the Foreign Secretary has 
resigned” is a true one. 
I want to suggest that one way in which I can come by the relevant 
knowledge in such a case is by exercising the capacity that constitutes my 
rhetic understanding, where such an exercise can be seen to be a form of 
acceptance.  If that is to be a way of my coming by the knowledge that 
you gave voice to, then in exercising that capacity, I must be able to come 
to have access to what it is that you know—that is, the knowledge you 
possesses that features in the causal explanation of why you uttered that 
sentence.  In other words, an exercise of my capacity that constitutes my 
rhetic understanding of your saying something must furnish me with 
access to the proposition that is the content of the rhetic act you 
performed.   
I have already shown, in my reply to Longworth's objection, how rhetic 
understanding under Rumfitt’s proposal can rationally supply this.  A 
recap: consider a proposition, p, that is associated with a rhetic act r, and 
p’ that is associated with a rhetic act r’.  p = p’ if, and only if, r = r’, and r 
= r’ if, and only if, to do r is to do r’.  To do r is to do r’ if, and only if, 
one who achieves rhetic understanding the utterance, u, with which the 
speaker performs r is capable of conducting the very same quasi-
inferences as one who achieves rhetic understanding an utterance, u’, 
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with which a speaker performs r’.  The idea is that in exercising this 
capacity with respect to the utterance with which the rhetic act in 
question is performed, one is comes to have access to the proposition 
expressed by the utterance (one that can be expressed by another 
utterance with which the same rhetic act is performed).  One can do this 
by exercising one’s capacity under the supposition that the utterance in 
question is true.  When this is paired with acceptance, then one comes to 
believe that p on the basis of accepting that u is true, or else comes to 
believe that u is true, on the basis of accepting p. 
In accepting that things are as I can infer them to be on that basis, I 
thereby avail myself of that knowledge that you gave voice to.  That’s 
because the exercise of my capacity has furnished me with access to the 
very thing that you know, and intended to convey with your utterance. 
By working through a supposition, one can alight upon its consequences, 
and either accept those consequences or not.  That can happen, too, for 
the quasi-inferential relations that hold between utterances and states of 
the world.  Once one accepts those consequences in cases in which 
knowledge is voiced, one’s uptake of the utterance with which the 
speaker did this constitutes an act of deference.  As a result the epistemic 
support that the speaker has for what she conveys is what constitutes the 
epistemic support for what one’s understanding has given one access to. 
What explains why one comes to have knowledge in such cases is not the 
grounds one had for believing that you uttered truth, but whatever 
grounds the speaker had for taking things to be as she conveyed them to 
be.  What rhetic understanding allows access to is the very thing that the 
speaker thereby conveyed.  
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So, one’s initial access to that which is known by the speaker may be by 
way of exercising one’s capacity on the basis of a supposition concerning 
the truth value of the utterance. But one need not come by such 
knowledge by going via such a supposition.  One can come to exercise 
the capacity one has on the basis of the reasons one has to believe that 
the utterance is true.  However bad or indecisive they might be, an 
exercise of it on this basis still furnishes us with access to the thing that 
the speaker intends to be conveying.  As such, even on poor grounds, by 
doing so one also comes to have access to the knowledge in question, 
when what the speaker intends to convey is backed up by knowledge in 
the appropriate way.  When this happens, what I can thereby acquire can 
outstrip what is is that I drew on to accept that you uttered truth.   
In allowing understanding to contribute to testimonial knowledge 
acquisition in this second way, I think that the account can 
accommodate the immediacy of acceptance as a way of coming by 
knowledge.  That is, I can agree with Dummett when he says, 
If someone tells me the way to the railway station, or asks me 
whether I’ve heard that the Foreign Secretary has just resigned, or 
informs me that the museum is closed today, I go through no 
process of reasoning, however shift, to arrive at the conclusion that 
he has spoken aright: my understanding of his utterance and my 
acceptance of his assertion are one; I simply add what he has told 
me to my stock of information.  
(Dummett, 1993, p. 419) 
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It is important to note that Dummett’s point is an epistemic one, not just 
a psychological one:  
[I]f the concept of knowledge is to be of any use at all, and if we 
are to be held to know anything resembling the body of truths we 
normally take ourselves to know, the non-inferential character of 
our acceptance of what others tell us must be acknowledged as an 
epistemological principle, rather than a mere psychological 
phenomenon. 
(ibid. p. 422) 
The point is that be accepting what we are told automatically, we can still 
come by knowledge.  What that automaticity, in the present context, 
amounts to, is an acquisition of the premise that the utterance is true, 
which, on the basis of what understanding provides, allows one to 
conclude that things are a certain way—in propitious circumstances, the 
way that the speaker knows that things are. 
We have already seen why I think we should allow this in Chapter 1, 
when I considered Dummett’s arguments against reductionism.  In 
requiring knowledge that the speaker uttered truth antecedently to one’s 
accessing knowledge that is voiced, we are forced to accept that we know 
a lot less than we ordinarily think that we do. Accepting Dummett’s 
point allows for one’s taking the speaker to have uttered truth to beget 
knowledge in the absence of one’s antecedently knowing that they have 
uttered truth.  I’ve been suggesting that the grounds one has for 
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accepting that the speaker uttered truth are epistemically inert when it 
comes to considerations about whether one acquires distinctively 
testimonial knowledge.  Even if I have very poor grounds for believing 
your utterance is true, or even good grounds for believing that your 
utterance is false, so long as I end up believing that you uttered truth, 
that allows for my exercise of the capacity that constitutes my rhetic 
understanding to make available knowledge to me.   Allowing for 84
testimonial knowledge acquisition in this way is just another way of 
saying that, so long as one accepts that the utterance of the speaker is 
true, in conjunction with one’s understanding that utterance, one can 
come to know that things are as the speaker said them to be, when she 
voices knowledge.  And this is precisely the view that I defended in 
Chapter 2.
VIII. 
Conclusion 
Over the course of the last few chapters I have been trying to defend part 
of an account of what it is to come to understand a particular utterance 
of a speaker (what I called utterance understanding).  Utterance 
understanding essentially involves possessing rhetic understanding of an 
utterance—that is, one’s coming to recognise what rhetic thing a speaker 
does in producing her utterance.  In achieving rhetic understanding of an 
 Of course, not just rhetic understanding is needed of the utterance in question, for 84
one to be in a position to avail oneself of the knowledge that is made available by a 
speaker voicing knowledge.  One will need to take the utterance in question to have 
been produced sincerely, so as to be in a frame of mind to accept it.  That is, one will 
have to take it, for example, that the speaker is not being ironic, or uttering what they 
are in jest.  
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utterance, I have said that one is meeting an expectation that a speaker 
has of one, when one is their audience; an expectation that is met by 
one’s being capable of conducting kinds of inferences specific to the 
rhetic act that the speaker means to be performing with their utterance. 
I have provided a response to Longworth’s objection, where I tried to 
show that rhetic understanding, under the proposal I have suggested that 
a view of this kind is able to sustain the epistemology of testimony that I 
presented and motivated over the course of the first couple of chapters. 
I am now going to move on to apply this picture of understanding to 
some debates outside the epistemology of testimony.  I do so in an 
attempt to display the wider explanatory potential that such a view has. 
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Chapter 5 
Understanding & Meaning Theory 
I. 
Introduction 
In recent philosophical theorising about language, the notion of 
understanding has not tended to attract very much philosophical 
attention in its own right.  It is, rather, usually appealed to for the sake of 
elucidating a notion that might be of more fundamental concern: 
meaning.  The appeal to understanding in the course of theorising about 
meaning has been made because it has been a preoccupation of 
philosophers of language of a particular stripe to provide specifications of 
what expressions, as used by speakers, mean—or rather, what speakers do 
in uttering those expressions.  And an appeal to understanding, in some 
form, has often been made in the course of the explanations that they 
have given of what it would be to do that adequately.   
I want to now try to bring to bear the foregoing on some of the 
considerations that are appealed to in the course of conducting this kind 
of meaning theoretic project.  I am going to conceive of that project as 
one in which the theory is ultimately concerned with what speakers do, 
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and I shall concentrate, in the main but not exclusively, on how we 
might go about theoretically specifying what speakers say, in the rhetic 
sense, when they produce particular utterances on occasions.  I want to 
start making a case for the claim that the account of rhetic understanding 
that I have been defending has the potential to provide some of what 
may be thought to be lacking in what I called in the last chapter the 
received view.  With respect to utterances with which the speaker 
performs the rhetic act of saying something, the received view is that 
rhetic understanding of such an utterance is one’s knowing a proposition
—a proposition that adequately captures the content of what rhetic thing 
the speaker has done.  When this is replaced with Rumfitt’s account—
namely, the view that rhetic understanding consists in one’s possessing 
the right kinds of quasi-inferential capacities—the explanatory resources 
of the theory are increased, or so I’ll argue. 
In the next section I will introduce one way of conceiving of the 
explanatory project that the provision of meaning theories is meant to 
contribute to.  Then, in §III, I’ll outline a particular family of approaches 
to meaning theory construction that rely centrally on the notion of 
(rhetic) understanding.  I call approaches of this sort ‘Cognitive 
Semantics’.  §IV is concerned with a subset of cognitive semantical 
approaches that make use of truth-conditions to provide the relevant 
specifications that feature in the meaning theory.  The idea is that those 
who achieve rhetic understand know the truth-conditions of the 
utterances in question.  By appealing to what it is that those who 
understand these utterances know, we can provide specifications of what 
is said by those who produce these utterances.  But in order to specify 
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what it is about the conditions for truth and falsity of such utterances, 
the knowledge of which is relevant to one’s understanding, such accounts 
must stipulate that it is that which is relevant to what it is that the 
speaker is saying.  This generates a kind of circularity in the kinds of 
explanation that such accounts can provide.  By plugging in, in §V, 
Rumfitt’s proposal concerning understanding, I try to show what 
explanatory advantages such an account has over its rivals, despite its 
failure to be non-circular.  §VI concludes. 
II. 
The Purpose of a Meaning Theory 
I said that it has been a preoccupation of certain kinds of philosophers of 
language to provide specifications of what potential utterance of the 
expressions of a language say, or ask, or order, or etc.  I want to 
ultimately say something about how Rumfitt’s conception of 
understanding can help in carrying through such a project, but to do 
that, I need to first say something about why it is that one should engage 
in a project of this kind at all.  That is, I need to say something about 
what purpose such specifications are meant to serve. 
One of the perplexing features of our linguistic behaviour is that, just by 
making certain sounds, or inscribing certain marks, we can perform acts 
with a certain kind of complex significance.  Our making these sounds 
can somehow make manifest to others some of our beliefs and some of 
our desires.  They can prompt others to provide us with information that 
we need, and they can induce others to act in the ways that we want 
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them to.  We’ve also seen that others performing such actions can provide 
us with knowledge, and our performing them can be a means of 
imparting what we know to others.  So one of the fundamental questions 
in this area is: how can such strings of sounds, and inscriptions of marks, 
have this significance? 
An adequate meaning theory is meant to contribute to the answer to this 
question by pairing up utterances with, ultimately, propositional attitude 
ascriptions.  Speaking is a manifestation of mind, so an explanation of 
the significance of some instance of speech will have to eventually say 
what of the mindful it is a manifestation of.  Part of what is needed to do 
this, is an association of these utterances with assignments of content. 
This will have to be done in such a way that makes perspicuous how it is 
that the contents associated with utterances of whole sentences are 
dependent on the associations that occur in the parts that compose the 
sentence.  That’s because we want our meaning theory to be able to 
account for what Chomsky calls “creative” language use—that is, the 
productivity that we display in our linguistic behaviour.  The theory will 
need to show how we are able, with a finite stock of words and modes of 
combining those words, to utter a potential infinity of distinct and 
meaningful sentences.  When they are uttered, each of them can be used 
in the service of doing any of the indefinitely many things to be done is 
speaking.  And, correlatively, each of those things that speakers can do 
can be understood to have been done by them, by one who is similarly 
competent in the language being spoken. 
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We may, here, be inclined to appeal to a practice of language use to help 
explain this; practices allow for otherwise insignificant actions can come 
to have the complex significance of the kind that our utterances in fact 
have.  In the absence of the practice of playing chess, the movement of a 
piece of carved bone across a checkered board does not have the 
significance it does within that practice.  In the absence of a practice of 
language use, our mutterings do not do the sorts of things we intend of 
them within the practice.  The appeal to the practice of language use 
makes it intelligible how complex and significant acts can be performed 
in doing more basic things; how it is, most centrally, that we can say 
things, or ask things, or command things, or … (etc.), by making certain 
sounds.  It is because there is such a practice for us to engage in that these 
less basic acts emerge out of the more basic ones.  What a meaning 
theory can therefore be thought to help to contribute to is an explanation 
of the significance of certain actions as being those that contribute to 
achieving the ends of those participants in the practice.  It would do so 
by making intelligible the behaviour of participants of the practice of 
language use, as participants in that practice.  The kinds of activities that 
would be attributed to them would, ultimately, be the panoply of 
illocutionary acts that there are to be performed in speaking, where these 
acts are made sense of as such, by virtue of the contributions that they 
make to the goals of the participants. 
To get anywhere close to this ultimate explanation, meaning theories 
must contend, first, with a less ambitious aim.  Given the speech-act 
theoretic framework imported from Austin, it would have to do so via 
attributions of rhetic things done by speakers producing the strings of 
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sounds that they do.  If it could be shown that certain kinds of outward 
behaviour manifestly and systematically line up with intentional states of 
the kind appropriate to performances of acts of these rhetic kinds, then at 
least part of what significance that behaviour has would be on display. 
Given the structure that that framework imposes on our speech-action, 
this is the foundation on which a more comprehensive linguistic theory 
will have to be based.  That is, since these more complex linguistic 
activities must be enacted by way of the performance of rhetic acts (see 
Chapter 3, esp. §III), any account that fully makes intelligible the 
behaviour of language speakers will have to reflect this fact.  What is 
sought, then, is a way of reading oﬀ intentional states of the kind 
appropriate to performance of rhetic acts, from the potential behaviour
—centrally, linguistic behaviour—of actual participants in the relevant 
practice.  A meaning theory is meant to provide us with the tools 
required to do this.  It will do this in such a way that accounts for the 
fact that finite creatures like us in fact engage in a practice as described by 
the theory. 
III. 
Cognitive Semantics 
I’m going to focus on one particular family of approaches to constructing 
meaning theories that seek to provide explanations of this sort.  The 
theories that I have in mind are those that approach the task of 
systematically specifying the rhetic things to be done in potential 
utterances of expressions of a language by appealing to the knowledge of 
the language’s practitioners.  Call theorists of this stripe cognitive 
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semanticists.  Cognitive semanticists take specifications of the requisitely 
explanatory kind to be, at least in part, achieved by specifying certain 
features of actual, potential, or possible knowledge states of those capable 
of achieving rhetic understanding of utterances of sentences of a shared 
public language.  The kind of relationship that is thought to hold 
between (some of ) the things done with utterances and the states of 
those who are capable of understanding those utterances is meant to have 
the requisite explanatory potential.  It is from this that the cognitive 
semantical approach is supposed to derive its appeal.   
Michael Dummett consistently insisted that a ‘theory of meaning’ for 
some language is at the same time a ‘theory of understanding’.  A theory 
of understanding, as Dummett conceives of it, is a theory that specifies 
what it is that someone knows when she understands particular 
utterances of sentences of the language.   Dummett, then, is an 85
archetypal cognitive semanticist, because he thinks that a meaning theory 
would have to specify what it is that a subject knows when they 
understand a particular utterance.   
In bringing in the notion of the practice of language use, I was 
channeling Dummett, and it is in these terms that he recently gave 
expression to what he thought would be needed from such a theory in 
order for it to provide an explanation of the kind he sought: 
 See, for example, Dummett 1975/1993, p. 3.  There he talks of ‘knowledge of 85
language’ and ‘knowing what expressions mean’.  In the current context that would be 
to specify that which one knows that enables utterance understanding.  This would not 
yet be quite what is wanted from a meaning theory, if what is wanted is an explanation 
of what speakers are doing, on some occasion, in uttering the things that they do.
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The use of a language is a practice.  To engage in the practice, you 
must know the meanings of the words.  In what do their meanings 
consist, and what is it to know them? […] A theory of meaning 
attempts to answer the question in what the meanings of a 
sentence, and of a word of any particular kind, consist, and either 
to explain what it is to understand a sentence or a word, or to 
provide the materials from which such an explanation can be 
constructed.  
(Dummett 2007, p. 370) 
Dummett here tells us that at least two things are required of the theory. 
Though he expresses things in terms of the meaning of words, he is 
explicit that what is really at issue is utterances (p. 367).  Transposing 
what he says here to that domain, constrained to acts of saying, we can 
read the requirements he places on a meaning theory as, first, demanding 
that is specify in virtue of what utterances of (indicative) sentences say 
what they do, and, second, that it at least contributes to an explanation 
of what it is to understand an utterance, where this is conceived of as 
possessing knowledge of what is said with it.  The justification for 
insisting on this second requirement is that, if we were to provide a 
theory that failed to make this kind of contribution, though ostensibly 
provided assignments of the things that are said, then it “would do little 
to make explicit the practice of using the language” (ibid.).  This—the 
making explicit the practice of using the language—is our ultimate aim 
as meaning theorists, or so says Dummett.  He gives us a suggestion as to 
how this is to be done: “to make that explicit, the theory must show how 
the use of sentences in converse flows, or is derivable, from the meaning 
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that the theory assigns to them” (pp. 370-1).  Transposing once again, 
this amounts to the idea that what the theory provides is information 
from which one can derive descriptions of at least some of the things the 
speaker has done, in uttering what they have.   
Given that our starting place is the rhetic acts performed by speakers, the 
first thing the theory has got to do is derive specifications of such acts.  It 
needs to do so in such a way that not vacuous.  It is natural, then, to 
think that the specifications that it provides will take us from some 
description of the activities of speakers that is devoid of information 
about the significance of their speech-behaviour to descriptions that 
provide that information. In the operative Austinian idiom, that would 
understood to be taking us from descriptions of the phatic acts 
performed to the rhetic one’s performed.  Or, as Jennifer Hornsby puts it,  
A theory of locution should provide one with all that is necessary 
to move systematically from reports of the phonetic acts that 
utterances are of, to reports of the rhetic acts they are of; from an 
instance of (P) to the correct instance of (R). 
 (P) An L speaker made these sounds: – – – – 
 (R) The L speaker said that **** 
(Hornsby 1988, p. 38) 
Hornsby here speaks of the input of the theory being a description of the 
phonetic things done, but we can substitute in phatic here without 
aﬀecting the main point.  In so doing we will get (P)’  instead of (P),  
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 (P)’ An L speaker said the words: #### 
And the ‘theory of locution’, concieved of as a component part of a 
complete meaning theory, would provide one with all that is necessary to 
move systematically from an instance of (P)’ to the correct instance of 
(R).  It will have to do so in such a way that meets that key desideratum 
that a cognitive semantical approach of the kind imposes on such 
theories: show how the component parts of the phatic things done, and 
their mode of combination, determine the contributions to rhetic things 
done by so combining those elements. By doing that via an appeal to 
what one who achieves rhetic understanding knows, the theory will then 
show how it is that we are capable of the productivity that we exhibit is 
speaking and understanding.  That is, by employing a compositional 
theory in setting out what those who understand utterances know, it 
would be able to show how finite knowledge of the contributions that 
the words, and their modes of combination, make to the rhetic things 
done, can yield a capacity to perform, and understand, a potential 
infinity of stand alone rhetic acts.  This is one way in which the appeal to 
understanding can help serve the purposes to which, I have said, 
meaning theories are put.   
But, ultimately, more than this will be needed, if Dummett’s full 
ambitions for such a theory are to be realised.  That’s because we will be 
leaving something out of the account if all our theory does is provide 
specifications of the rhetic things done by speakers producing their 
utterances.  What participating in the practice of language use allows for 
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is not just the doing of rhetic things, but also for the doing of all sorts of 
illocutionary things. A full explanation of what speakers are doing in 
producing their utterances will have to include and explanation of their 
doing these illocutionary things.  
It has been standard to partition theoretical responsibility for such 
explanations in the following way: a ‘theory of sense’ will output 
specifications, of the right systematic kind, of the rhetic things done on 
the basis of the phatic things done; a ‘theory of force’ will output 
specifications of the illocutionary things done on the basis of the rhetic 
things done.  What the theory of force is typically thought to do is allow 
for utterances in diﬀerent moods, employed to perform acts of diﬀerent 
illocutionary kinds, to be redescribed in such a way as to be amenable to 
treatment by the theory of sense.  Since the theory of sense has typically 
been constructed for indicative sentences, used to say things, the 
transformations that the theory of force eﬀects will be from utterances of 
non-indicative sentences, used to perform acts other than assertion-like 
sayings, to utterances of indicative sentences used to perform such 
sayings (and leave the indicative ones untouched).  McDowell expresses 
how this is usually thought to be achieved: 
If the object language has more than one mood, a theory 
competent to impose interpreting descriptions on all possible 
utterances in it will need to be able to classify utterances a 
performances of speech acts of this or that kind (assertion, 
question, command, or whatever).  We can require the principles 
that eﬀect this classification to be written in such a way that, in the 
case of a non-assertoric utterance, besides enabling us to identify 
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the kind of speech act performed, they also equip us with an 
indicative sentence, related to the sentence uttered in such a way 
that [it can] serve (perhaps with minor syntactic modification) to 
express the content of the non-assertoric speech act performed by 
utterance a non-indicative counterpart. 
(McDowell 1980, p. 33) 
(To be clear: here McDowell is considering a theory for a language that is 
significantly less complex than a natural language.  What he is 
articulating is what a theory of the kind under consideration would look 
like, if it could be adapted to serve as a theory of sense for a language 
with some of the features of a natural language like English.  There is 
obvious optimism, though, that, at least in principle, this could be 
extended to accommodate all those features that natural languages have). 
So concieved, we can take the theory of sense to take as input the phatic 
thing done, and output the rhetic thing done; the theory of force will 
take as input a specification of the rhetic thing done, and outputs a 
specification the illocutionary thing done (or at least something relatively 
close to such a specification).    86
I want to flag one issue about this conception of the role of the theory of 
force, before considering some concrete proposals.  In Chapter 3, we saw 
that the prospects were bleak for accounts that attempted to assimilate 
 The qualification is inserted here because there are those who find it doubtful that 86
the illocutionary as such is something that could be subject to the systematic 
theoretical treatment that might be suggested by the idea that we could have a bona 
fide theory that takes as input specifications of the rhetic things done and outputs 
specifications of the illocutionary things done.  Whether one thinks this or not, right 
now, not much hangs on it.
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non-indicatives into the indicatives (i.e. that the rhetic things typically 
done with utterances of non-indicative sentences could be shown to be 
equivalent to one’s doing some indicative rhetic thing, or combination of 
such rhetic things).   The upshot of this was that in our account of the 87
rhetic act performed, there would be an ineliminable appeal to some 
elements of the speech that the above picture would associate with its 
force.  That is, in specifying any given rhetic thing done, some appeal to 
categories demarcated by distinctions in mood was needed to capture a 
speaker’s performing such acts.  So, when it comes to an utterance in 
which a command is given, for example, a specification of the rhetic 
thing done would have to show in some way that the speaker is enjoining 
something; it cannot rely on the theory of force to transform 
specifications of things said into specifications of the command issued.  If 
that is right, then the clean division of duties represented in the 
McDowell quotation cannot be made.  This would be a significant 
concession, if it has to be made.  But for all that, I’ll leave these 
important issues to one side, in the main, and I’ll concentrate on the 
construction of meaning theories for the indicative sentences used to 
eﬀect assertion-like sayings.  I will briefly, however, pick up on this issue 
again at the very end of the chapter. 
IV. 
Truth Conditional Cognitive Semantics 
Perhaps the most straightforward way to conduct a cognitive semantical 
program is to take as a baseline assumption the claim that what a speaker 
 Chapter 3, §IV. b.87
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says in uttering something is the content of the knowledge state of one 
who possesses rhetic understanding of their utterance.  As such, if we 
specify what it is that those who achieve rhetic understanding of an 
utterance know, then we will have thereby specified what rhetic thing the 
speaker did with their utterance. 
The received view—the view that rhetic understanding is a matter of 
possessing knowledge of some proposition—emerges when the 
knowledge state in question is thought to be propositional knowledge, 
and with that in place, it can make it seem as though the cognitive 
semantical project must take a particular shape.  Given the assumption 
that one who achieves rhetic understanding of some particular utterance 
knows that …, where the ‘…’ is filled by whatever it is that they know, 
the meaning theory will output propositions that are the content of the 
knowledge states of those who achieve rhetic understanding of the 
utterance.   
Within this way of thinking, then, one of the primary tasks of meaning 
theory construction is to find the appropriate propositions to fill the gap. 
In order to do so, the cognitive semanticist that subscribes to the received 
view must find a way of deciding between candidate propositions—that 
is, saying under what conditions a candidate proposition will be suitable 
for their purposes.  A candidate proposition will only be suitable if 
knowledge of that proposition puts one in the cognitive position 
occupied by one who achieves rhetic understanding of the target 
utterance.  We have already seen that one who understands an utterance 
must be capable of making certain kinds of inferences.  For example, 
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when it comes of an utterance, u, with which the speaker says that p, 
they must be capable of inferring that p from the claim that u is true, 
that u is true from the claim that p, that it is not the case that p from the 
claim that u is false, and that u is false from the claim that p is not the 
case.  So one way to decide between propositions is to see whether 
knowledge of the candidate propositions provides one with the capacity 
to conduct these inferences. 
Of course, these are the set of inferences that lie at the heart of Rumfitt’s 
proposal.  You may recall that Rumfitt expressed pessimism about 
whether there is a proposition, knowledge of which would put one in the 
cognitive position he describes.   As we’ll see, he does so primarily for 88
reasons that emanate from Foster’s (1976) criticisms of the Davidsonian 
program (I discuss these below in §IV b.).  It is now time to look at that 
claim he takes such criticisms to support more closely.  Because the 
obvious candidate body of knowledge that would put one in the 
cognitive position that Rumfitt describes, is knowledge of the conditions 
under which the utterance in question is true.  Under the received view, 
that is a proposition which states these conditions.  Call this ‘the truth-
conditional approach’. 
IV. a. 
Davidson’s ‘Cognitive Semantics’ 
The truth-conditional approach has tended to take a particular form. 
Inspired by Donald Davidson’s employment of Tarskian truth-theories in 
 See Chapter 4, § III.  That pessimism is voiced at Rumfitt 2005, p. 444.88
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the course of providing his own brand of meaning theory, others have 
sought to incorporate a number of elements of Davidson’s project for 
their own purposes.  But Davidson’s own way of employing truth-
theories cannot be incorporated wholesale into the cognitive semantical 
project, given its stated explanatory ambitions.   
Davidson sets himself the task of specifying that which, were it known, 
would suﬃce for interpreting the speakers of a language.  This is a 
crucially distinct ambition to that which I said characterised cognitive 
semantics—that of saying what knowledge one who achieves rhetic 
understanding of the utterances under investigation possesses.  As such, 
the kind of theory Davidson is after does not attempt to provide one of 
the key things that is supposed to be required of a meaning theory, since 
it makes no attempt to say anything about what is known by those who 
understand the utterances under consideration.  In point of fact, 
Davidson doesn’t even commit to the claim that those who achieve so 
much possess any knowledge at all that plays any role in their successfully 
understanding the utterances of others (see, for example, Davidson 1973, 
p. 125).   For all that, he thinks that the approach he favours can 89
provide some explanation of the kind that I said the cognitive semanticist 
seeks.  We will see that there are serious doubts about whether Davidson 
is right about this. 
Davidson thinks that the kind of thing that will provide the answers he 
seeks is a theoretical assignment of meanings to sentences, from a finite 
 Davidson says there that “it is not altogether obvious that there is anything we 89
actually know which plays an essential role in interpretation.”
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set of axioms, that are all, and only, those assignments that are 
‘empirically’ confirmable.  The assignments in question are those which 
would be made by a hypothetical interpreter.  Interpreters engage in 
interpretation; interpretation is a method of redescribing one set of facts 
in terms of another.  In this case, the facts that are being redescribed are 
facts about the behaviour of the speaker, both linguistic and non-
linguistic, from a starting point of almost total ignorance about the 
intentional states that tend to accompany that behaviour. The ambition is 
to redescribe these facts, from this starting point, in intentional terms. 
These descriptions are ‘empirically’ confirmed only if they cohere with 
both the publicly accessible facts about their behaviour and the 
assignments of intentional states that the theory itself provides (this 
second point allows for the assignments, at first provisional, to become 
less provisional as more and more of its assignments are confirmed by the 
evidence, and the growing assignments of the theory).   
The kind of interpretation that Davidson is interested in is what he calls 
radical interpretation.  This is a program of redescription that is carried 
out by hypothetical interpreter, who is only permitted to engage in such 
interpretation according to a relatively small set of interpretive principles. 
These principles say what kind of assumptions can be made by the 
interpreter in assigning propositional attitudes to speakers on the basis of 
the outward, publicly accessible behaviour that they exhibit. That is in 
order to hold fixed, provisionally, something upon which the assignments 
of meaning can be made, and such assignments will, if correct, be 
confirmed by the behaviour of the target speakers in conjunction with 
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the other assignments that have been entered into the theory (see for 
example Davidson 1973, p. 137).   
In addition to these ‘empirical’ constraints, there are formal constraints 
on the theory.  These are constraints that derive from considerations 
about the composition of sentences by repeatable elements, in repeatable 
modes of combination, and exploiting this fact in connection with the 
desideratum that the theory entail a truth of the form exhibited by 
theorems of a Tarskian truth-theory for every sentence of the language 
under investigation.  That is, theorems of the form: ‘s is true if and only if 
p’, where ‘s’ is replaced by a structural description of a sentence in the 
object language, and ‘p’ picks out a sentence of the metalanguage that 
meets the condition laid down by the application of the truth 
predicate.   As such, the assignments that the theory makes to the 90
component parts have got to themselves fit with the evidence when 
combined in other constructions.   
With these restrictions in place, Davidson claims that what someone 
could know that would suﬃce to endow them with the relevant 
interpretive capacity is knowledge that a truth-theory, for some language, 
states that …, where the ‘…’ is replaced by an actual truth-theory, 
suitably constrained.  Knowing so much is said to suﬃce on the grounds 
that it would entail knowledge of the theorems of the theory, each of 
which states that a particular sentence, as uttered on an occasion, is true 
just in case a certain condition is met.  The idea is that knowing under 
 The ‘s’ here, from the current outlook that in concerned with the things that people 90
do with their utterances might better be replaced with ‘u’, where this describes an 
utterance of such a sentence in terms of the phatic thing done with it.
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what conditions the truth-predicate, so applied, would yield true 
theorems of this form is enough to be able to interpret the utterances in 
question. 
This is only a brief sketch of Davidson’s whole view of the matter, and I 
have left out much that is central to it.   But enough has been said to 91
demonstrate one point in particular.  It a point made by Barry Smith 
(1992) when he points out that there is an odd upshot of the axiomatic 
nature of the theory Davidson put forward, that results from the 
imposition of the formal constraints that I’ve just described.  The oddity 
in the proposal is that a meaning theory that meets the formal constraints 
that Davidson imposes possesses explanatory potential which Davidson is 
precluded from exploiting.   
We saw that one of the things that our meaning theory should be 
explaining is the productivity that we display in our speech and our 
understanding.  And compositional theories of the kind that Davidson 
appeals to are ideally suited to being employed for such explanatory 
purposes.  They are suited to this because, were such a theory known, it 
would provide the basis of an explanation of how we are capable of 
producing and understanding utterances of a potential infinity of distinct 
sentences.  But, as I’ve mentioned, the theories that Davidson describes 
say nothing about what those who understand languages know.  All they 
try to output are propositions, the knowledge of which would suﬃce for 
interpretation of their speech-behaviour; all it states is (at best) 
something that, were it known by an interpreter, would enable them to 
 I have said very little, for example, about Davidson’s holism.91
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correctly assign (for Davdison’s purposes—he permits a level of 
indeterminacy here) propositional attitudes to practitioners of the 
language that would make their behaviour intelligible.  The oddity, in 
other words, is that one of the chief virtues of a theory of the kind that 
Davidson provides us with—that is, a compositional theory—is meant to 
be that it can be employed to explain the productivity and creativity that 
ordinary speakers are capable of in their (linguistic) behaviour.   But, as 
employed by Davidson, it cannot provide such an explanation.  
What this all goes to show is that Davidson has not really provided a 
‘cognitive semantics’ of the kind that I’m interested in.  That’s because 
Davidson’s approach does not so much as constitute an attempt at 
providing the kind of explanation that Dummett, and others, have 
thought that such theories should be providing—namely, what it is that 
is known by those who understand the utterances of speakers of the 
language in question.  
IV. b. 
Foster Problems 
But even on its own terms, Davidson program faces serious diﬃculties. 
A point that has been made on more than one occasion, by more than 
one commentator, is that, since the theories that Davidson appeals to 
only speak about truth, there is a lacuna to be filled to get any such 
theory to say something about meaning (or rather, what speaker’s say, or 
ask, or … etc.).  In other words, not any true equivalence of the form ‘u 
is true if and only if p’ is enough to show that whatever replaces ‘u’ really 
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does say that p.  What is needed is a way of replacing the ‘u’ and the ‘p’ 
in such a way that the thing that replaces ‘p’ really does capture of the 
thing that is said with what replaces ‘u’.   
The true extent of this problem for Davidson’s account was first clearly 
identified by John Foster (1976).   We can call the truth-theorem, ‘u is 92
true if and only if p’ interpretive when p is said in the production of u. 
The problem is that, even for Davidson’s aim of specifying something, 
knowledge of which would suﬃce to know that an utterance of sentence 
says, an interpretive truth-theorem is not adequate for these purposes. 
That is because one may know an interpretive truth-theory for a language 
(a theory that contains all only only interpretive truth-theorems) and fail 
to know that it is interpretive.  But it precisely this knowledge that is 
required, if one is to know what it is that the relevant utterance says 
(Foster 1976, pp. 19-20).  
Suppose that I know that “snow” denotes snow, and know that “is white” 
is true of the white things, and know, on the basis of knowing these 
things that “snow is white” is true if and only if snow is white (i.e. the 
truth-condition of the complete sentence is canonically derived from the 
relevant axioms).  The problem is that my knowing so much is consistent 
with the utterance of that sentence saying that snow is white and 
arithmetic is incomplete, if the ‘if and only if ’ is construed as the 
material biconditional (as Davidson himself construes it).  In essence, 
knowing the extensional truth conditions of an utterance of this kind is 
 Though similar problems had been raised before in Wiggins (1971), and Strawson 92
(1971).
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consistent with one’s failing to know what is thereby said with it.    This 93
shows that not only does Davidson’s approach, as I’ve described it, not 
provide what the cognitive semanticist seeks, it doesn’t yet provide what 
Davidson himself sought. 
It is, for the most part, on account of this point that Rumfitt is 
pessimistic about finding a proposition, knowledge of which is equivalent 
to one’s possessing rhetic understanding of an utterance.  When 
something is said with the utterance, Rumfitt has told us that one’s rhetic 
understanding is constituted by one’s possessing the quasi-inferential 
capacities that I discussed at such length in the last chapter.  He doubts 
whether there is any proposition, knowledge of which is equivalent to 
occupying the cognitive position that he describes.  The above line of 
thought is supposed to give some indication of why.  The most plausible 
candidate proposition is a statement of truth conditions, but when this is 
conceived of as a theorem of a truth-theory, we have a proposition that 
one could know, and, at the same time not be capable of making the 
relevant quasi-inferences.  This is suggestive.  What Rumfitt seems to 
have put his finger on is what, precisely, is missing for one who knows an 
interpretive truth-theory with regards to what the utterances it treats say. 
What such knowledge fails to provide one with is precisely the capacity 
to make the kinds of inferences that lie at the heart of Rumfitt’s proposal. 
 The kind of problem raised by Foster has been thought to be a major problem for 93
carrying out Davidson’s program.  For those who so regard it, see, for example, Foster 
(1976), Loar (1976), Evans and McDowell (1976), Soames (1989), (1992), 
Higginbotham (1992).  For an influential response to Foster’s objection to Davidson, 
see Lepore & Ludwig (2005, Ch. 8), who contend that Davidson never had the view 
Foster attributed to him.
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Foster showed that something was missing from Davidson’s proposal. 
What Rumfitt gives us is what that missing thing is. 
IV. c. 
McDowell’s Cognitive Semantics 
For all that, elements of Davidson’s approach have been taken up by 
others who have sought to provide a form of cognitive semantics.  It is to 
these approaches that I now turn.  I’ll first set out how they seek to 
implement the parts of Davidson’s approach that they do.   I’ll then say 
something about how these accounts seek to avoid the kinds of problems 
Foster identified, and show why the manoeuvres such approaches employ 
result in a kind of circularity—a circularity that greatly concerned 
Dummett.  In light of this, I’ll conclude by saying why appealing to 
Rumfitt’s proposal can yield explanatory dividends beyond those yielded 
by the truth-conditional approaches. 
For Davidson’s approach to count as constituting an attempt to provide 
the kinds of explanation that the cognitive semanticist is in the business 
of providing, the emphasis needs to shift to providing a theory whose 
theorems are at least candidate contents of the knowledge states of the 
practitioners of a language.  Only then would we have a recognisably 
truth-conditional form of an explanatory cognitive semantics.  For that 
portion of the practice of language use in which speaker’s say things, an 
account of that kind is going to ideally be structured in the following 
way: (i) one who achieves rhetic understanding of an utterance with 
which a speaker performs an act of saying something has knowledge that 
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…, where the ‘…’ is filled by a proposition which states what is thereby 
said; (ii) what fills the gap is a statement of truth-conditions; and (iii) 
those statements can take the form of a suitably constrained truth-theory 
for the language.   
The relevant constraints cannot be those that Davidson imposed, 
because, at any rate, there what was wanted was something diﬀerent to 
what cognitive semantics seeks.  Here the constraints have got to be such 
that the theory chosen reflects the knowledge possessed by one who 
achieves (rhetic) understanding of the utterance produced by the speaker. 
One philosopher who has taken up the challenge of setting out what 
these would be is John McDowell.  McDowell, in setting out what a 
meaning theory, as he conceives it, needs (in part) to provide, tells us 
that, 
Given a suitable non-interpreting description of any possible 
utterance in the language—a formulation of information available 
equally, on hearing the utterance, to someone who understands the 
language and to someone who does not—the theory would enable 
anyone who knew it to derive that interpreting description under 
which someone who understands the language would be capable of 
recognising the action performed.  
(McDowell 1980, pp. 119-20) 
What is needed, then, is something that can take a ‘non-interpreting’ 
description of the utterance as input and yield an ‘interpreting’ 
description as output.  And interpreting description would be one that is 
 243
recognisable to those who understand the utterance in question.  In 
eﬀect, what is wanted is a way of deriving which less basic act was 
performed on the basis of knowing which more basic act was performed. 
The ‘non-interpreting’ description is a description of what the speaker 
does that does not make them intelligible in light of propositional 
attitude assignments, whereas the ‘interpreting’ description of what they 
do does make their behaviour so intelligible.  What is needed, in other 
words, is a way of generating a description of the rhetic thing done, from 
a description of the phatic thing done with the utterance in question. 
The output description will be adequate if it is recognisable as a 
description of what the speaker did to someone who understands their 
utterance.   
For cases in which a rhetic act of saying something is done, what this 
means is that “the theory would need […] to make someone who knew it 
capable of specifying, for any indicative sentence in the language dealt 
with, the content of the saying which an utterance of the sentence would 
be taken to be by someone who understood the language” (ibid. p. 120) 
So one who understands an utterance with which a speaker says such-
and-such, takes the speaker to say precisely that.  And what the theory 
provides, is information that would allow one to specify what it is that 
one who understands the utterance takes the speaker to have said.   What 
it, in eﬀect, does, is specify what is known by one who knows what the 
speaker has said, on the basis of their knowing the phatic thing by which 
their saying that is done.  
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More generally, it is to specify what “propositional act”, with what 
“content”, has been performed by the speaker producing the utterance in 
question.  Such knowledge is what is stated by a theorem a “bipartite 
theory” (McDowell 1976, p. 45); in other words a theory that is the 
combination of a theory of sense and a theory of force (see above).  The idea 
is that a truth-theory of a kind similar to that appealed to be Davidson 
could serve as a theory of sense.  If it can, then such theories could 
provide a way of generating a specification of the rhetic thing done by a 
speaker, from a specification of the phatic thing that they did.  The 
question is, can truth-theories be devised to do this work—that is, serve 
as the ‘theory of sense’ part of the complete meaning theory?  McDowell 
certainly thinks so.  Here is how.  McDowell begins with a claim about 
what form the specification, that a theory of sense will output, should 
take.   What is needed is a finitely axiomatisable theory that entails 94
infinitely many theorems of the form ‘s … p’.  ‘s’ here is to be replaced by 
a canonical description of an object-language sentence in use (here 
understood as a description of the phatic act performed), and ‘p’ is 
replaced by a sentence of the metalanguage that fulfils the role of ‘giving 
the meaning’ of what replaces ‘s’.  The ‘giving the meaning’ here, 
following Hornsby, can be interpreted as specifying what rhetic thing is 
done on the basis of one’s producing something for which the canonical 
description that replaces ‘s’ is true (i.e. the phatic thing).   
What is wanted is that the theory chosen provides necessary and 
suﬃcient conditions for the satisfaction of a predicate which comes out 
true when the schematic letters have been filled in the way just specified. 
 See, for example, McDowell 1976, 1980 & 2007.94
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Davidson’s idea was that an expression of the form ‘is true if and only if ’ 
could replace ‘…’, where the truth predicate is backed by a suitably 
constrained Tarskian truth-theory.  McDowell agrees to this extent: the 
truth predicate is precisely one that can be used to fill the schematic gap 
such that true statements of necessary and suﬃcient conditions for that 
predicate to be satisfied will be theorems that will connect the 
replacements of ‘s’ and ‘p’ in the desired way. 
The diﬀerence between Davidson and McDowell is that McDowell, 
unlike Davidson, builds in the guarantee that what is stated by the truth-
theory also states what it is that is said with the utterances.  In other 
words, he avoids Foster problems by stipulating the connection between 
the two “up front”: 
What we want is a truth theory for a language that is usable in 
making sense of the language’s speakers, in a way exemplified by 
this condition: if a speaker were to utter a sentence in a stand-alone 
speech act intelligible as an assertion, her action would be 
intelligible as saying that …, assertorically expressing the thought 
that …, where what fills the blank is the specification of a truth 
condition that the theory yields. 
(McDowell 2007, pp. 351-2) 
The idea is that we choose our truth-theory precisely because it allows us 
to make the transitions from the phatic things done to the rhetic things 
done when a speaker produces their utterance.  What this does is allow 
for one who knew the theory to be able to discern what rhetic thing has 
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been done on the basis of the phatic thing that has been done—precisely 
because they will know that it is theory serving that purpose.  Because of 
this, such knowledge licences conclusions about what, in uttering what 
they did, the speaker said on the basis of the words they produced, in the 
manner of construction, in those circumstances.   
There is, I think, an aﬃliation, and an instructive parallel, between the 
approach favoured by McDowell and a response to the worry about how 
to fill the lacuna left by the Davidsonian approach that is provided by 
James Higginbotham.  The lacuna that needed to be filled was for the 
theory to say how it is that a truth theory could at one and the same time 
be a meaning theory.  Higginbotham provided the following suggestion: 
To a first approximation, the meaning of an expression is what 
your are expected, simply as a speaker, to know about its reference. 
As a speaker of English, you are expected, for example, to know 
that ‘snow is white’ is true if and only if snow is white; to that 
‘snow’ refers to snow, and that ‘is white’ is true of just the white 
things; and to know quite generally that the result of combining a 
singular term noun phrase with a predicate in the form of an 
intransitive adjective is true just in case the predicate is true of the 
reference of the term.  If, and only if, you know these things do 
you know that the sentence ‘snow is white’ means that snow is 
white. 
(Higginbotham 1992, p. 5) 
The task that Davidson faced was to show how it is that knowledge of 
truth-conditions, as specified by a suitably constrained Tarskian truth-
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theory, could suﬃce for knowing what one who understands an utterance 
knows.  The problem is that one could know such a theory, without 
knowing the meaning of any of the expressions that it treats (i.e. what 
utterances of those expressions say).   This problem will, then, equally 
aﬀect the truth-conditional form of cognitive semantics which tries to 
provide a meaning theory by specifying what it is that those who 
understand utterances know.  The thought we get from Higginbotham is 
that by qualifying the knowledge that one attributes to those who 
understand the utterances to that knowledge that one is expected to have 
simply as a speaker of the language (concerning the conditions under 
which an utterance of that sentence is true), we close the gap between 
knowledge of truth-conditions and knowledge of what’s said.  As Rumfitt 
emphasises, 
[T]he paranthetical qualifier ‘simply as a speaker’ is essential. 
Someone who knows what snow is at all may be expected to know 
that it is white.  In particular an ordinary speaker of English may 
be expected to know this.  Since, as Higginbotham says, he may 
also be expected to know that “snow is white” is true if and only if 
snow is white, he may further be expected to know that “snow is 
white” is true.  But it is surely not part of the meaning of “snow is 
white” that it is true. 
(Rumfitt 2005, p. 446) 
The point is that we need the qualifier ‘simply as a speaker’ in order to 
isolate the knowledge concerning the conditions for truth and falsity that 
is relevant to our understanding. Absent the qualifier, we pick out 
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knowledge that is irrelevant to one’s understanding any given utterance 
of the sentence “snow is white”. 
In both McDowell and Higginbotham, then, the idea is to restrict the 
propositions about the truth-conditions of the utterance to those that are 
relevant to understanding the utterance, but stipulating that it is 
propositions of that character that are being provided.   Just as McDowell 
relies on the stipulation that the truth-theory whose theorems can fill the 
lacuna in the specifications of meaning is interpretive, Higginbotham 
stipulates that the knowledge of truth conditions one needs for achieving 
the requisite level of understanding is knowledge one comes to possess 
about them simply by being a speaker of the language of the sentences 
which are uttered.  That is, the knowledge that one comes to possess by 
virtue of one’s being capable of understanding the utterance. 
What are we to make of this?  With regards to Higginbotham’s proposal, 
at any rate, Rumfitt concedes that, “while this claim is surely true, it 
throws little light on the nature of rhetic understanding” (ibid.).  The 
concession of truth is not, it seems, a major one.  The thought seems to 
be that, claims of this kind cannot really be rejected, since they say 
something that is close to truistic.  But once we retreat to the truistic 
statements, it is unclear what contribution is now being made to the 
explanatory project that such statements were employed in the service of. 
So if there is more to be explaining to be done here, then we must be 
able to say something more than what McDowell and Higginbotham have 
provided us.  To see what else there might be to say, and what 
explanatory significance it might be thought to have, I’ll take a brief 
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diversion through a complaint that Dummett has made about truth-
conditional accounts that is in the same spirit of the comment here made 
by Rumfitt.   
V. 
Circularity 
Rumfitt’s complaint against Higginbotham can be seen as a more general 
worry for the kinds of truth-conditional cognitive semantical approaches 
that I’ve been discussing.  In one sense, circularity is quite blatantly 
abroad, since what speakers are doing—centrally, their saying things—is 
meant to be explained by appeal to what those who understand the 
utterances in which they do this know.  But when that knowledge is said 
to be of truth-conditions, to isolate the relevant knowledge about them, 
we need to appeal to what they know, simply by virtue of knowing what 
it is that the speaker is saying.   
Michael Dummett recently raised an objection against truth-conditional 
forms of cognitive semantics that, I think, in its essentials, is the same 
complaint that Rumfitt makes against Higginbotham.  It occurs in a 
response to some criticisms that McDowell has of a diﬀerent problem 
that Dummett thought he saw in the truth-conditional approach—again, 
one that locates in such an approach a vicious circularity, but of a slightly 
diﬀerent character.   
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V. a. 
Dummett’s Complaint 
Dummett had originally complained that, to the question of what 
understanding consists in, truth-conditional approaches provide only 
specifications of propositional knowledge (see, for example, Dummett 
1998).  That is, to the question: “in what does understanding (an 
utterance of ) a sentence consist?”, the truth conditional approach returns 
the answer, “it consists in knowledge that …” (where the gap is filled by 
some proposition—one that suitably characterises the truth-condition of 
the (utterance of ) the sentence in question).  The issue here is not so 
much what fills the gap (as has been my primary concern in this 
chapter), but that the truth-conditional approach thinks that this is the 
gap that needs filling.  What Dummett thinks is needed is an attribution 
of some kind of practical knowledge, ‘knowledge-how’ or capacities, in 
addition to whatever propositional knowledge is required to account for 
linguistic competence.   In the absence of the account providing such 95
information it must rely on the idea that what the knowledge that one 
who understands an utterance possesses consists in, is their knowing that 
it is true under certain conditions, where grasp of what those conditions 
are already requires knowing what is said in the course of the utterance. 
As a result, the attributions of propositional knowledge that the truth-
conditional account provide, according to Dummett, “beg the question 
spectacularly” (2007, p. 371).  It is, for Dummett, an appeal to 
knowledge, the very possession of which is being attributed to one who 
achieves rhetic understanding; in other words, it is an attempted 
 This is, at any rate, the position that Dummett occupies from his (1993d) onwards.95
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explanation of something by way of an appeal to the very thing to be 
explained.  
McDowell responds to this complaint by locating something that a 
theory of the kind he favours does says of practitioners of the practice of 
language use what they are able to do—namely, express thoughts:  
[Dummett’s] argument starts from the claim that a truth-
conditional conception of meaning cannot equate understanding a 
sentence with being able to do anything. […] But […] the claim is 
false. [U]nderstanding a sentence can be equated with being able to 
use it to express a thought—the thought it is enabled to express, 
given the way the language works, by the expressions that compose 
the sentence and how they are put together. 
(McDowell 2007, p. 356) 
Since understanding an utterance of a sentence is, in part, to be able to 
use that sentence to express a thought, truth-conditional accounts do say 
something about what those who understand the language are able to do. 
Accordingly, the truth-conditional theorist need not rely on purely 
propositional knowledge in setting out what one who understands 
utterances knows.  McDowell thinks that the appeal to such a capacity 
provides all the is needed to falsify this accusation of circularity.  
It is Dummett’s response to this retort that I’m interested in.  Dummett 
thinks that what McDowell has really done here is make perspicuous how 
tight the circle is.  Since (1) what understanding an utterance of an 
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indicative sentence is said to consist in is one’s being capable of 
‘expressing a thought’ with it, and (2) since what it is to express a 
thought with an indicative sentence is to utter the sentence knowing 
what it can be used to say, then (3) what understanding an (utterance of ) 
a sentence consists in is knowing what it has been used to say.  If what is 
said in uttering something was meant to be elucidated by appeal to what 
those who understand such utterances know, then the claim is, in eﬀect, 
that what is said in uttering something is what one who knows what is 
said knows.  Dummett remarks that “this is not the circle to which I was 
originally referring, but it shows just as well how truth-conditional 
theorists argue” (2007, p. 370). 
Dummett’s own reaction to this is to make some prodigious demands on 
cognitive semantical approaches, allowing very few conceptual resources 
to be employed in the metalanguage, in setting out what it is that 
speakers do in course of their uttering things.  But I’m going to avoid 
entering into a discussion here of Dummett’s own views on this point 
because what is interesting, at least from my point of view, is that, for all 
the similarities in the complaints the Dummett and Rumfitt raise, 
Rumfitt’s proposal doesn’t seem to move us any further in the 
explanatory project, if such a project is to be advanced by non-circular 
accounts of meaning (saying) and understanding.  And that is despite the 
fact that what Rumfitt provides us with is a characterisation of a capacity 
that is supposed to say in what our understanding utterances consists. 
What, then, if any thing, does Rumfitt’s account provide that the truth-
conditional accounts cannot? 
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V. b.  
Circular Explanation 
If theories of truth can be employed in theories of locution then what 
they do is allow one to specify what rhetic things a speaker does on the 
basis of the phatic things that they do.  Since, or so I’ve argued, the rhetic 
things that we do are tied to the rhetic intentions that accompany our 
performing our phatic acts, such specifications should allow for one to 
provide a description from which a speaker’s rhetic intentions—their 
intentions to say such-and-such, in the indicative cases—can be derived. 
The manner in which the truth-conditional theorists, as I have 
represented them, attempt to do this, is by relying on the notion of an 
interpretive truth theory—namely, one that is suited to capturing what 
the speaker is saying.  By then stipulating that understanding consists in 
one’s possessing knowledge equivalent to one's knowing the theorems of 
an interpretive truth-theory, and knowing that it is interpretative—i.e. to 
know what one is expected to know, simply by virtue of understanding 
the utterance, about its conditions for truth and falsity—they secure the 
connection between knowledge of truth conditions and knowledge of 
what’s said. 
What Rumfitt’s proposal can provide further information on is the basis 
upon which one is expected to know what one does about the conditions 
under which an utterance is true, simply by virtue of understanding it. 
Being capable of making the kinds of inferences that he isolates is what 
one is expected of one, simply by virtue of understanding the utterance. 
When one enjoys rhetic understanding of such an utterance, one is 
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expected to know what one does about its conditions for truth and falsity 
because there is an expectation that the speaker has, one met by one’s 
being capable of making the quasi-inferences at the heart of Rumfitt’s 
proposal.  That is, one’s being capable of (quasi-)inferring p from u is 
true, u is true from p, ¬p from u is false, and u is false from ¬p, is what 
explains why it is interpretive truth theories that serve to capture what a 
speaker is saying, when they produce an utterance to that end.  
The appeal to the schematic ‘p’ keeps us in Dummett’s circle.  That 
stands in place for what would usually be thought of as the content of 
the utterance, or the thought that it is used to express.  There is a further 
question to be asked, namely, why does one who achieves rhetic 
understanding of an utterance possess that inferential capacity, as 
opposed to any other?  That is, what explains the fact that one who 
understands an utterance, u, of a speaker in which they say that p, is 
capable of inferring p (rather than q) from the premise that u is true? 
The answer that might be returned is that it is that one, as opposed to 
any other, because that is what the speaker said.  Then, of course the 
circle has been closed again, because, when we try to explain what it is 
for a speaker to have said that p, we are relying on the idea that one who 
understands the utterance with which they do this, and that appeals to a 
capacity to infer precisely that things are as the speaker says them to be, 
from the premise that they have uttered truth (amongst the other things). 
But circles are only a problem when they are vicious, and, one might 
suppose, the circle that is created by truth-conditional accounts is not 
vicious.  That conclusion is borne out by the fact that the straight truth-
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conditional approach is already able to boast of being capable of 
explaining the productivity that we display in our speech and 
understanding.  By committing to the fact that the theory reflects the 
cognition of those capable of understanding the utterances, the view can 
allow for the compositional nature of the theory to serve the purpose it is 
ideally suited for—namely, showing how it is that we are capable of 
speaking and understanding a potential infinity of distinct sentences 
(used to do an indefinite number of things), from a finite stock of 
meaningful words and modes of combination of those words (something 
that, we saw, Davidson was unable to do).  96
That suﬃces to show that some explanatory resources are provided, even 
if the account is circular at the point of specifying what’s said in the 
course of a performance of given utterance of an indicative sentence 
(with which the speaker says something).  The question is whether 
Rumfitt’s proposal provides anything which the truth-conditional 
account does not.   
What more might be gleaned from Rumfitt’s proposal, I think, is 
something I have already gestured at, and can be brought out when we 
reconsider the Foster problems that beset Davidson’s account.  The 
McDowell/Higginbotham strategy for dealing with such problems is to 
retain the idea that truth-theories can be employed, but concede that 
truth-conditional accounts alone cannot provide what Foster showed is 
 The usual tactic is to appeal to something like ‘tacit knowledge’.  This is a notion 96
that is often treated with not inconsiderablele disregard, though, a plausible 
psychological explanation of what such attributions might come to can be found in 
Peacocke (1986) and Davies (1987).  
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missing.  They then simply stipulate possession of the knowledge that is 
required for what is missing to be supplied.  Rumfitt’s response, on the 
other hand, is to locate what it is that missing from such accounts—that 
is, he locates what such stipulations provide us with, beyond what is 
provided by the interpretive truth-theories themselves—and tie 
understanding to that missing component.  This is an important shift in 
emphasis, and provides added explanation of what it is to perform given 
acts with one’s utterances.   
What Rumfitt gives us is a statement of what it is about the truth and 
falsity of an utterance, with which a speaker says something, that we are 
expected to know, simply by virtue of understanding it.  For any 
proposition that we choose, unless knowledge of that proposition results 
in one’s being capable of making the kinds of quasi-inferences that 
concern Rumfitt, possessing that knowledge cannot be what 
understanding that utterance consists in.  What that goes to show, is 
precisely that what our understanding consists in is our capacity to make 
inferences of the kind that Rumfitt isolates.  In other words, it is in virtue 
of this that his proposal can be employed to explain is why it is that what 
is stated by an interpretive truth-theory, on its own, is not what one 
knows in understanding an utterance with which something is said by a 
speaker. 
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VI. 
Conclusion 
I have take myself to have shown that Rumfitt’s proposal can provide 
explanation of what it is to understand others’ utterances where its rivals 
cannot.  Though a certain circularity remains in what we have ended up 
with, I hope to have borne out to some degree something that David 
Wiggins says, (actually in connection with an employment of truth-
theories in the style of McDowell) when he says that “simple circularity 
as such is not inimical to philosophical enlightenment” (Wiggins 1992, 
p. 75).  With this observation, together with a reminder that the 
approach serves to underpin a central way in which, I have argued, we 
acquire knowledge from what others tell us, I conclude my defence of the 
conception of rhetic understanding that Rumfitt’s proposal provides. 
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Conclusion 
In Chapter 1 I argued that we should accept that there is such a thing as 
irreducibly testimonial knowledge; that is, a kind of knowledge that one 
can acquire from a knowledgable source, even when one does not have a 
conclusive inductive argument for the belief that the speaker uttered 
truth.  I showed that views that agree that we can acquire knowledge of 
this kind from what others tell us tend to accept what I called ‘the 
enabling principle’.  This principle says that one must have a suﬃciently 
epistemically supported belief that the speaker uttered truth in order for 
one to acquire the knowledge that a speaker can make available by 
speaking knowledgeably.  I tried to show that the enabling principle is 
strictly optional; given the epistemic dependences that non-reductionism 
as such is committed to, further argument is needed to show that there 
are restrictions on our acquiring testimonial knowledge beyond whether 
knowledge has been present at some appropriate point in the testimonial 
chain.  The absence of such an argument opens up the possibility that 
there are no restrictions of the kind imposed by the enabling principle on 
when we can acquire irreducibly testimonial knowledge. 
In Chapter 2 I presented my own account of how it is that we can 
acquire knowledge from others that is not restricted by a substantive 
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enabling principle.  I said that a speaker makes available irreducibly 
testimonial knowledge to their audience by voicing knowledge.   One 
voices knowledge that p when knowledge that p (one’s own, or another’s) 
contributes in the required way in a causal explanation of why one 
produced one’s utterance.  I defended the claim that, so long as a speaker 
in fact voices knowledge that p, then their audience can come to know 
that p by believing the speaker, regardless of what reasons they initially 
had to think that the speaker uttered truth or falsity.  I motivated this by 
critiquing Richard Moran’s epistemology of testimony.  I considered 
some possible objections, and oﬀered some possible responses. 
In Chapter 3 I showed that the causal explanation of a speaker’s linguistic 
behaviour will also appeal to expectations that the speaker has of their 
audience; expectations that they will have understood what speaker has 
done in so speaking.  Employing a framework given to us by Austin 
about what sorts of things we do in speaking, I gave an interpretation, 
modelled on the one given to us by Jennifer Hornsby, of what kinds of 
things his classifications pick out.  I conceived of utterance 
understanding in terms of audiences meeting these expectations, where 
rhetic understanding is what is required for the primary requirement of 
success in our communicative endeavours to be met.  One achieves rhetic 
understanding by recognising what rhetic thing the speaker thereby 
means to be doing.  This means that rhetic acts are the basic 
communicative acts.   
In Chapter 4 I defended Ian Rumfitt’s proposal about what it is to 
achieve rhetic understanding, which conceives of it as a state of 
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possessing capacities to make inferences specific to the kinds of acts that 
speakers’ (mean to) perform with their utterances.  I responded to an 
objection that Guy Longworth has raised, showing how the account can 
accommodate the fact that rhetic understanding provides one with the 
capacity to make judgements about what is said in such a way that it 
does not require prior non-rational acceptance or rejection that things are 
the way the speaker says them to be.  I ended by showing how it is that 
Rumfitt’s proposal can sustain the epistemology of testimony that I 
defended in Chapter 2. 
Finally, in Chapter 5, by applying this picture of understanding to some 
historic debates in which the notion has featured, I have highlighted its 
explanatory advantages over some rivals.  In particular, I showed that 
what Rumfitt’s proposal provides, where its rivals cannot, is an 
explanation of why it is that knowledge of interpretive truth-theories is 
insuﬃcient for understanding what rhetic things speakers are doing with 
their utterances.    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